Preamble

The House met at a Quarter before Three of the Clock, Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair.

PRIVATE BUSINESS.

Railways (North Western and Midland Group) Bill (by Order),

Second Reading deferred till Friday, 31st March.

RAILWAYS (WEST SCOTTISH GROUP) BILL,

"to empower the Caledonian and Glasgow and South Western and the Highland Railway Companies to provide and use road vehicles, and for other purposes," presented, and read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDERS (LEEDS AND BRADFORD EXTENSION) BILL,

"to confirm certain Provisional Orders of the Minister of Health relating to Leeds and Bradford," presented by Sir ALFRED MOND; read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 53.]

MINISTRY OF HEALTH PROVISIONAL ORDER (NO. 1) BILL,

"to confirm a Provisional Order of the Minister of Health relating to Doncaster," presented by Sir ALFRED MOND; read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills, and to be printed. [Bill 54.]

Oral Answers to Questions — NAVAL AND MILITARY PENSIONS AND GRANTS.

APPEALS TRIBUNALS.

Mr. T. GRIFFITHS: 1.
asked the Minister of Pensions the number of appeals that have been dealt with by the Cardiff
Appeals Tribunal during the last 12 months, and the number that have been successful?

Mr. ACLAND: 2.
asked the Minister of Pensions whether he can give a return of the percentage of cases allowed and refused by the Pensions Appeal Tribunal, No. 19, which has lately been sitting at Exeter, during their work there in comparison with similar figures for other tribunals which have sat at Exeter and with the average figures for the country?

Sir R. NEWMAN: 3.
asked the Minister of Pensions what number of appeal cases have been granted and refused by the Pensions Appeal Tribunal, No. 19, since its constitution and during its recent sittings at Exeter; and whether he can give comparative figures for other tribunals for the same or similar periods?

Mr. BROMFIELD: 4 and 5.
asked the Minister of Pensions (1) the total number of officers who have made appeals to the Pensions Appeal Tribunals; the number of appeals that have been successful;
(2) the total number of ex-service noncommissioned officers and men who have made appeals to the Pensions Appeal Tribunals; and the number of appeals that have been successful?

The ATTORNEY - GENERAL (Sir Ernest Pollock): I have been asked to reply. As these questions raise the same point, I will answer them together. I cannot undertake to give the figures asked for. I refer the hon. Members to my answer to the hon. Member for Workington given on Tuesday last. A comparison of the number of cases that succeed or fail before one tribunal with the number that succeed or fail before another tribunal, with the consequent percentages of their relation to each other is to be deprecated, as I pointed out in my speech to the House on Thursday last upon the Supplementary Vote. There is no numerical standard to which a judicial tribunal ought to conform on hearing appeals. Their duty is to hear the evidence and decide accordingly in each case that comes before them.

Mr. J. GUEST: 17.
asked the Minister of Pensions if he is aware that many ex-service men are, when called upon to
appear before the Appeals Tribunal, in a state of health which prevents them doing justice to their case, and that in some cases they are unable to attend; and if he will undertake to make some financial provision in order that a reasonable fee may be paid to the local doctor, who usually has had the case in hand, or some other person selected by the person appealing, and whose knowledge of the case will assist the tribunal in arriving at an equitable decision?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY of PENSIONS (Major Tryon): I understand that provision is made in the Regulations of the pensions appeal tribunals for the hearing of a case to be adjourned if the appellant is unable owing to illness to appear; and if he is likely to be unable to do so for an indefinite time, one or two representatives are appointed by the chairman to visit the appellant and take down his evidence. The tribunal already has power, where any difficult medical or surgical question arises, to obtain a report from a specialist.

HOSPITAL TREATMENT, LONDON.

Mr. GILBERT: 6.
asked the Minister of Pensions how many hospitals and treatment centres his Department are still maintaining in the County of London; where they are situated; how many men are still under treatment, by orders of his Department, at hospitals and centres in London; and if there is any immediate prospect of closing down any of the same?

Major TRYON: There are five hospitals and nine special medical clinics maintained by and under the direct control of the Ministry within the area of the administrative County of London, of which I am circulating particulars in the OFFICIAL REPORT. In addition, the Ministry is making use of some 50 civil hospitals and treatment centres at an agreed charge for each patient. The number at present receiving treatment at these institutions is approximately 21,000. I am afraid that there is no immediate prospect of closing down any of the institutions under the control of the Ministry in the London County area, though that possibility is constantly kept in view.

The following is the statement:

(1) Addresses of Ministry of Pensions Hospitals.

Church Lane, Tooting.
Ducane Road, Shepherd's Bush.
Lonsdale House, Clapham Park.
Ruskin Park, Denmark Hill.
"Fernbank," Roehampton.

(2) Addresses of Ministry of Pensions Special Medical Clinics.

Cheltenham Terrace, King's Road, Chelsea.
92, Dalston Lane, Hackney.
St. Paul's Schools, Queen Street, Hammershith.
12a, Lyndhurst Road, Hampstead.
Regent Street Polytechnic, 14, Langham Place, Regent Street.
6, Hatherley Grove, Paddington.
11, Palace Green, W. 1.
The Hut, Morpeth Terrace.
28, Nightingale Place, Woolwich.

OFFICERS' CHILDREN (ASSISTANCE).

Mr. STEWART: 7.
asked the Ministry of Pensions whether the Officers' Friends Branch of the Ministry of Pensions, being satisfied that assistance is necessary for the maintenance and education of an officer's children, are unable to make any grant before the officer makes a return of his financial position; whether this is the case if the officer has deserted his wife and the children are in the custody of the wife, and the officer refuses to make any such return; and whether, in any such case, the Ministry of Pensions would withhold the personal pension payable to such officer until he made the necessary return to the officers' friends branch?

Major TRYON: I may explain that in no circumstances is the Officers' Friend Branch empowered to make grants: the function of that branch is to inform and advise officers as to their rights under the Regulations of the Ministry. My right hon. Friend has no power to withhold payment of retired pay in the circumstances stated. Grants under the Regulations of the Special Grants Committee to assist a disabled officer to maintain and educate his children are subject to his being in need and to other conditions, and can only be granted on the officer's application. In the particular case which I understand my hon. Friend has in mind
it is impossible to decide whether the conditions are satisfied in the absence of information from the officer.

Mr. STEWART: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this lady has an Order from the High Court for £120 a year alimony, and has never been able to get anything at all, and cannot something be taken from the pension?

Major TRYON: I am aware of the difficulty and sympathise very much with my hon. Friend's point of view, but the fact is, this officer's pension is a statutory right and we have not got power to stop it.

ORTHOPÆDIC HOSPITAL, SHEPHERD'S BUSH.

Mr. PENNEFATHER: 8
asked the Minister of Pensions (1) whether the surgical staff of the Ministry of Pensions Hospital at Ducane Street, Shepherd's Bush, have expressed the opinion that the removal of the patients therein to huts would be detrimental to the patients; whether he proposes to ignore that opinion in the interests of economy; what net saving would be effected in the treatment of the same number of men by the removal to huts;
(2) how much money has been spent in fitting up and adding to the Ducane Street Hospital for wounded men, including the cost of the operating theatres, massage and electrical departments, and gymnasium; what arrangements, if any, in regard to security of tenure were entered into with the guardians before this money was spent upon the premises;
(3) if his attention has been drawn to an appeal published on behalf of the wounded patients at the Ministry of Pensions Hospital, Ducane Road, Shepherd's Bush, urging that that admirably situated, fitted, and organised hospital, containing some 600 inmates, and treating some 2,000 out-patients weekly, should not be closed on 31st March next, as proposed, and pointing out that any saving effected by the transfer of the patients to hutments would be effected at the expense of and to the detriment of the wounded men; and will he take immediate steps to cancel the proposed arrangements, and maintain this hospital where it is and in its present state of efficiency?

Major TRYON: With my hon. Friend's permission I will take these questions together. I refer him to the answer given
in this House on 15th, 16th and 23rd February to the hon. Members for Islington, Tonbridge and Bethnal Green. Arrangements have been made for a conference to be held to-morrow between representatives of the guardians and the Ministry.

Mr. PENNEFATHER: In view of the fact that a conference is to be held tomorrow, will the hon. Gentleman permit me to put down a question on the subject early next week, in order not to interfere with the conference?

Major TRYON: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend. I shall be very glad if he will put down a question for next week.

REASSESSMENTS (STATISTICS).

Mr. HURD: 11.
asked the Minister of Pensions if he will present to the House statistics showing the result of the re-assessment of pensions during the past year, that is to say, the number of pensions made permanent, the number in which pensions have been increased, and the number in which they have been decreased, and to what extent?

Major TRYON: During the last year the number of pensions made permanent as the result of reassessment was 13,500. Of the cases reassessed—


76,000
 were raised.


441,000
were not altered.


349,000
were lowered.


The general reduction in average assessment was 4.4 per cent., and is due mainly to improvement in the condition of men suffering from minor disabilities.

SPECIAL GRANTS COMMITTEE.

Mr. STEWART: 12.
asked the Minister of Pensions whether he is aware that dissatisfaction exists throughout the country as to the work of the Special Grants Committee regarding the cases of children of deceased soldiers; and whether he will cause inquiries to be made from local war pensions committees as to the grounds of complaint and the unsatisfactory method of administering the care of these children?

Major TRYON: I am not aware of any general complaint. I understand that my hon. Friend has in mind three individual cases, into which I am having inquiries made.

ENTITLEMENT CASES.

Mr. J. GUEST: 15.
asked the Minister of Pensions if he will give the status and qualification of the officers of the Ministry who decide upon questions of entitlement to pension; whether the decisions arrived at are given after consideration of the case by one official only, or by two or more officials giving joint consideration; and whether any hon. Members of this House are called in to assist in this work?

Major TRYON: Every decision on entitlement represents the result of consideration by at least two specially selected officers, one of whom is a medical man. Cases presenting features of doubt or difficulty are submitted to headquarters for consideration by the Director - General of Awards. The Director-General of Awards occasionally avails himself of the technical military knowledge of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Skipton (Lieut.-Colonel Roundell), but the latter is in no sense responsible for any decision reached.

Mr. GUEST: Do these medical men, or the officials dealing with the cases, attach to the medical papers of the man, which are sent forward to the Appeals Tibunal, a reasoned statement supporting the conclusions they have arrived at, and is this treated as private and confidential, and kept away from the knowledge of the man when the appeal is heard?

Major TRYON: The position is this: If any man is not satisfied with the result of his entitlement decision, he is entitled to appeal to the independent Appeals Tribunal. He then submits the case again, and instructions are given to our local committees to afford him every assistance. We then consider the case again, because fresh evidence may be submitted by the man, and in a great many cases we grant pension, because the new evidence enables us to do so, but if not the case goes on, without any attempt to prejudice the case in any way, to the further tribunal. We do everything we can to help. As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Skipton has been alluded to in the question just put, I hope I may be allowed to say—and I trust the House will agree with me—that the hon. and gallant Member, as my Parliamentary private secretary, has done his very best to help members of all parties who come to
him in reference to pension questions. He is able to make that help more valuable by keeping himself, as he does, in personal touch, not only with the matter of entitlement, dealt with in this question, but with the actual work of other branches of the Ministry.

Mr. GUEST: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that I have as much respect for the hon. and gallant Member for Skipton as he has and that I have in no way reflected on the hon. and gallant Member's integrity in regard to this question? May I ask for a definite answer to my question, whether papers are attached to the man's medical history when it is sent to the Appeals Tribunal, which are not open to the man's knowledge?

Major TRYON: I do not wish in any sense to avoid a definite answer, but I would be glad if my hon. Friend would put that question down. Our whole attitude is that we have no wish to prejudice the findings of the tribunal in any way, and we make all arrangements to have all the available information placed at their disposal. May I add that I quite realise that my hon. Friend was not in any way attacking the hon. and gallant Member for Skipton. I was simply showing how it came to pass that the hon. and gallant Member was taking part in this and other branches of the work of the Ministry.

Sir J. BUTCHER: Will the hon. Gentleman take steps to ensure that the men are informed, if they have got fresh evidence to bring before the Appeals Tribunal, that they are entitled to do so?

Major TRYON: Yes. I entirely agree with my hon. and learned Friend. The whole knowledge is made available, and very often cases are granted, if new evidence enables us to do so, without going to the Appeals Tribunal at all.

Mr. GUEST: 16.
asked the Minister of Pensions the number of entitlement cases of ex-service men dealt with by the Ministry during the 12 months ending 31st January, 1922, together with the number of such cases dealt with in which the Ministry decided that entitlement was not proven?

Major TRYON: During the year ending 31st January, 1922, approximately 72,500 first applications for disablement
pension have been dealt with, and in about 17,500 of these entitlement was not admitted.

CANADIAN CATTLE EMBARGO.

Mr. W. SHAW: 18.
asked the Chief Secretary for Ireland the total sum expended by the Irish Department of Agriculture in connection with the Finlay Royal Commission on the Importation of Cattle; and whether such sum includes the expenses of their witnesses?

The CHIEF SECRETARY for IRELAND (Sir Hamar Greenwood): In regard to the first portion of the question, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply upon this subject given on 22nd February to the hon. and gallant Member for Central Aberdeen. The reply to the concluding portion of the question is in the negative. Three officers of the Department gave evidence before the Commission, and the comparatively small expense in connection with their attendance in London covered other business besides that of the Royal Commission.

Captain W. BENN: Are we to understand that one Government Department spent public money opposing a decision which the Government itself enforced, and is that Cabinet responsibility?

Sir H. GREENWOOD: There was no Government money spent in this particular matter. The hon. and gallant Gentleman has misunderstood me.

Major MACKENZIE WOOD: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that the Irish Department opposed, and the Scottish Department supported, the suggestion that the embargo should be removed?

Captain BENN: Civil war!

Mr. WILLIAM SHAW: 60.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the Government's refusal to adopt the recommendations of the Findlay Royal Commission, and to raise the embargo on Canadian cattle, has been officially notified to the Dominion Government; and whether or not any communication has been received from the Dominion Government regarding this matter?

The SECRETARY of STATE for the COLONIES (Mr. Churchill): The reply to
the first part of the question is in the negative. As to the second, I would refer to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Agriculture on 13th March to a question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Montrose Burghs.

Mr. SHAW: Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether or not the pledge given to Canada at the Imperial Conference of 1917 still holds good?

Mr. CHURCHILL: That does not arise out of the question.

Sir A. WILLIAMSON: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the action of the Government in for long postponing consideration of this question and at length appointing a Royal Commission and then acting contrary to its recommendations has undermined confidence in the sincerity of the Government and given grave offence in Canada?

Major M. WOOD: Would the right hon. Gentleman—

Mr. SPEAKER: We have a speech every time this question comes up.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE.

AEROPLANE SQUADRONS.

Mr. RAPER: 21.
asked the Secretary of State for Air how many effective squadrons of aeroplanes are owned by, respectively, Great Britain and France, stating how many effective machines and pilots are calculated per squadron; and, so far as Great Britain is concerned, how many of these effective squadrons are at present stationed in this country for home defence?

The SECRETARY of STATE for AIR (Captain Guest): As regards the first part of the question, the differences in organisation of the Air Services of Great Britain and France make it impossible to supply, within the limits of a parliamentary answer, comparative figures which would be of any value. The present strength of the Royal Air Force, in terms of active units, is 32 squadrons, of which the number stationed in England for all purposes is 12. I would ask the hon. Member to wait for my speech on Air
Force Estimates, in which I hope to be able to deal briefly with the question of home defence.

Mr. RAPER: Is the House to understand that the right hon. Gentleman is unable to give any figures in regard to the strength of the French Air Service?

Captain GUEST: No. I am able to do so, but I could not do so in a form which would be of any value to the House in reply to a question.

Mr. RAPER: Will the right hon. Gentleman issue a published statement?

Captain GUEST: I will make a statement on Monday next.

EX-PILOTS (PRACTICE).

Mr. RAPER: 22.
asked the Secretary of State for Air if he can now see his way to grant to ex-Air Force pilots the same facilities as are accorded both in France and the United States to enable those who desire keeping in practice, so far as the actual flying of machines is concerned, thereby maintaining at a minimum expense a most useful type of Reserve?

Captain GUEST: The regulations for the Air Force Reserve, when they become operative, will provide for periodical flying practice by officers belonging to it. But, as my hon. Friend has previously been informed, I do not think that provision from public funds of free facilities for flying could be justified in the case of persons who have no Reserve liability.

AIR ATTACHÉS, FRANCE.

Mr. RAPER: 23.
asked the Secretary of State for Air whether France has decided to withdraw her Air Attachés?

Captain GUEST: I am not aware of any general withdrawal by France of her Air Attachés, but their number has been recently reduced from seven to four.

Mr. RAPER: Will my right hon. Friend inquire if it is not a fact that France has withdrawn her Air Attachés, and, if that is so, will he then agree to withdraw our Air Attachés?

Captain GUEST: No. The facts do not bear out the suggestion of the hon. Member. The number reduced by the French Government is from seven to four, but one in London still remains.

Oral Answers to Questions — RUSSIA.

REFUGEES (REPATRIATION).

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: 24.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government is seeking to renew negotiations with the Russian Government with a view to an amnesty for and the repatriation of the refugees of Russian nationality who are at present being supported by the British Treasury; and whether he will lay the previous correspondence on this subject upon the Table for the information of hon. Members?

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Cecil Harmsworth): His Majesty's Government will be prepared to renew negotiations if and when the Soviet Government show any disposition to grant an amnesty and admit the refugees under British control into Russia. It is not proposed to lay the correspondence on this subject on the Table of the House, especially as the Foreign Office letter of 31st October last to Monsieur Krassin, which dealt fully with this question, was communicated to the Press.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: As we are actually paying for these unfortunate people, ought we not to take the initiative in making another attempt to see if they can be otherwise disposed of?

Mr. HARMSWORTH: We shall carefully consider that, but our former approaches were not met in a very friendly spirit.

Lord ROBERT CECIL: Why does the Government not propose to lay the correspondence?

Mr. HARMSWORTH: I should like to examine the correspondence again myself, but I think there is a great deal of objection to the unnecessary multiplication of White Papers.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Does not the hon. Gentleman understand that it is to our interest that these repatriations should take place?

Mr. HARMSWORTH: I think I understand it a great deal better than any other Member of the House.

TRADE CREDITS.

Mr. MILLS: 30.
asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that relief credits
for Russia, and a trade credit scheme for Russia, were both urged in the memorandum submitted to the Government last December by the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour party, and that at the special conference convened by the same bodies on 24th November, on unemployment and foreign policy, immediate steps were urged to promote export to Russia as part of a policy to relieve our own unemployed and restart industries; that the chairman of the London Council of the Unemployed who headed a deputation, included trade with Russia as one of the principal demands of the unemployed; and whether the Government proposes to grant an immediate relief credit for the people in the Volga famine region with the two-fold purpose of relieving unemployment in Great Britain and investigating the horrors of famine in Russia?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (Leader of the House): I have seen the memorandum to which the hon. Member refers, but, pending the full discussion which is to take place on Friday, I can add nothing to the statement which I made on Thursday last on this subject.

Mr. MILLS: Do I understand that the question to-morrow will include the question of recognition?

BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE, MOSCOW.

Mr. MILLS: 49.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who is the British representative in Moscow; how many staff are employed; and what are their duties?

Mr. HARMSWORTH: The British representative in Moscow is Mr. R. N. Hodgson of the Commercial Diplomatic Service. He is assisted by seven officers, of whom one is in charge of passport, visa and similar matters, assistance to distressed British subjects, repatriation and questions of the kind which are dealt with by consular officers in the ordinary course of their duties. A second performs the ordinary duties falling upon a commercial secretary in the Commercial Diplomatic Service, and the other five act as assistants to the head of the Commercial Mission, and to these senior officials. There are, in addition, five persons in charge of clerical duties.

Mr. MILLS: Is it a fact that the gentleman appointed at the head of this Mission was in close touch, as chief of staff, with General Denikin?

Mr. SPEAKER: Notice should be given of that question.

TRADE AGREEMENT.

Mr. MILLS: 51.
asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the names of the gentlemen appointed to carry out the provisions of the Russian Trading Agreement; what has been the extent of their work; and how many provinces, if any, have been visited by them?

Mr. HARMSWORTH: This question ought to have been taken with others, as it contains a certain amount of repetition, for which I apologise. If I rightly understand the hon. Member to refer to Clause 5 of the Trade Agreement, the answer is that the names of the official agents sent to Moscow by His Majesty's Government are as follow:

Agent:

Mr. R. M. Hodgson, C.M.G.

Assistant Agents:

Mr. William Peters.
Mr. H. M. Grove.
Mr. Hugh Ledward.
Mr. P. Leigh Smith.
Major Charles Dunlop.
Mr. O. T. Rayner.
It is impossible to give an adequate idea of their work—which is of a very varied nature—within the limits of an answer to a Parliamentary question. The disorganisation of transport services in Russia would render extensive travelling by members of the Mission difficult, and for this reason the only two provinces visited up to the present, so far as I know, are Petrograd and Kharkoff.

Mr. MILLS: In view of the disorganised state of the vast continent of Russia, is the hon. Gentleman satisfied with the attempted researches of this delegation?

Mr. HARMSWORTH: As far as we are able to make them—certainly!

Oral Answers to Questions — EX-SERVICE MEN.

OFFICERS (EDUCATION).

Sir J. D. REES: 29.
asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the present bad trade and high taxes, he will consider the propriety of ending at once the education of 10,000 officers of the Army and Navy at the universities at the expense of the taxpayers, instead of allowing such expenditure to continue, as contemplated, till or even, after the year 1925–26?

The PRESIDENT of the BOARD of EDUCATION (Mr. Herbert Fisher): I have been asked to reply to this question. I presume the hon. Baronet refers to the scheme for the higher education of ex-service students. The Government do not propose to inflict on the students concerned the harship of withdrawing their grants and depriving them of the means of completing the courses for which the grants were awarded.

Sir J. D. REES: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I should have anticipated from him the answer he has given, and therefore addressed my question to the Prime Minister?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: If my hon. Friend desires the Prime Minister's answer, it has already been delivered by my right hon. Friend.

CASUAL LABOUR.

Mr. ERSKINE: 84.
asked the Minister of Labour what benefits an ex-service man man with a wife and five children under 14, and who is out of work, is entitled to; and what would his pay be if employed at casual labour in St. James's Park under the Office of Works?

The MINISTER of LABOUR (Dr. Macnamara): Provided that the conditions laid down by the Acts are fulfilled, the weekly rate of unemployment benefit and dependants' grants in the case mentioned by my hon. Friend would be 25s. As regards the second part of the question, I am informed by my right hon. Friend the First Commissioner of Works that the rate of pay for casual labour in St. James's Park, based on 75 per cent. of the rate for permanent employés in the Royal Parks, is approximately 37s. 6d. for a five-day week. If a man who is claiming "free" benefit
refused such work his case would be submitted at once to the local employment committee.

Mr. ERSKINE: Is it not a fact that a man who is said to earn 36s. per week when in work gets 45s. per week when out of work?

Dr. MACNAMARA: Not in unemployment benefit.

Oral Answers to Questions — IRELAND.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (LAND).

Colonel NEWMAN: 19.
asked the Chief Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to a statement recently made by a member of the Irish Provisional Government that his Government held at its disposal 60,000 acres of land which it contemplated distributing, or had already distributed, to those at present without land; will he say the total acreage of land recently acquired by the Provisional Government formerly the property of the British Government; and what representations does he propose to make to the Provisional Government with regard to the large area of land which has been seized by the orders of the Republican Government from the rightful owners and given to, or held in occupation by, adherents of the Republican cause?

Mr. CHURCHILL: In reply to the first part of the question, I understand from a newspaper report that at a meeting of Dail Eireann on the 1st instant an official of that body stated that the Dail Eireann Department of Agriculture had had at its disposal for about three years about 60,000 acres of land, and another speaker stated that this land represented purchases made by the National Land Bank In reply to the second part, no land formerly the property of the British Government has been acquired by the Provisional Government; but, as I have previously informed the House, land evacuated by the Crown forces has been handed over to that Government subject to valuation if they express a desire to acquire it. In reply to the third part of the question, if the hon. and gallant Member will supply me with particulars of any cases in which owners have been dispossessed of their land as alleged, I will undertake to bring them to the notice of the Provisional Government.

Colonel NEWMAN: As there are a great many of these cases, will the right hon. Gentleman consent to receive a deputation?

Mr. CHURCHILL: Certainly. If my hon. and gallant Friend will give me sufficient notice, I will gladly do so.

RATE COLLECTORS (COMPENSATION).

Sir JOHN BUTCHER: 61.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will state the result of the discussions with the Provisional Government as to the position of rate collectors in Ireland whose collection books were seized by the Irish Republican Army some two years ago, and who were thereby deprived of their fees and earnings; and what arrangements have been made for assessing their pensions or compensation on a fair and equitable basis?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I would refer the hon. and learned Member to the reply which I gave on the 13th instant to the hon. and gallant Member for Finchley.

Oral Answers to Questions — PEACE TREATIES.

CONFERENCES (GENOA AND PARIS).

Lieut-Commander KENWORTHY: 25.
asked the Prime Minister the names of the British delegates to the Genoa Conference and to the Conference in Paris on the Turkish Question and the Treaty of Sevres; and whether the date of 10th April remains the opening day of the Genoa Conference?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The British delegates to the Genoa Conference have not yet been finally settled, but they will include the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The answer to the second part of the question is the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The answer to the third part is in the affirmative.

Mr. L. MALONE: 32.
asked the Prime Minister which countries have been invited to send experts to consider economies and finance matters preliminary to the Genoa Conference; whether this Conference is to be held in London on Monday, 20th March; what are the names of the British experts; and who are the representatives of finance, industry, and labour?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The countries invited to send experts to the meeting in London, which is expected to begin on 20th March, are France, Italy, Belgium, and Japan. The British experts are Sir Sydney Chapman (Board of Trade), Mr. J. D. Gregory (Foreign Office), and Mr. R. G. Hawtrey (Treasury). The British Committee has been in continuous consultation with the various interests concerned.

Mr. CLYNES: 39.
asked the Prime Minister whether his personal attention has been drawn to the request of the Parliamentary Committee of the Cooperative Congress that representatives of the co-operative movement should be invited to attend the Genoa Conference in an advisory capacity; whether he is aware that the body in question is not asking for direct representation at the Conference but merely that persons connected with the co-operative movement in this country and fully conversant with the international activities of the cooperative societies should be present to give any advice desired on points which may arise; and whether, in view of the fact that representatives of co-operative societies in other countries will be present at Genoa, and that during the War tribute was paid to the valuable assistance rendered by the British co-operative societies, he will reconsider this matter and grant the request made by a movement which represents a very large section of the community, and which, by reason of its international connections, is in a position to render assistance in developing international trade?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The Prime Minister, while fully recognising the achievements of the co-operative movement, as at present advised, doubts the necessity of arranging for representatives of the movement to be in Genoa during the Conference. He is not yet aware of the arrangements being made by other countries generally, but it is obviously necessary to keep within reasonable limits the number of persons who should be asked to be available for immediate consultation, and it would clearly be impossible to provide for the presence of every organisation directly or indirectly concerned in the matters which will be under discussion.

AMERICAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: 34.
asked the Prime Minister whether the Government of the United States of America is putting forward a claim for the cost of the American army of occupation in Germany after the Armistice; what is the amount claimed; whether this claim will affect the proposed allocation or distribution of the indemnity payments made and to be made by Germany; and, if so, in what way?

The FINANCIAL SECRETARY to the TREASURY (Mr. Hilton Young): I would refer the hon. and gallant Member to the reply given to the question asked on this subject by the hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle - under - Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) yesterday.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Can the hon. Gentleman give an answer to the second part of my question, which was not answered yesterday, namely, as to what was the amount claimed by the American Government, and also to the third part of the question, which was not answered yesterday, as to the proposed alterations of allocation, if any?

Mr. YOUNG: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will glance at my answer yesterday, I think he will see it was impossible for me to answer those questions until the formal representations, to which I have referred, have been made by the United States Government.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Will the hon. Gentleman say whether we have made any representations to the United States for the withdrawal of this demand?

Mr. YOUNG: I should certainly be very sorry to answer that question myself without particular notice.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: May I ask the hon. Gentleman when he expects the official notification or note from the United States Government?

Mr. YOUNG: Of course, I could not say. It is a matter entirely for the United States Government.

REPARATION PAYMENTS.

Captain BENN: 42.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the consent of the American Government is required before any actual payments are made by the Reparations Commission to the Allies?

Mr. YOUNG: The answer is in the negative.

Captain BENN: May I ask whether the American Army remained on the Rhine at the request of the Allies?

Mr. YOUNG: I am afraid that these questions rather relate to a historical subject—

Captain BENN: Financial.

Mr. YOUNG: I should be very diffident about answering without some notice.

PALESTINE (JEWISH SETTLEMENT).

Captain Viscount CURZON: 26.
asked the Prime Minister whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to establish a national home for the Jews in Palestine; if so, whether, before such a decision was arrived at, the cost of such an undertaking received consideration; what is the direct cost to this country of such a policy to-day; and whether, in all the circumstances, this policy can be reconsidered in the interest of economy?

Mr. CHURCHILL: This question should be addressed to me. The reply to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. The policy of the Government, as the House is aware, was laid down in the letter addressed to Lord Rothschild in November, 1917, by my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council. The question of the grounds that led to the adoption of that policy is not one that can be dealt with by question and answer. I am not prepared to reconsider the policy that has been adopted. As regards the cost to this country, I would refer the Noble Lord to the Estimates submitted to the House.

Viscount CURZON: Is it not a fact that no fewer than 69 per cent. of the Zionists going into Palestine come from Russia or Poland, and why have we got to pay for them?

Mr. SPEAKER: That is pure repetition. We had an answer giving the percentages of admissions only a day or two ago.

IRAQ.

Viscount CURZON: 27.
asked the Prime Minister whether any Turkish concentration is taking place to the north of Iraq;
and, if so, if the matter is receiving the attention of His Majesty's Government?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The Noble Lord may rest assured that His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the aspect of the question to which he calls attention. I do not think that it would be in the public interest to make any further statement on the subject at the present juncture.

Sir J. D. REES: Where Arabian Iraq is meant, would it not be desirable to distinguish between them?

INDIA (REVOLUTIONARY AGITATORS).

Viscount CURZON: 28.
asked the Prime Minister whether he can make any announcement as to the arrest of revolutionary agitators in India?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I understand that it is intended to circulate a White Paper on this matter in the near future. As announced in the Press, Mr. Gandhi was arrested on the evening of the 10th March.

NAVY, ARMY AND AIR MEDICAL SERVICES.

Commander BELLAIRS: 31.
asked the Prime Minister what is the composition of the Committee which is considering the amalgamation of the Navy, Army and Air Medical Services and hospitals?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The composition of the Committee referred to has not yet been finally settled.

Commander BELLAIRS: Will the right hon. Gentleman take care that there is not an undue proportion of medical officers on that Committee who are interested in keeping up the present establishments?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Oh, yes.

Captain BENN: Will the terms of reference to the Committee be laid before the House in any form?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: As soon as the Committee is established, if the hon. and gallant Gentleman will put a question to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Health he will give him the terms of reference.

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

Mr. L. MALONE: 33.
asked the Prime Minister when the Nine-Power Treaty, the Four-Power Treaty, the Chinese Customs Treaty, and the other Regulations and Agreements concluded at Washington will be laid before this House; whether he is aware that these matters are already being discussed by the United States Senate; and why His Majesty's Government delay to present these Agreements to the British people?

Mr. HARMSWORTH: The documents relating to the Conference are in the printers' hands, and I hope to be able to lay them before Parliament shortly.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES' RETURNS (FEES).

Mr. HURD: 37.
asked the Prime Minister if he has received protests from friendly societies against the proposal of the Geddes Committee that 10s. should be charged for registering their annual return and for the quinquennial valuation; whether a society with branches, such as the Manchester Unity Friendly Society, would be mulcted to the extent of £2,000 per annum with an inevitable discouragement of the cause of voluntary thrift; and what course the Government propose to take?

Major BREESE: 45.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in the event of the Government deciding to impose fees for registering annual returns and quinquennial valuation reports of friendly societies, consideration will be given to the equity of fixing an inclusive maximum charge, varying and decreasing in amount according to the ascending aggregate number of such returns, in the case of those societies rendering returns in respect of numerous branch lodges?

Mr. YOUNG: As regards the question put by the hon. and gallant Member for Carnarvonshire (Major Breese), I would refer to the reply to the question put by the hon. and gallant Member for Hulme (Lieut.-Colonel Nail) on the 13th instant. As regards the question put by the hon. Member for Frome (Mr. Hurd), I would refèr to the reply to the questions put by the hon. Member for West Houghton (Mr. R. Davies) and the hon. Member for Clitheroe (Mr. A. Davies) on the 9th instant.

ENTERTAINMENTS DUTY.

Sir J. D. REES: 41.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the Entertainments Duty falls at the rate of 40 per cent. on the cost of a seat for the poor, and 12½ per cent. on the cost of a seat for the rich, frequenter of cinema theatres; and whether, in view of this fact and of the effect of this tax super-added to all others, and affecting only entertainments, he will consider the need for some change in this behalf?

Mr. YOUNG: I am aware that the rates of Entertainments Duty form a larger percentage of the cost of admission in the lower ranges of the scale than in the higher. As regards the second part, I would refer by hon. Friend to the reply given by me to a question asked by the Hon. Member for the Burslem Division (Mr. Finney) on the 13th instant.

RETIRED CIVIL SERVANTS (PUBLIC AFFAIRS).

Mr. HINDS: 43.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether retired civil servants are at liberty to criticize Departmental policy in the public Press without running any risk of being penalised by doing so?

Mr. YOUNG: A retired civil servant is not debarred from giving expression to his views on public affairs in the Press or elsewhere, subject, of course, to his not infringing the statute law, and more particularly the Official Secrets Act, 1911. The Government relies on the discretion of its former servants to avoid the publication of matter which, though not confidential, may be prejudicial to the public interest.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES, SCOTLAND (PUBLIC AUDITORS).

Sir A. WILLIAMSON: 44.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether a fellow of the Corporation of Accountants is eligible for appointment as a public auditor, under the Friendly Societies Acts, in Scotland?

Mr. YOUNG: The answer is in the negative, except in the case of a person with these qualifications who had been
appointed prior to the introduction of the regulation prescribing certain qualifications.

Sir A. WILLIAMSON: Will my hon. Friend say why the members of this corporation are not eligible?

Mr. YOUNG: I could not say, in a historical matter like this, why it is so.

Sir A. WILLIAMSON: If the qualification be a good one, would it not be wise to open the door to them?

Mr. YOUNG: That, surely, must be a matter of opinion and argument at greater length than I can deal with it in answer to a question.

NAVY, ARMY, AND AIR SERVICES (ACCOUNTANCY).

Commander BELLAIRS: 47.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider the formation of a committee of the leading bankers to consider the methods of accountancy in the civil and military departments of the Navy, Army, and Air Services with a view to their amalgamation on a unified and simplified system leading to considerable economies?

Mr. YOUNG: The accounting methods of these departments are generally similar to those of the rest of the public service. I do not understand what the hon. and gallant Member means by a unified system of accountancy.

Commander BELLAIRS: Will my hon. Friend consider the matter from the point of view of amalgamating the systems of the Navy, Army, and Air services, as is being proposed in the medical services?

Mr. YOUNG: I really am not quite sure to what my hon. and gallant Friend refers. If he refers to the amalgamation of staff, that, surely, must be quite a different question from the services conducted by different Departments and different offices.

RAND DISTURBANCES.

Colonel NEWMAN: 36.
asked the Prime Minister whether the evidence that has been brought to light directly connecting the Government of the Russian Republic
with the present outbreak of civil war at Johannesburg will modify his present intention of meeting the Soviet authorities in conference; and, if the answer is in the negative, will these activities of the Soviet Government be the subject of remonstrance or of discussion at the forthcoming Genoa Conference?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I am not in possession of any official information in support of the allegations which have recently appeared in the Press on this subject. As regards the last part of the question, I would refer my hon. and gallant Friend to the answer given by the Prime Minister on the 13th February last.

Colonel NEWMAN: Will the right hon. Gentleman get into communication with a representative in this country of the Union of South Africa?

CENTRAL CONTROL BOARD (LIQUOR TRAFFIC).

Major KELLEY: 40.
asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Government are still purchasing licensed property in the Cumberland district; and, if so, whether, in view of present conditions, he will put a stop to the use of the nation's money for that purpose?

The SECRETARY of STATE for the HOME DEPARTMENT (Mr. Shortt): I have been asked to reply. No recent acquisitions of licensed property have been made in the Cumberland district.

Major WILLIAM MURRAY: 52.
asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether the profits made by the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) during the period 1st April, 1918, to 31st March, 1921, have paid interest on the capital provided by the Treasury, and also Excess Profits Duty and Income Tax; whether such payments will be made for the current financial year; and whether it is intended to acquire by purchase further premises in the Carlisle area in order to complete the scheme of State control?

Mr. SHORTT: Interest has been and will be charged out of profits on the capital provided by the Treasury, but as regards Excess Profits Duty and Income Tax, and as to the question of further acquisitions, I would refer the hon. and
gallant Member to my answer to the hon. and gallant Member for Basingstoke of the 8th instant.

Major CHRISTOPHER LOWTHER: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Central Control Board are spending considerable sums of money on premises which they have already acquired quite contrary to the recommendations of the Geddes Committee?

Sir J. D. REES: Is there any independent audit of these accounts on behalf of the taxpayer to see that every debitable item is debited?

Mr. SHORTT: I do not quite follow the second supplementary question; as to the first, I do not think that any money is being spent contrary to the recommendations of the Geddes Committee.

Major C. LOWTHER: I will send the right hon. Gentleman a list.

ENGINEERING TRADE DISPUTE.

Colonel NEWMAN: 35.
asked the Prime Minister whether, in connection with the present lock-out in the engineering industry, his attention has been called to an official notice given by a leading trade union to the effect that any member who does not immediately comply with the orders given by his union will be expelled from his union and deprived of his means of livelihood; and what action does he propose to take to safeguard the liberty of the subject in this instance?

Dr. MACNAMARA: I have been asked to reply. I saw the reference in the Press upon which my hon. and gallant Friend presumably bases his question. It would not appear that the matter is one in which I can take any action.

Mr. J. DAVISON: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the trade unions are combined expressly for the purpose of taking joint action? Is he also aware that an order would be issued in like manner from the Engineering Employers' Federation, and that any member of the federation who failed to comply with the order would be expelled from that federation?

Colonel NEWMAN: Does that mean that any worker is at the mercy of a Bolshevist shop-steward?

KENYA.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: 38.
asked the Prime Minister whether the interpretation of the Resolution of the Conference of Prime Ministers on equal rights for all British subjects adopted in the Colony of Kenya has yet received the consideration and approval of His Majesty's Government?

Mr. CHURCHILL: No exact interpretation of the Resolution has been attempted. Both the control of the composition of the population and the rights of citizenship to be accorded to Indians now lawfully domiciled in Kenya must be considered in the light of the interests of the four communities now in existence, and the determining factor must be the welfare of the Colony as a whole.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: May we take it that the difference of opinion on this subject between the Colonial Office and the India Office has ceased, now that the Secretary of State for India has resigned?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The differences of opinion between these two Departments had been reduced to a very narrow compass before my right hon. Friend the late Secretary of State for India resigned.

Colonel WEDGWOOD: Are we to take it the Secretary of State for India wholeheartedly approved of the after-dinner speech by the Secretary of State for the Colonies?

Captain BENN: Was the Cabinet consulted before the right hon. Gentleman made his speech at the Kenya dinner?

SEAMEN'S UNIONS (S.S. "CAMITO").

Mr. RHYS DAVIES: 53.
asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been drawn to the circumstances of the signing-on of the crew of the s.s. "Camito" at Bristol on 20th February last; is he aware that police were stationed at the gangways leading to the ship to demand union cards of men proceeding on board to sign on, and that the police prevented members of the Amalgamated Marine Workers' Union from going on the ship while permitting members of the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union to do so; under what powers the police acted in this regard; whether
any protest has been made to the Bristol authorities; and whether he will make representations to stop the practice referred to?

Mr. SHORTT: This incident had not previously been brought to my notice, but I have communicated with the Chief Constable, and am informed that on the date in question police were sent at the request of the owners of the vessel to maintain order and to prevent intimidation of members of the crew when signing on. My information is to the effect that the police did not ask any man to produce his union card. I am also told that a deputation from the Amalgamated Marine Workers' Union subsequently saw the Lord Mayor and the Town Clerk, who satisfied themselves after inquiry that there had been nothing irregular in the action of the police and that they had in no way exceeded their duty. Any complaint as to their conduct is a matter for the Watch Committee, in whom the control of the force is vested by law, and I see no reason to intervene.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT.

Mr. GILBERT: 57.
asked the Home Secretary whether the Criminal Investigation Department at Scotland Yard is maintained solely as part of the Metropolitan Police Force; whether, in the event of serious crimes in any part of the country, officers in this Department are at the disposal of county and borough police forces, or on what conditions are officers of the criminal investigation force sent away from London; is the whole cost of this Department borne on the Metropolitan Police Fund; and are any credits given to that fund for any officers or services of this Department given outside the London area?

Mr. SHORTT: The Criminal Investigation Department at New Scotland Yard is a part of the Metropolitan Police Force and the cost of its maintenance is defrayed from the Metropolitan Police Fund. Chief officers of county and borough police have been informed that the services of Metropolitan detective officers are at their disposal to assist in the investigation of specially obscure or serious crimes, and the rule is to make no charge in such cases, the expenses involved in their employment on these
special duties outside the Metropolis being one of the items in respect of which an annual grant from voted moneys of £100,000 for Imperial and national services is made to the Police Fund.

POLICE HANDCUFFS.

Mr. R. DAVIES: 58.
asked the Home Secretary whether his attention has been called to the comments of a London judge, in which he condemned the use of a certain type of handcuff by the police; and whether, if these comments were justifiable, he will take immediate steps to introduce a less severe type?

Mr. SHORTT: The learned judge's comments appear to have been based on an insufficient appreciation of the facts. The handcuffs now used by the Metropolitan Police are handier and appear to be less likely to do a prisoner any injury than the older patterns, and no complaint has been received with regard to them.

Mr. DAVIES: Will the right hon. Gentleman conduct a personal experimental test of these, preferably on some of the irrepressible Members of the Cabinet?

Mr. SHORTT: I have personally seen these handcuffs—[An HON. MEMBER: "And tried them?"]—and have also read what the learned judge said. It is quite evident he had never seen them, because he described them in a hopelessly inaccurate manner.

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Has the right hon. Gentleman actually tried on these handcuffs?

Mr. SHORTT: If the hon. and gallant Gentleman will come round to the Home Office, he can try them himself!

Lieut. - Commander KENWORTHY: Will you let me out of them again?

LONDON UNIVERSITY (NEW SITE).

Mr. GILBERT: 59.
asked the hon. Member for the Pollok Division of Glasgow, as representing the First Commissioner of Works, whether the site purchased by the Government behind the British Museum has been handed over to the University of London or remains in
the hands of the Government; whether the agreement with the Council of King's College upon which the acceptance of the site by the Senate of the University was conditional has been effected; whether any funds have been collected by the University for the erection of permanent buildings on the site; and whether the Government have considered disposing by public sale of the site in the interest of economy?

Mr. YOUNG: I have been asked to reply. The Bloomsbury site still remains in the possession of His Majesty's Government and is administered by the Office of Works. A small portion of the site, however, is occupied by the University of London on a sub-tenancy from the Y.M.C.A., and the University have erected thereon, with the consent of the Government, an institute of historical research. With regard to the second part of the question, the Senate of the University, in accepting the Government's offer of the Bloomsbury site, stipulated, inter alia, that an agreement should be concluded between His Majesty's Government, the Council of King's College, and the Senate of the University as to the terms of the removal of King's College from the Strand to the Bloomsbury site. His Majesty's Government accepted this condition, but such an agreement has not yet been concluded. As far as I am aware, no funds have yet been collected by the University for the erection of permanent buildings on the site. The answer to the last part of the question is in the negative.

LOCAL RATES (RE-ASSESSMENT).

Lieut.-Colonel HILDER: 68.
asked the Minister of Health if he is aware that in current re-assessments for local rates rateable values are in some cases being increased by 100 per cent. and over and that this will impose in some cases an almost impossible burden on small property holders, who are already suffering severely from the deterioration in values owing to the competition of Government-subsidised cottages; and will he consider the possibility of a remedy?

The MINISTER of HEALTH (Sir Alfred Mond): My attention has not been drawn to any cases of the kind referred to, nor am I aware that the competition of houses built under the
Government Housing Scheme is causing deterioration in the values of other properties. I would point out that a general re-assessment of an area does not necessarily involve an increased rate burden, and that, in cases of over-assessment, the law provides a method whereby persons can appeal against the rateable value placed on their property.

LEPER LUNATICS.

Lieut.-Colonel HILDER: 69.
asked the Minister of Health whether his attention has been called to the case of Henri Girand, a native of Mauritius and a leper lunatic, now under the charge of the Rochford Guardians; whether he is aware that both mental asylums and the East Hanningfield Leper Colony refuse to admit him, though the Rochford Guardians offer to pay for his maintenance, and in consequence the Rochford Guardians have to make special provision for him at a cost of £600 a year; and whether he will, in the interests of economy, insist that all leper patients should be accepted by the East Hanningfield Leper Colony, seeing that the medical opinion of the world is generally in favour of segregation of lepers?

Sir A. MOND: Yes, Sir, my attention has been drawn to this unfortunate case. I have no authority to give directions as to the admission of patients to the colony mentioned, but I am in communication with the authorities of the colony.

IMPERIAL INSTITUTE.

Sir HARRY BRITTAIN: 65.
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he can state what amount is contributed by the Government, directly and indirectly, to the support and maintenance of the Imperial Institute; what amount comes from the Dominions and India; and what is obtained from the Crown Colonies and Protectorates?

Mr. CHURCHILL: The contributions in question in respect of the current year are approximately as follow:



£


Imperial Government (direct)
10,000


Dominions and India
9,650


Colonies, Protectorates, Egypt, and Sudan
21,150


In 1920–21 the indirect contributions of the Imperial Government were as follows:



£


Maintenance
9,494


Contribution to local authorities in lieu of rates
5,153

Sir H. BRITTAIN: Is it not the fact that some of the unfortunate Crown Colonies who have little say in the matter contribute more in support of this white elephant than the Dominions and India?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I think that is a very inaccurate way of describing this institution which is of very great importance from the point of view of Imperial consolidation.

Sir H. BRITTAIN: Is it not a fact that India is disposed to get out of it at the end of the year?

Mr. CHURCHILL: I should consider it very deplorable if that is so.

TELEGRAPH POSTS (REINFORCED CONCRETE).

Lieut.-Colonel HILDER: 67.
asked the Postmaster-General whether, in the interest of economy, he will introduce the use of reinforced concrete for all new telegraph posts, though the initial cost would be larger, in view of their much greater durability and the fact that their manufacture here would give a great amount of employment now?

The ASSISTANT POSTMASTER-GENERAL (Mr. Pike Pease): I am advised that the interests of economy would not be served by the use of concrete poles. The initial prices for sizes of poles corresponding to those most largely used by the Post Office are from four to five times higher than the prices for wooden poles. This consideration, combined with the heavier cost of transportation and erection due to the much greater weight, would counterbalance any economy arising from a possibly longer life, even if it can be regarded as established that concrete poles would be more durable than the creosoted wooden poles now used.

Lieut.-Colonel HILDER: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these are used
extensively in France and other countries, and have they not been a success there?

Mr. PEASE: If my hon. and gallant Friend will give me any particulars in regard to their use in other countries I shall be glad to inquire. The information I have given refers to this country.

HOUSING, ISLE OF WIGHT.

Mr. WALTER SMITH: 73.
asked the Minister of Health whether a complaint signed by four inhabitant householders in the rural district of the Isle of Wight, that the local authority had failed to exercise their powers under Part XI of the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890, was sent to him at the beginning of last December; whether an offer to give security for costs was also made on a subsequent occasion; whether a reply to the complaint has now been sent by the authority; and whether it is intended to hold a public inquiry without any further delay?

Sir A. MOND: I am asking the local authority to expedite their reply and as soon as it is received I will consider carefully whether there is a primâ facie case to justify a local inquiry.

Oral Answers to Questions — UNEMPLOYMENT.

FORESTRY SCHEMES.

Lieut.-Colonel COURTHOPE: 75.
asked the hon. Member for Monmouth, as representing the Forestry Commissioners, how many schemes have been approved for a grant from the Forestry Unemployment Fund; how many acres will be planted or prepared for planting under these schemes; how many men are employed; what sum is payable in grants; and what is the total cost of the schemes?

Mr. FORESTIER-WALKER (for the Forestry Commission): 559 forestry schemes have been approved for grants from the Unemployment Fund; of these 86 are on Forestry Commission or Crown areas and 473 on woodlands of private individuals or local authorities. Under these schemes 25,371 acres are being planted, 20,834 prepared for planting, and 8,021 cleared of scrub. In the Crown woods there are road-making schemes
and works of maintenance which cannot be stated by area. On 4th March (date of latest return) 4,428 men were employed on the schemes, and it is estimated that the total employment will be 5,131 men for 20 weeks. £70,340 is payable in grants to private individuals and local authorities. The total cost of the schemes to the Commission is estimated at £202,342. Including the grants amounting to £70,340, private individuals and local authorities will expend approximately £300,000 on their schemes.

Lieut.-Colonel COURTHOPE: Does that reply mean that for every £1 of grant the owners are spending £3 on these forestry schemes for the unemployed?

Mr. FORESTIER - WALKER: That is so.

LOCAL UNDERTAKINGS.

Sir WALTER de FRECE: 83.
asked the Minister of Labour whether, in approving relief works for the benefit of the unemployed, he will consider the special suitability of restarting local undertakings which for some reason or other are not able to continue operations at the present moment, but whose existence is vital to the local communities; and whether he can state instances in which this policy, if approved, has been followed?

Mr. YOUNG: As regards the first part of the question, the Trade Facilities Committee, which the Treasury have appointed with a view to advising them as to carrying out the provisions of the Trade Facilities Act, are authorised to recommend a guarantee of capital or interest, or both, of loans not exceeding an aggregate total of £25,000,000 to be raised in connection with approved capital schemes. I understand that this Committee have at present under consideration the particular scheme which, I believe, the hon. Member has in mind. As regards the second part of the question, I am not aware that the Committee has approved so far any scheme of this kind.

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION.

TEACHERS' SUPERANNUATION.

Mrs. WINTRINGHAM: 76.
asked the President of the Board of Education whether the 5 per cent. deduction from
teachers' salaries on account of pensions will be made in those areas where the education authority has not adopted the Burnham scale?

Mr. FISHER: I would ask the hon. Member to await the introduction of the Bill which will deal with the matter.

OPEN-AIR SCHOOLS.

Mr. TREVELYAN THOMSON: 77.
asked the President of the Board of Education how many schemes of local educational authorities for the provision of open-air schools and for schools for the mentally defective scholars had been held up by his Department during the last five years; and what prospect is there of his sanctioning the same or any similar schemes during the next few years, in view of the recommendations of the National Economy Committee which have been adopted by the Government?

Mr. FISHER: Until the end of 1920 the Board did not withhold their approval of proposals by local education authorities for the provision of schools of the kind referred to unless the proposals were in themselves unsatisfactory. No record has been kept of the number of cases in which approval was withheld before that date. Since the beginning of 1921 the Board have been obliged, by financial considerations, to suspend approval of proposals for the provision of 28 open-air schools and 19 schools for mentally defective children. I regret that I am unable to say how soon it will be possible to authorise new expenditure on institutions of these types.

SAFEGUARDING OF INDUSTRIES ACT (FABRIC GLOVES).

Captain BENN: 79.
asked the President of the Board of Trade whether the Government, in accordance with the recommendations of the Statutory Committee, has yet decided to make an Order, under Part II of the Safeguarding of Industries Act, imposing a duty on fabric gloves?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of TRADE (Sir W. Mitchell-Thomson): I would refer the
hon. and gallant Member to the reply given yesterday to the hon. Member for Maldon.

Captain BENN: Can the hon. Baronet say when the Government will be likely to arrive at some decision on this matter?

Sir W. MITCHELL-THOMSON: I answered a similar question yesterday, and in the interval between yesterday and to-day I am not able to answer anything further.

Captain BENN: I beg to give notice that I will raise this question on the Motion for the Adjournment on Monday next.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL NAVY.

PAYMASTER COMMANDERS (PROMOTION).

Sir THOMAS BRAMSDON: 81.
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty why it was considered desirable to adopt the recommendations of the Halsey Committee with regard to the promotion of paymaster commanders to paymaster captain, and not to adhere to the Admiralty's decisions on the Chapple Committee for the promotion of commissioned writers to lieutenant up to the number of 10, and warrant writers to commissioned writers up to the number of 20, observing that three vacancies for paymaster lieutenant have existed over a period of nine months, and that the six paymaster commanders promoted to the rank of paymaster captain were so promoted after it was known that drastic reductions would have to be effected in the personnel of the Navy?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Amery): The reasons for the action taken in the case of the promotion of paymaster commanders to paymaster captains were fully explained in my reply to the hon. Member on the 6th March. The increase, however, in the number of warrant writers and above, approved as a result of the recommendations of the Chapple Committee, was explicitly stated to be a provisional increase of establishment for the period of the War. This establishment would not have been justifiable under post-War conditions, and will be still less justifiable when the further reductions contemplated in naval personnel are made.

His MAJESTY'S SHIP "THUNDERER."

Major Sir B. FALLE: 82.
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty if he is aware that His Majesty's Ship "Thunderer" is a Portsmouth ship, Portsmouth officers and ship's company, and that her refit in her home dockyard is looked forward to by all; if he can give any reason for refitting this ship elsewhere; if he is aware that in such event every officer and member of the ship's complement must pay two railway fares and lose a certain amount of leave, and that even the watch on board must suffer?

Mr. AMERY: The forthcoming refitting arrangements make it necessary that a capital ship not manned from Devonport should be refitted at that port. It is fully realised by the Admiralty that a certain amount of hardship will be caused to the crew of the ship selected, but no other course is possible. H.M.S. "Thunderer" was chosen as her crew is the smallest of the capital ships which have to refit next month, being only 687 as against the 1,236, for instance, of H.M.S. "Malaya." The hardship is thus being confined to as few ratings as possible, and in any case is very small compared with that of crews of Atlantic Fleet ships which have refitted at Rosyth during leave seasons, this necessitating a much heavier railway fare.

Sir B. FALLE: Does that answer mean that red tape is going to be allowed to inflict this hardship on the ship's complement at a time when there are not sufficient men in the Portsmouth Dockyard?

Mr. AMERY: No, Sir. This arrangement does allocate some degree of evenness to the various ports according to their capacity.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRANSPORT.

TRAMWAY TRACTION (EDINBURGH).

Captain BENN: 86.
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport whether the Ministry have decided to hold an inquiry into the form of traction to be adopted by the tramway committee of the Edinburgh Town Council, with special reference to Princes Street; and, if so, what is the scope of the inquiry and its estimated cost?

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (Mr. Neal): Yes, Sir. The inquiry will be conducted by Sir William Marwood and Colonel Pringle, who will endeavour to elicit such information as may be necessary to enable a correct decision to be arrived at, but they will discourage any discursive discussion upon general questions. The public expense involved cannot be large. I cannot control the expense which the corporation or others may determine to incur, but I deprecate and regard as unnecessary any substantial outlay.

Mr. W. GRAHAM: Would the hon. Gentleman exclude from this inquiry the question of the amenity, which obviously is a matter for the Corporation of Edinburgh and not for any Committee?

Mr. NEAL: I think any truncated inquiry is generally unsatisfactory, but the two officers who will conduct the inquiry are experienced men and they will try to keep it within reasonable limits.

Captain BENN: Will it sit in Edinburgh?

Mr. NEAL: Yes.

RAILWAY RATES TRIBUNAL.

Mr. M. STEVENS: 87.
asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport whether, as the Railway Rates Tribunal will almost certainly be fully occupied for two years in adjusting the millions of railway rates and charges upon a reasonable basis for trade and for railway revenue, he will see that no other duties beyond those provided for in the Railways Act, 1921, are undertaken by the tribunal until that most important revision is completed?

Mr. NEAL: I am fully aware of the considerations to which my hon. Friend draws attention. They will be borne in mind if occasion arises, but, as he will appreciate, it is not possible to give a general undertaking such as he suggests.

Mr. STEVENS: Is my hon. Friend not aware that the question arises to-day of a Bill which is down for the Second Reading this afternoon and has he considered if that provision is conceded that it will mean that every railway company in the
country and every road carrier may reasonably ask for it to come into operation?

Mr. SPEAKER: That Bill has been put off until the 31st March.

Oral Answers to Questions — GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

SUPERANNUATION.

Mr. T. THOMSON: 88.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury whether the Government's adoption of the recommendation of the National Economy Committee that teachers in State-aided schools should contribute to their pensions is to be also applied to the members of the Civil Service, in order that there shall be no breach of the agreement recently made with the teachers that their pensions should be on the same footing as the Civil Service?

Mr. YOUNG: No, Sir. The Committee did not consider it possible to recommend any course likely to lead to a reduction in the cost of civil servants' superannuation. The latter part of the question is not understood.

REGRADING SCHEMES.

Sir ROBERT NEWMAN: 90.
asked the Secretary to the Treasury what is the proportion of higher clerical and executive to lower clerical posts for men and women, respectively, in those Departments which have already submitted re-grading schemes to the Treasury; and whether, in the case of the women, the number of writing assistants has been included in the figures, and whether, as the lower clerical women normally supervise the work of writing assistants, they have a higher proportion of superior posts than the lower clerical men who do no supervision?

Mr. YOUNG: The regrading schemes put before the Treasury do not normally distinguish posts by the sex of the occupant. As regards the latter part of the question, higher clerical and executive posts are allotted, not on any proportion, but with strict regard to the requirements of the work; but, other things being equal, it might safely be assumed that in a branch employing writing assistants the proportion of higher clerical to lower clerical posts is
higher than it would have been had all the writing assistant posts been graded clerical.

IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM.

Sir HARRY BRITTAIN: 91.
asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury how much space the Imperial Institute is being invited to surrender to enable the Imperial War Museum to find the necessary minimum of accommodation in that building; whether any space would be available to compensate the Imperial Institute in whole or in part for the space surrendered; what is the percentage of loss of space the Institute would suffer; and what would be the saving of cost to the nation?

Lieut.-Colonel Sir J. GILMOUR (for the First Commissioner of Works): No decision on the proposal to house the Imperial Institute has yet been reached, and it is not possible at the present moment to give the detailed information asked for by the hon. Member. I hope, however, to be able to make an announcement shortly.

UNFIT HORSES (EXPORT).

Sir J. BUTCHER: 93.
asked the Minister of Agriculture the precise terms of the agreement which has been made between the Government and the respective Belgian and Dutch Governments as to the slaughter on this side of horses intended to be sent abroad for food; and whether the export of all horses from this country has been stopped unless they are proved to be fit for useful and substantial work?

The MINISTER of AGRICULTURE (Sir Arthur Boscawen): The Belgian and Dutch Governments have agreed not to put obstacles in the way of the importation of horse flesh, and a considerable increase in this trade has recently taken place. It would be impracticable to make a definite agreement to prevent the slaughter in Belgium or Holland of any horses exported from this country. The answer to the last part of the question is in the affirmative.

Sir J. BUTCHER: 94.
asked the Minister of Agriculture whether his attention has been called to statements publicly
made by Miss Cole, of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, to the effect that the "Mersey," from Goole, reached Antwerp on 24th January last with one horse dead, one so injured that it had to be killed at the dock, and one that had to be conveyed to the slaughter-house on a float; that on another line from Leith last year an average of one horse in each hundred reached Antwerp dead or fatally injured; whether he will inquire into the truth of these statements, and what arrangements are made for inspection of the accommodation, feeding, and watering of horses on board ship or on arrival abroad which are exported from this country?

Sir A. BOSCAWEN: The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. With regard to the second part of the question, out of 831 horses shipped from Leith to Antwerp last year there were eight casualties, all of which occurred before the system of inspection was reorganised. With regard to the last part of the question, a new Order relating to the transit of horses was issued on the 21st December last, the requirements of which have to be complied with by an early date. By this Order a daily ration is prescribed for every horse car ried, together with a surplus for emergencies. Inspectors of the Ministry go on board and see that this is provided. Horses are also required to be watered before being shipped. A superintending inspector of the Ministry frequently meets the vessels on arrival on the Continent, and he has reported that adequate provision is made for feeding and watering the animals on disembarkation.

Sir J. BUTCHER: If facilities are given for inspectors will the right hon. Gentleman see if the arrangements made abroad for these horses are satisfactory?

Sir A. BOSCAWEN: I think so. At any rate, I have the fullest report from our own inspectors that the arrangements are satisfactory.

Sir J. BUTCHER: Including the methods of slaughter?

Sir A. BOSCAWEN: Obviously, I have no control over the methods of slaughter. All we can do as to that is to make representations.

DISEASES OF ANIMALS.

Mr. WILLIAM NICHOLSON: 96.
asked the Minister of Agriculture when the Report of the Advisory Committee for Research into Diseases of Animals will be published; whether the Report was signed by all the members of the Committee last November; and who is responsible for the delay in publishing the Report?

Sir A. BOSCAWEN: The Report has now been published. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative. The Report was not signed by all the members of the Committee until the 15th February last, upon which date it was submitted to the Development Commissioners. Publication was authorised by the Commissioners on 23rd February at their next meeting following the receipt of the Report. No delay in publication can therefore be said to have occurred.

UNITED SERVICES FUND.

Mr. BRIANT: 98.
asked the Secretary of State for War what is the total amount which is due to the United Services Fund; and when the amount will be actually handed over to the Committee?

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Lieut. - Colonel Sir R. Sanders): As stated in the Report of the Committee presided over by my hon. Friend the Member for the Ecclesall Division of Sheffield, the total amount available for transfer to the United Services Fund is expected to reach £7,000,000. As stated in the reply to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Melton yesterday, the payment of the balance of this sum awaits the conclusion of certain inquiries which I hope will be completed at an early date.

Major WHELER: Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman realise that great dissatisfaction is felt at this delay in the allocation of this sum as the men think the money belongs to them and this is the time which more than any other, when they should have it, in view of the many difficulties they have to contend with?

Sir R. SANDERS: I can assure my hon. Friend the matter will be pressed forward as soon as possible.

BRITISH EMPIRE EXHIBITION.

Mr. RAPER: (by Private Notice) asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade whether he is in a position to make any statement as to the circumstances in which the engagement with the Inter-Allied Trade and Banking Corporation of Mr. Wintour, the general manager of the British Empire Exhibition, was terminated? In putting this question I desire to thank you, Mr. Speaker, for allowing me this opportunity of apologising for any misapprehension which may have arisen from the supplementary question which I put in this House on Monday last.

Sir P. LLOYD-GREAME (Secretary, Overseas Trade Department): Yes, Sir. On the day after my hon. Friend put his supplementary question to me, I received the following letter from Sir Henry Birchenough:—

Rhodesia House,

2, London Wall Buildings,

London, E.C.2.,

14th March, 1922.

My DEAR LLOYD-GBEAME,—I have seen in "The Times" a report of the questions addressed to you in the House of Commons with regard to the British Empire Exhibition.

I am myself a member of the Executive Council, and was the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Trade and Banking Corporation when Mr. Wintour was Managing Director of that company. Mr. Wintour's connection with the Inter-Allied Trade and Banking Corporation terminated owing to a change of policy consequent upon the acquisition by a new group of the controlling interest in that firm, and the circumstances connected therewith in no way reflected upon Mr. Wintour's ability—or integrity—of which I, in common with all those who have worked with him, have the highest opinion.

Yours always sincerely,

(Signed) HENRY BIRCHENOUGH.

Major Sir Philip

Lloyd-Greame, K.B.E., M.P.

I am very glad that my hon. Friend has put this question. The point was raised on a supplementary question which did not relate to the subject-matter of the question on the Paper, and I was not then in the possession of the facts. I am very glad to have this opportunity of now stating the full facts as given me by the Chairman of the Corporation.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

Mr. CLYNES: May I ask the Leader of the House what business it is intended to take next week?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I have received urgent representations this morning of a desire to discuss the situation caused by the lock-out in the engineering trade and the action of the Government in relation thereto. If the wish for such a discussion is maintained—I understand it is still a subject matter for consideration by those immediately concerned—I shall then propose to make time for that discussion on Monday. What I am asked to do is to move the Adjournment of the House in order to afford an opportunity for a discussion which I think must in any case close by dinner time. We cannot allow more than till 8 o'clock for that discussion. Then at 8 o'clock we shall take the Supplementary Estimates, starting with the Ministry of Agriculture Vote. If time is not desired for that discussion on Monday then we shall begin with the Supplementary Estimates after the close of Questions.
On Tuesday we propose to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on the Air Estimates.
On Wednesday we shall take Army Estimates, Vote A and Vote 1, in Committee.
On Thursday and Friday we shall take the Committee and Report stages of the remaining Supplementary Estimates on the Paper, and of the Financial Resolution in connection with the Diseases of Animals Bill and all the stages of that Bill.

Earl WINTERTON: Does the fact that there is going to be a Debate on the lockout on Monday mean that the Government are going to formulate some policy with regard to intervening, or are we merely going to discuss at large what is purely a trade dispute?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No, Sir; the Government do not at this moment think that they can usefully take any action beyond that which they have already taken. It is because they have come to that decision that, I understand, those who disagree with it may desire to challenge our action, or our inaction, in this matter.

Mr. CLYNES: May I say that the House ought not now to conclude that we are seeking to force a discussion on Monday? Our object is to report to those concerned this afternoon the views of the Government, as represented to us earlier during the day, as to why a Court of Inquiry is not being set up. Our whole object, if there be a discussion, is to assist towards a settlement, and for the moment we are not at all seeking to force a discussion on Monday, but we are seeking to get the opinion of those concerned as to whether a discussion would help matters or not.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I understand that I shall hear from the right hon. Gentleman in the course of to-day whether he and his party desire such a discussion to take place on Monday, and in that case I shall be able, on the Motion for Adjournment to-night, to say definitely what Monday's business will be.

Mr. J. DAVISON: May I ask why the Government decline to institute a Court of Inquiry in accordance with the Act?

Mr. G. LOCKER-LAMPSON: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether anything beside the Russian famine question will be taken to-morrow?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: In answer to the last question, we shall take, if time permits, further Report stages, as they stand on the Paper.

Mr. LOCKER-LAMPSON: Which ones?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Not the Irish.

Mr. LOCKER-LAMPSON: Which will be the first one?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: That for the Middle Eastern Services is the one which stands first. With regard to the other question, I met a deputation, of which the right hon. Gentleman was one, this morning, and, after hearing all that they had to say, I stated the views of the Government. I think I had better not enter into argument upon that now, and, indeed, it would be out of order to do so.

Sir F. BANBURY: In the event of the right hon. Gentleman's announcing this evening, on the Motion for Adjournment, that a discussion on the engineering dispute is to take place on Monday, will that be practically a Vote of Censure on the Government if they do not accede to the
request of the right hon. Gentleman opposite? If it is not going to be a Vote of Censure, is it advisable that we should in this House discuss matters which are really outside our jurisdiction?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I indicated to the deputation which met me this morning my own view that the institution of a Court of Inquiry by the Government now would tend rather to prolong the duration and extend the area of the dispute than to limit either.

Mr. DAVISON: In what way?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I cannot argue the matter now. I am only trying to answer as well as I can the questions put to me, including that of the hon. Member. I also indicated that in my opinion a discussion in this House would tend rather to inflame than to allay passions. At the same time, if the right hon. Gentleman and those for whom he speaks think that there ought to be a discussion in this House, I think it would be unwise for the Government to refuse them the opportunity of raising it.

Mr. A. SHORT: Will a statement be published of the conversations and deliberations that have taken place this morning?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I understand that a summary, agreed by representatives of the two parties to the conference —the Government and the deputation-will be sent to the Press.

BLASPHEMY LAWS (AMENDMENT) BILL,

"to amend the Blasphemy Laws," presented by Mr. FREDERICK GREEN: supported by Mr. Atkey, Captain Wedgwood Benn, Mr. Kiley, Mr. George Roberts, and Mr. William Thorne; to be read a Second time upon Wednesday, 5th April, and to be printed. [Bill 55.]

MESSAGE FROM THE LORDS.

That they have passed a Bill, intituled, "An Act to provide for the substitution of a memorandum and articles of association for the existing constitution and regulations of the Legal and General Assurance Society, Limited, and to re-
peal The Legal and General Life Assurance Society's Act, 1878, and The Legal and General Assurance Society's Act, 1919; and for other purposes." [Legal and General Assurance Society Bill [Lords.]

And also, a Bill, intituled, "An Act to amend and consolidate the enactments relating to the payment of interest on the Debenture Stock A and the Debenture Stock B of the Milford Docks Company; and for other purposes." [Milford Docks Bill [Lords.]

Legal and General Assurance Society Bill [Lords,]

Milford Docks Bill [Lords,]

Read the First time; and referred to the Examiners of Petitions for Private Bills.

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY.

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1922–23.

MR. AMERY'S STATEMENT.

Order for Committee read.

Mr. SPEAKER: Before the House enters upon the question of Supply today, I would draw attention to what I said yesterday, on the Army Estimates, about the presentation of the Estimates in full. On future occasions I hope that the Admiralty, as well as the War Office, will take to heart what I said yesterday.

Sir DONALD MACLEAN: On a point of Order. May I ask whether it is possible for you, Sir, as the custodian of the rights of Members of this House, to bring any influence to bear to ensure that the Estimates shall be laid by the Executive at the very earliest possible moment?

Mr. SPEAKER: I may say that I have already taken such steps as were in my power, and I shall exercise very vigilant supervision in future.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (Leader of the House): May I say that it will be the earnest endeavour of the Government to comply with the indications which you, Sir, have given? We regret that the Estimates are not ready for presentation in full, but I think the House will recognise that we had very little time between the presentation of the Geddes Report and the present moment in which to consider the very important and widespread reductions proposed in that Report, to decide our policy, and to frame our Estimates.

Sir F. BANBURY: In view of the fact that this is not the first time that this has occurred during the last two or three years—it occurred, I think, only last year or the year before—may I ask, Mr. Speaker, what would be our remedy if the Government did the same thing again next year?

Mr. SPEAKER: I think the remedy, if without due cause this happened again, would be for the House to refuse to let me go out of the Chair.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Amery): I beg
to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
I need not assure you, Sir, that I fully concur in what the Leader of the House has just said, and I hope to comply with the wish of my right hon. Friend the Member for Peebles (Sir D. Maclean) and lay the full Estimates before the House as soon as possible. I might only add, in reference to the difficulty of producing anything more than skeleton Estimates on this occasion, that that was created, not only by the investigation into the Report of the Geddes Committee, but also by the fact that our whole naval scheme was still in uncertainty until the Naval Treaty of Washington was actually signed a few weeks ago. I hope, however, that with these skeleton Estimates, and the fairly full explanation given in the First Lord's statement, hon. Members will not be without sufficient material to criticise and discuss these Estimates on the Vote on Account to-day.
4.0 P.M.
When I dealt with the final revised Estimates of the current year, some seven months ago, I had to draw the attention of the House to a naval situation which was by no means free from anxiety. The policy of this country ever since the War has been one of drastic reduction in naval armaments. We had relegated to scrap or otherwise disposed of nearly 2½ million tons of warships. We had broken oft all new construction of capital ships with the Armistice. We had, in fact, given a lead to the world in the inauguration of a complete naval holiday. But, up to that moment, it did not seem as if our lead was destined to be followed. Two other great Powers, rich in every resource, human and material, for the building up of sea power, had not only initiated but had carried far towards completion great programmes of new construction. On the slipways of America and Japan whole battle fleets were being hurried forward, incorporating in their armament and design the complete revolution wrought in naval construction by the lessons of the War, and calculated from the hour of their completion to reduce to obsolescence, if not, indeed, to utter powerlessness, the splendid Navy which for four long years had maintained inviolate our mastery of the seas. Those formidable new developments were not
aimed at us. But we could not afford to be indifferent to them. We can never afford to let our whole existence depend upon the sufferance of any foreign Power, however friendly. Consequently, without directly joining in any competition, we were compelled to abandon, and to abandon with reluctance, our policy of cessation from construction.
Confronted by a new situation, not of our choosing, we set ourselves, without haste but without hesitation, to the task of replacing, by gradual steps, our obsolescent fleet by ships fit to be matched in line of battle with any ships afloat and worthy of the skill and devotion of the men whose lives we confided to them. The first four of these ships were to have been begun before the end of this year, and others would necessarily have followed at more or less close intervals. I need not remind the House what a serious financial strain that programme of replacement would have imposed upon this heavily burdened country. In the situation of the world as it stood six months ago, there was no alternative. There was, indeed, a hope, in which all men of goodwill could join, that the forthcoming Conference at Washington might set some limit to this menacing and exhausting new competition in naval armaments. It might, we thought, at least secure that no additional American or Japanese programmes beyond those already sanctioned should be launched; we hoped it might even lead to the abandonment of some of the ships in the existing programmes on which comparatively little work had been done. We were not sanguine enough to imagine that it could affect our first four or even our first eight replacement ships, that it could, in fact, bring about a return to that complete naval holiday which we had been so reluctant to forgo.
I rejoice to know that we were wrong. The wise daring of President Harding and of Mr. Secretary Hughes, the wholehearted co-operation, under the leadership of the Lord President of the Council, of the representatives of the British Empire, and the loyal concurrence and help of the other delegations, have achieved a solution going beyond our best hopes. It is not my business to-day to discuss the Washington Agreements, except in so far as they directly affect our Naval Esti-
mates. I should like, however, in passing, to pay a tribute—and here I know that I am only voicing the views of the First Lord and of the whole Board of Admiralty—to the conspicuous services rendered by Lord Beatty, Admiral Chatfield, and the other British naval advisers in helping to adjust to the great conceptions of statesmanship a subject-matter bristling with technical difficulties, and to do so without impairment of those ideals or sacrifice of the interests committed to their charge.
The result of that Conference is, that, without any dereliction from the one-power standard, the recognised minimum of security necessary for our existence as a free Power, we have been able to make far-reaching reductions in our naval organisation, and to effect economies, very substantial, when compared with the expenditure of the present year, and immense when compared with the future burdens that otherwise we should have had to shoulder. The economies thus won for the long-suffering taxpayers of this country are only a part of the economies gained, in like proportion, by the other naval powers concerned. The total sum liberated may be reckoned, over the next 10 years, in hundreds of millions, and represents a powerful contribution to the economic recovery of a war-spent world. There are other gains, less directly susceptible of measurement, but even more worth their endeavours, that our representatives have brought home from Washington—the removal of suspicion, the growth of sympathy and mutual understanding among nations, and. not least, the increasing proof of the capacity of the British Empire, under its new organisation, to unite in, and give effect to, a single Imperial policy.
I turn now to the actual task which throughout the past year has been foremost in the thoughts of those responsible for the administration of our naval affairs. I mean the task of securing the utmost possible measure of economy consistent with the maintenance of the, standard of security laid down by the Government, accepted by Parliament, and re-affirmed as the minimum last July by the Imperial Conference. Throughout the spring and summer of last year the Finance Committee of the Admiralty subjected to the closest scrutiny the whole field of our naval expenditure. That expenditure, I may remind the
House, had already been drastically reduced during the preceding two years. The gross Naval Estimates of 1920–1 and 1921–2 were £96,500,000 and nearly £91,250,000 respectively. Every item and every Vote was once more reviewed and passed under the pruning knife. In the end we were able to secure a total gross reduction of £15,348,000. A considerable part of that saving, roughly about £6,000,000, was accounted for by the anticipated fall in wages and prices, and by the clearing off of War liabilities. The remaining £9,250,000 represented the direct result of our efforts to curtail expenditure to essentials, and to postpone even essential expenditure if not actually urgent. That was a substantial achievement in economy. In the actual Sketch Estimates for 1922–3, which were presented to the Treasury at the end of July, and which were subsequently dealt with by the Geddes Committee, that achievement was neutralised and obscured by two adverse factors. One was an anticipated reduction of over £3,500,000 in Appropriations-in-Aid from the sale of surplus vessels and other munitions. The other was the heavy cost of the first full year of expenditure on the new replacement programme, for which we had to provide £11,750,000. The total net reduction in the Sketch Estimates below the Estimates of 1921–22 was only £1,295,200, a reduction from £82,479,000 to £81,183,800. But to have effected even this reduction at the very moment that we were called upon to shoulder this heavy new burden of construction, to have offset and more than offset that new burden, was, I submit, evidence of the effort which the Board of Admiralty were making to respond to the appeal of Parliament for economy.
Under pre-Washington conditions, those sketch Estimates represented practically the lowest point to which naval expenditure could be reduced in the coming year, or in the years immediately to follow. But for Washington those, or very nearly those, are the Estimates that I should have been submitting to-day. How comes it then that the Committee on National Expenditure were able to suggest that those Estimates were on a scale so lavish and extravagant that, apart from any change in the naval situation arising from the Washington Conference, apart from any possible reduction of ships in full or partial commission, apart from
any reduction in the scale of manning ships or establishments, apart from any reduction of our provision for oil reserves and accumulation of oil stores, they could have been cut down by a further £21,000,000? I do not wish to say anything in disparagement of the great public services rendered by Sir Eric Geddes and his colleagues in carrying out, in so short a space of time, a complete survey of the whole field of our national expenditure. But the House will understand that I owe it to my Chief and to my colleagues on the Board of Admiralty, who are not represented here, to vindicate their administration against a charge which, however colourlessly worded, is one either of gross incompetence or of reckless indifference to the nation's crying need for economy. Even from my own personal point of view, I do not see how, with any self-respect, I could have moved this Motion if I had believed that the conclusions of the Report, or any large part of them, could have been sustained.
I confess, however, that I am more concerned to deal with this matter from an even wider point of view. There never was a time when there was greater need than there is to-day for confidence in our public institutions. That applies to this House of Commons. It applies equally to those great Departments of State and administrative and combatant services which are the instruments through which the policy of this House and of the nation is carried into effect. I believe that nothing could be more disastrous than that the opinion should prevail that those who are engaged in the responsible work of those services are wasteful, incompetent, selfishly intent upon their own interests or that of their particular branch or section of the public service. The House knows, of course, how utterly devoid of truth such a charge is. But it knows equally well that this is, in fact, the picture—the odious travesty—which is continuously being held up before the wider public outside. It will therefore, I trust, forgive me if I trespass a little on its patience in order to express the reasons for my dissent from a verdict which, delivered by so distinguished and well-intentioned a tribunal, must inevitably give colour to the charges so freely made in less responsible quarters.
The £21,000,000 of possible pre-Washington savings claimed to have been dis-
covered by the Geddes Committee fall into three parts. About £7,000,000 can be credited to a number of detailed administrative recommendations, some of which I shall touch upon later. Another £7,000,000 was apparently to be secured by the immediate abolition of an alleged excess of 35,000 officers and men. The third £7,000,000 was, to use the phrase of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, not specified. I wish to deal more particularly with the second item—that which concerns the manning of the Navy— because it furnishes, I believe, the key to the whole point of view from which the Committee approached the rest of their inquiry into naval administration. The conclusion of the Committee is that the Navy has been maintaining an excess of 35,000 officers and men over and above its reasonable requirements. They expressly make it clear that they do not mean by this that the number of ships kept in full commission has been too large or that the standard of manning is too high. Those are, in their opinion, separate and additional possibilities of economy deserving of investigation. The discovery they claim to have made is that apart from an excess of some 3,300 accounted for by certain recommendations —based on a complete misunderstanding— as to officers' servants and coastguards, there are nearly 32,000 officers and men-more than a quarter of the whole Navy— who are not needed at all. These are apparently kept tucked away in barracks or other shore establishments with nothing special to do except to wait for mobilisation.
Hon. Members may well wish to know by what process of reasoning or calculation this interesting discovery was made. Before doing so, however, may I remind the House of the general principles on which the Navy is maintained and trained in peace and on which its personnel is allocated on mobilisation? I will begin with the peace distribution. In a highly technical service like the Navy it is obviously impossible to give a specialist training afloat. That training must be given in separate schools on shore, and at any one moment a large proportion of officers and men must be in those schools either going through their training courses or forming part of the working and teaching staff of those schools. Add to these the inevitable float-
ing margin of men crossing from foreign stations, sick, or on special leave, cadets and boys, and coastguards, and you will realise why it is that in peace there must be for every thousand men actually afloat in ships of war something like 600 men in these various establishments or in the floating margin. That is not a matter of extravagance in manning, but is a necessary condition of the war efficiency of the fleet.
I now come to a quite different thing and that is the war allocation of this same personnel. That depends entirely on the kind of war that is contemplated, and upon the extent to which a Navy maintains a reserve fleet, in addition to the Fleet in permanent full commission. In 1914, as the result of continuous new competitive programmes, we had accumulated an immense reserve fleet of comparatively up-to-date vessels, as large as the active fleet itself. Consequently the whole of the men not already afloat were in the 1914 war allocation assigned to mobilising this great reserve fleet. Even the schools were broken up, their staffs pulled out, and only care and maintenance parties left in charge. Everything was concentrated on having the largest possible number of ships available for a decisive action in the first week. Our post-War fleet is of an entirely different character. The maintenance of the one-Power standard and the absolute necessity of training for fleet purposes made it impossible to reduce the active service fleet lower than we did. But it was obviously sound economy to cut down the reserve fleet to the utmost possible extent and not to waste money or men on vessels which were bound to be obsolete long before the next war. That, of course, meant a far smaller call on our peace margin and made it possible, consistently with the strictest economy in peace establishments, to carry out the lessons of the war and allocate a larger proportion of men in the War allocation to the very essential smaller vessels, and to retain the staffs of the schools at the critical moment of mobilisation.
I have, I trust, succeeded in making clear two things, firstly, that the War allocation of the active service personnel as between the three main groups of fighting ships, auxiliary ships, and shore establishments must necessarily vary widely according to the general strategic situation, and more particularly accord-
ing to the size of the reserve fleet as compared with the active fleet, and secondly, that the variations in this allocation bear no fixed relation to the peace distribution between the same groups, which is determined in the main by the training requirements of the active service fleet. What the Geddes Committee did was to take the War allocation of 1915 and, treating it as an ideal allocation, to scale down the War allocation for the present year by taking the first group, the fighting ships, for granted and, reducing the other two groups, by a simple rule-of-three sum, in the same proportion as in the 1914 allocation. This naturally showed a very wide difference between the two allocations. Then, by a curious confusion between war allocation and peace distribution, which runs through every line of the pages of the Report which deal with this matter, they jumped to the conclusion that this difference of over 30,000 men was in fact an excess provision in the peace establishment of those groups over the 1914 standard.
One or two simple illustrations will show the obvious fallacy of such a deduction. If the Admiralty had saved a score of old ships from the scrap heap, and kept them moored somewhere in charge of care and maintenance parties, it could, on the same Vote A, and with the same peace distribution as to-day, have framed a war allocation on 1914 lines. It would have been a bad allocation, but it would, on the principles of the Geddes Committee, have shown that we have not a single man in excess. On the other hand, if for reasons of economy we had scrapped a few more reserve ships, our war allocation would on those same principles have shown an even more culpable extravagance of man-power than at present. Applying these principles to the Japanese Navy, which has no reserve fleet, I find that the thrifty Japanese are maintaining to-day over 33,000 unnecessary men out of a total personnel of 82,000—in other words, they are 50 per cent, more extravagant than we are. Applying the principle to the American Navy, I find that their extravagance in maintaining unnecessary officers and men amounts to nearly 60,000. I think the House will agree that there must be a serious flaw in a method of calculation which can lead to such impossible results. The attempt to apply that method in the
case of our Navy involved a number of errors of detail which have been dealt with in the recent Admiralty Memorandum. I need not weary the House with these. The point I wish to make clear is that not a part but the whole of the alleged excess is a statistical delusion. The 35,000 surplus officers and men of the Report are like the Emperor's new clothes in the fairy tale: they are not there, and with their disintegration and disembodiment vanish, alas! £7,000,000 of the £21,000,000 of the Geddes economies.
I have dealt at this length with the manning question because it provides the key to the rest of the Committee's Report. It is only natural that if the Committee believed that the Admiralty were wasting £7,000,000 of public money on keeping in barracks and other shore establishments an excess of 35,000 men above our requirements, they should also, with such statistical proof of extravagance before their eyes, believe that another £7,000,000 of unspecified economies could be found in the Votes which they had not specially examined, or that in the specific proposals which they made they not infrequently assumed extravagance where a closer investigation would have furnished a better explanation. I do not propose to enter into a detailed discussion of our reasons for dissenting from come of these specific proposals. They are briefly given in the Admiralty Memorandum.
As regards the publication of that document, which seems to have aroused some comment and misunderstanding, still persistent in certain quarters, I need only repeat that, as stated by the Leader of the House, it was issued in pursuance of the Cabinet decision authorising Ministers to take such steps as might be required to rebut reflections made upon their Departments in the Report and that it neither discussed nor prejudged the issues of policy which were still before the Cabinet, but was simply intended to correct, and to correct immediately, certain misconceptions and errors of fact in the Report which I believed might do grave injury to the Navy if left uncorrected to sink into the mind of the public.

Lieut. - Commander KENW0RTHY: Was it submitted to the Cabinet?

Mr. AMERY: I think that matter has been fully dealt with by the Leader of the House. After the example I have given of one striking instance of such misconceptions even the most rigid economist in this House may be inclined to sympathise with the Admiralty in its reluctance to lay its head meekly on the block awaiting decapitation and to agree that in this matter we did not, if I may scurrilously misquote poetry—
Call upon the gods in vulgar spite
To vindicate our helpless right,
But with our keener eye
The axe's edge did try.
I do not propose to revert to the various points of controversy dealt with in the memorandum unless the necessity for doing so should arise out of this or subsequent discussions on these Estimates, but rather to indicate the points on which we have been able to find ourselves in agreement with the Committee and have seen our way to adopt in whole or part the suggestions which they have made. Of these suggestions, the following could have been adopted, apart from the Washington Agreement, and have in fact been adopted. We are abolishing the Scottish and Western Approaches commands, involving a saving of £73,000. By doing away with the "Alexandra," of which His Majesty has patriotically approved, the "Enchantress," and other yachts, we shall save £80,000. The closing of the War Signal Stations will save another £50,000. We are reducing stocks from three to two months —a saving on the pre-Washington Navy of £319,000. We are abolishing a hospital ship and making other reductions in medical establishments to the extent, apart from the effects of Washington, of £58,000. We are saving a further £13,000 on Dartmouth. Of the dockyard reductions, including the reduction at Gibraltar, some £800,000 might conceivably have been carried out before Washington. The saving on the policing of our dockyards and depots by the substitution of a special marine pensioner police force for the Metropolitan Police, whose recent increases of pay have rendered them far too expensive for us to keep, will amount to £40,000 in the current year and eventually to about £100,000 a year. We are saving a further £483,000 on Vote 10—Works. The figures I am giving are all as compared with the July sketch Estimates upon which the Geddes Committee worked, and not with the Esti-
mates for the current year. There is £100,000 in reduction of Admiralty staff, in addition to the reduction of £265,000 effected in July. Lastly, there is a saving of £390,000 in the withdrawal of the travelling concessions, which I hope the railway companies may be able to see their way to restore on the pre-War basis. With the decision of the Government that we shall omit the proposed officers' marriage allowance—a regrettable necessity— and minor savings not actually suggested by the Geddes Committee, this brings the total administrative economies which we have been able to carry out in compliance with the recommendations of the Committee, or at any rate on similar lines, to nearly £3,000,000. There is a further saving due to the continuing fall in prices and wages below the fall estimated for in July last of not far off £1,600,000 over the whole of the Votes. That is the utmost by which the Estimates could have been reduced, apart from the Washington Conference.
I now come to the most substantial part of our economics, those resulting from the Washington Conference. I treat these as assured, though I need not remind the House that they are contingent upon the ratification of the Naval Treaty by the Powers concerned, and would have to be reconsidered if the Treaty miscarried. The chief direct economy arises from the abandonment of the construction of the four super "Hoods" and the substitution in their place of two vessels of 35,000 tons, the maximum tonnage limit of new war-ships under the Treaty. These two battleships will, owing partly to the necessity of making out complete new sets of designs, and partly for reasons of economy, not be laid down till the beginning of 1923. The to1 al expenditure in connection with them is estimated at £721,000 in the new Financial Year as compared with £11,810,000 included for the four original ships in the July Sketch Estimate. This is a saving of well over £11,000,000, of which nearly £1,250,000 is an actual reduction on the amount provided for capital ship construction in 1921–22, while the balance represents the liberation of nearly £10,000,000 of our July economies. A further direct saving of £250,000 in these Estimates results from the reduction of our peace requirements by 2,700 men in consequence of the scrapping of a further 12 older capital ships.
These are the only economies directly and necessarily following upon the Naval Treaty; but the whole international situation has been so profoundly modified, not only by the Naval Treaty but by the whole series of Agreements concluded at Washington, that the Admiralty have felt justified, in view of the urgent national need for economy, in re-interpreting the one-power standard, as fixed and laid down at Washington, on a definitely lower plane of preparation for immediate war than even the present, which itself marks a great easing off from the pre-War period. In pursuance of this policy we have carried out a further scheme of drastic reductions, carrying economy to the utmost limit compatible with the maintenance, in any sense of the word, of our accepted standard of sea power, and with the efficient training of the Navy in peace. While it is impossible to reduce the Atlantic or Mediterranean fleets any further without destroying the tactical training of the Navy, we have decided to place the "Renown' in reserve on the completion of the Prince of Wales' tour, to reduce the already inadequate number of light cruisers abroad, by keeping the "Birmingham" in reserve, to reduce to two-fifths complements yet another of the destroyer flotillas belonging to the Atlantic Fleet, bringing the total number in full commission with that fleet to 40 destroyers, a figure which no-one with knowledge of modern naval conditions can regard as more than the barest sufficiency. Another 23 destroyers of the Local Defence Flotillas will be reduced to reserve, and 27 out of our total of 85 submarines, at present in reserve, are to be scrapped entirely.
Again, while the Atlantic Fleet itself cannot be reduced, the naval staff have agreed on a reduction of the peace complements of the capital ships by nearly 16 per cent, below the establishment laid down as the result of war experience. Such other reductions as have been found possible are to be made right through the active fleet, and a total decrease of nearly 4,000 officers and men on Vote A will thus be effected. The reductions in the numbers afloat resulting from scrapping vessels now in reserve, transferring others from active service to reserve, and reducing of complements, all enable consequential reductions to be made in the peace margin of men crossing reliefs, sick, training, or on the staff of the training
establishments. To secure the utmost economy of men in this respect we are abolishing two-year commissions and keeping ships abroad for not exceeding three years in order to keep down the numbers crossing reliefs, and we have rigidly combed out the staffs of all the shore establishments. In one way or another we are effecting a total reduction of 20,000 officers and men, from 118,000 (exclusive of coastguard) to 98,000, involving a saving of something like £1,300,000.
Other important savings over and above the July Sketch Estimate, include a further £920,000 by reducing the fuel allowance to the fleet to the lowest possible limit, by laying up some of the fuelling ships, by reducing the reserve stock of coal, and other similar economies, all involving considerable temporary in convenience and loss of efficienc—

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: A great risk.

Mr. AMERY: A reduction of £500,000 in the scheme of providing oil fuel reserves at various bases abroad—a reduction, I might add, only made with the greatest reluctance and anxiety in view of the serious immobility of our fleet outside European waters owing to the absence of the necessary oil fuelling bases; a yet further reduction of £350,000 in the dockyards, and a reduction of £800,000 by deferring the overhaul and reconditioning of surplus stocks of ammunition, by diminishing the reserves of mines and depth charges, and by delaying the completion of the necessary equipment of armour-piercing shell. In all these various ways another £3,900,000 approximately have been squeezed off the Votes, making a total economy resulting from, or made possible by, the Washington Conference of over £15,200,000. The position as regards the dockyards is clearly set forth in the memorandum attached to the First Lord's statement, and will no doubt be fully discussed during the further progress of these Estimates.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: It certainly will.

Mr. AMERY: The reduction of over 10,000 men contemplated is being made solely in order to meet the need for
avoiding expenditure in the immediate future, and involves the delaying or abandoning of a great deal of important and necessary work. As far as possible we are spreading this reduction evenly. It was impossible in the interests of economy, with the reduced work to be done, to continue maintaining Rosyth in its present very costly inchoate state as a dockyard centre still in the making, and it has been decided to place it on the footing of becoming mainly a docking yard, making use of its exceptional facilities in this respect. This decision, I may hasten to assure hon. Members who are specially interested in Rosyth, is one which deals purely with the temporary financial emergency and in no way prejudices the ultimate destiny of Rosyth, the great natural advantages of which are fully recognised. I can also assure the same hon. Members that we are trying as far as we can to ease the situation for the men in this dockyard, where the rate of reduction has been so much heavier than elsewhere.
There is one group of Votes, that for the non-effective services (Votes 13–15), which shows an increase of £3,195,000. Of this, £3,000,000 represents a provisional estimate of the cost of the special arrangements which will have to be made in order to make possible, within the year, a reduction in the personnel of the Navy far exceeding any reductions that can be secured by ordinary wastage, as well as to provide for the increased charges for gratuities and pensions arising from the heavy reduction at the dockyards. It is a purely conjectural estimate, as it has been quite impossible in the brief time at our disposal since the reductions were decided upon to frame special schemes of retirement which will meet a very complicated problem, and which will be fair not only as between the different Services, but also as between the many ranks and categories in each Service. Such schemes will, I hope, be announced shortly. All I will say about them to-day is that they must not be ungenerous. The State cannot afford, even in these difficult days, to disregard the just and equitable rights of those who have given the best of their lives to its service.
There is one scale on which I fear it will not be possible to compensate those who may have to leave the service in consequence of these reductions, and that is
the scale of the pay and emoluments with which they are credited in the Third Report of the Geddes Committee. Here, again, I do not wish to be controversial, but I may say that a calculation according to which the lodging and other allowances given to junior officers, for instance, when away from their ships or other establishments are supposed to be a standing part of their emoluments, is surely rather misleading. The suggestion that a sub-lieutenant receives, or that the State is out of pocket on his behalf by an extra 7s. 1d. a day, or £135 a year, because he is allowed to swing a hammock between decks and share one-twentieth part of the light and warmth of a gun-room, and half the spare time of a marine servant, has really an element of unconscious humour which will appeal to no one so much as those junior officers themselves. Nor do I think it is really much use when by these means you have worked out that a sub-lieutenant gets or costs over £500 a year, and that a junior lieutenant commander gets £900 a year, to compare these figures with the pay of the Civil Service, without, taking into account not only the enforced early retirement of the great majority, the discomforts, the separation from home, with the cost of keeping up a separate establishment, the hardships, the danger ever present, not only of a great war, but perhaps of death in some trifling scuffle during a landing party, or in some accident to a boat. The business test, after all, is that the emoluments are not more than sufficient to secure for the nation by voluntary enlistment the type of officers and men which it needs.
These £.3,000,000 are a necessary offset against our economies, a special war charge, as the Geddes Committee suggested, and consequently diminish the total reduction on the net Estimates to £17,595,000. The reduction on the effective Votes, which is the test of our effort at economy, is £20,791,000. The resultant effective Vote is, in fact, when allowance is made for the altered value of money, just half of the similar Vote for 1914–15. The proportion of this Naval Vote to the total national expenditure, excluding pensions and debt charges, is 15 per cent, as compared with 28 per cent, in 1914–15. The actual reduction is 33 per cent, on the Vote for 1920–21. I trust that the House will agree that these figures represent a genuine and most substantial con-
tribution to the public need. The credit for this result I should like to give wholeheartedly to my naval colleagues. From Lord Beatty downwards, far from resenting the demand for reduction, they have thrown themselves with the utmost keenness into the task of discovering means of economy in every direction without impairing the training or the strength of the Navy in essentials. I do not believe that by any other method could we have secured such large reductions with comparatively so little damage to the enduring life of the Service.
We have reached the limit. Things have been scraped to the bone. Only the effects of a further fall in prices, or the possibility of other navies following up Washington by some yet more advanced policy in the reduction of armaments, would make possible additional economies in subsequent years We cannot go further unless, indeed, we abandon the one-power standard altogether, and drop to the rank of the second or third naval power—and if we drop once we shall do so for all time. We have no right to do that. We owe the maintenance of that standard to our fellow subjects in the Empire, with whom we formally, by resolution of the Empire Conference, agreed only last summer that the standard of equality with any other Power was our minimum. We have collaborated again with them at Washington in these last few months in re-affirming that standard and definitely fixing it in actual terms of ships and tonnage in the Naval Treaty. We owe it in trust to future generations of our people here and across the seas.
All else in politics may change; one principle stands firm and beyond question. We live and move and have our being as a nation and as an empire by our power to keep open and free the highways of the sea. That power we can never surrender even to the best friend or the closest ally. We have agreed at Washington to accept terms of equality in naval power with the one nation with which, above all things, we wish to live on terms of friendship. We regard that equality as one not of competition but of co-operation in maintaining the peace of the world. But even for the purposes of that co-operation we, with our traditions and responsibilities for the peace of the world, cannot afford to be less than equals. That is the meaning of these Estimates. They
represent what I believe is a fair and true adjustment of our great naval responsibilities to a difficult and anxious domestic situation. I trust that the House will recognise this in supporting the Motion that you, Sir, do leave the Chair.

Mr. LAMBERT: Rarely has the House listened to a more eloquent speech than that which my hon. Friend has just delivered, and I cordially concur with him in his remarks at the commencement as to the debt of gratitude which we all owe to the great United States of America. We owed them a great debt of gratitude when they came to our help in April, 1917, and we owe to President Harding and his advisers a great debt for the Washington Conference, and the very successful result which I am sure has been achieved there. We owe also a special debt to the Lord President of the Council for the splendid manner in which he upheld the finest types of British statesmanship. I take precisely the same view as my hon. Friend about the all importance of the Navy. That this is an island dependent upon foreign trade is too often forgotten, and we have to secure the communications of that trade and to secure our food supplies. The Navy is all important in these matters. We had an opportunity yesterday of listening to a very eloquent speech by the distinguished Field Marshal the Member for North Down (Sir H. Wilson), who adorned the Debate with his experience. But without the Navy you could not move a division of troops from these islands, and the magnificent armies which were transported across the sea during the War were all dependent for safe conduct upon the Navy. But while the Navy is all important, there is a still more important factor, and that is finance, the question whether this country can carry the burden. From what I can judge, of the Estimates to be presented, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the coming financial year, will budget for something like £900,000,000 or four and a-half times as much as the amount was before the War.

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; House counted; and 40 Members being present—

Mr. LAMBERT: The fighting force to-day, according to Estimate, are to cost
£137,000,000 against £80,000,000 pre-War. I am wondering when peace is going to break out in Europe or in the world so that we may have a reduction in the Estimate for fighting forces. I sympathise heartily with the Admiralty in the very difficult task which they have before them. They have to make great reductions. That must mean great hardship to many, possibly thousands of men, who have served their country devotedly and well during the War. It is very easy to make an increase in establishment and expenditure. It is extremely difficult to cut it down. Therefore I do not minimise for one moment the difficulties which exist, and I do not envy my hon. Friend or the First Lord of the Admiralty their very difficult task. But may I say that when we are asked to believe that economy has been the ruling note of the Admiralty during the past three years I must take leave to doubt it. After all, before the War, in 1914, the Naval Estimates were £51,550,000. To-day had it not been for the Washington Conference, my hon. Friend says that they would have been £81,000,000 or £82,000,000, but they are £65,000,000 with the Washington Conference. Therefore we are spending £14,000,000 a year more on the Navy than when the German fleet was in being and was a threatening menace to the security of this country. I do not understand why the Estimates in these conditions should be £14,000,000 more, or had it not been for the Washington Conference, something like £32,000,000 more.

Mr. HOHLER: Wages have increased.

Mr. LAMBERT: Yes, that covers a certain field, but if we are not to have a reduction in warlike implements in future then good-bye to civilisation. In 1914 the personnel of the Navy was 151,000. To-day you propose to reduce it to 98,000, and I do not understand why the cost should be £15,000,000 more after making this great reduction. My hon. Friend has made a vigorous attack on the Geddes Committee. He did it before in a very able memorandum; he has done it this afternoon. I do not wonder that Sir Eric Geddes has left the Treasury Bench. If he could have been there to listen to the attack made upon him by my hon. Friend I am sure he would have shrivelled up almost into nothingness, but I confess that I think that the
country owes a considerable debt of gratitude to the Geddes Committee. The Geddes Committee have brought out many very salient facts of the Admiralty accounts. I do not think that it is quite wise for my hon. Friend to accuse them of gross incompetence and reckless disregard of the nation's need.

Mr. AMERY: I must interrupt my hon. Friend's argument for a moment. What I said was that the charge of extravagance, if true, would be one of incompetency and disregard of the nation's need on the part of the Admiralty. Certainly I did not make that charge against the Geddes Committee.

Mr. LAMBERT: I took down these words. I considered them rather strong. I thought my hon. Friend was attacking the Geddes Committee.

Mr. AMERY: I was only disclaiming their charge as applicable to the Admiralty.

Mr. LAMBERT: Then the Geddes Committee is guilty of gross incompetence in making the Report which it made to Parliament. My hon. Friend, of course, has got a great command of language, but I was thinking that possibly he might have modified some of these adjectives and adverbs with a little wisdom when dealing with the Committee which was appointed by his own colleague the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But let me turn to one or two of the facts that have been brought out by the Geddes Committee. That is one of the things that the House, of Commons never can do; it can never go into the Estimate Vote by Vote. All that the House of Commons can do is to fix a certain sum which the Admiralty or War Office may spend, and to leave them to spend it to the best advantage. To go into all the Votes is impossible. I have given my experience before as to how Members came over when I was at the Admiralty before the War, and in an hour they were snowed over by documents. But the Geddes Committee has given us a few facts, and you cannot get rid of the Geddes Committee in the airy way in which my right hon. Friend has done. After all, Sir Erie Geddes has been First Lord of the Admiralty. He had as Secretary of this Committee a very able civil servant, who was Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty.
What the Geddes Committee complain of and, I think, justly, if their figures are right, is that you are keeping up an enormous Navy on shore to the detriment of the righting men. On page 14 they give a figure for coastguards, harbour ships and retinue. I agree that the word "retinue" has a sarcastic flavour. That group of shore establishments shows an increase in personnel from 6,700 pre-War to 16,060, an increase of 9,360 in personnel in the shore establishments. That is the most wasteful form of naval expenditure. I say deliberately, with considerable experience of naval Estimates and naval administration, that, if these figures are right, it only shows that the Admiralty are not alive to the fact that what eats away money are all these shore establishments, all these small depots here, there and everywhere dotted around the country. We have not got the Estimates for this year. I hope that the very wise admonition to the Department will be taken heed of next year, but last year I observe in the Estimates an increase in the number of new establishments dotted about all over the country. Every one of these new establishments has got to be guarded and watched; it has got to have a personnel attached to it which is of no effective fighting value. Moreover, they have all to be guarded. The Geddes Committee have shown clearly that the cost of guarding all these establishments, especially by the Metropolitan Police, is enormous.
5.0 P.M.
I remember the views of a very distinguished, probably the most able naval administrator we have had for generations, the late Lord Fisher. I am not ashamed to have gained from him any knowledge I may have about naval affairs. When the hon. Member for Devonport (Sir C. Kin-loch-Cooke) jeers, I am reminded that no naval reduction suits him. He thinks a reduction not only endangers the country but endangers his seat at Devonport.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: It is as safe as yours.

Mr. LAMBERT: The late Lord Fisher held that all these shipyards meant a withdrawal from the effective fighting forces of the Navy. What has the Admiralty done during the last three years since the Armistice? Take the dockyards. I have mentioned the subject before, but it has fallen upon deaf ears, and I have
not the smallest doubt it will fall on deaf cars again until the electors have to pronounce on the question of economy. That will be the final test. Before the War we have five dockyards in this country; to-day we have six. What earthly use can there be for six dockyards as against five before the War? I am put ting aside Haulbowline, which is to be closed, but even then you have one more dock to-day than you had when the German fleet was in being. I shall not trench on the subject which the hon. and gallant Member for West Derby (Rear-Admiral Sir R. Hall) is to put before the House. He will render a great service to the Navy by his speech as he rendered great service to the Navy during the War. I ask the Admiralty to give little consideration to the question of the dockyards. Are the dockyards in a position where they can be attacked by-aircraft? No one knows the future of aircraft. Are the dockyards in sound strategic positions? Take Rosyth. You are about to reduce Rosyth. I see the First Lord in his statement says that it is to revert to a docking establishment. For how long have you decided to reduce Rosyth? I think the decision can have been reached only recently. What are you going to do with the enormous number of auxiliary establishments at Rosyth, the magazines, oil fuel depots and all the other things that, are congregated there? I was amazed yesterday to be told—the Civil Lord can say if it is true—that within the last few months, the Admiralty have feud something like 100 acres of land at an annual quit rent for the erection of houses at Rosyth. I believe my information is correct. There has been really no foresight in the method of dealing with the dockyards. The First Lord said that the reductions in the dockyards will delay repairs:
They necessitate delaying or abandoning a great deal of important ship construction and reconstruction as well as the restriction of necessary repairs and refits of ships of the Fleet.
You are actually going to reduce ship repairing, although there are far more men in the dockyards to-day than there were before the War. In an answer to question yesterday, it was stated that there were nearly 60,000 men in the dockyards, whereas before the War, when the German fleet was a menace, there were only 54,200. What is the reason for em-
ploying 5,600 more men in the dockyards to-day? If, as the First Lord says, repairs are to be delayed, what are the men doing? Is it true, as is stated in the Geddes Report, that in the Royal Dockyards the cost of repairing ships is so enormous? This matter cannot be dismissed in an airy fashion, because on the Geddes Committee there were able business men who understood shipbuilding. They stated that in the dockyards, for every pound's worth of material used, £3 was paid in wages, and that in private shipyards for every pound's worth of material used, £1 10s. only was paid in wages.

Sir EVAN JONES: Private yards are for construction; dockyards are for repairs.

The CIVIL LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Commander Eyres-Monsell): Establishment charges.

Mr. LAMBERT: What is meant by establishment charges? I am certain that if to-day skilled shipbuilders went through the dockyards they would find an enormous amount of waste going on. There is no doubt about it. You hear it on every hand. I hear it in Devonshire, at Plymouth; there is no secret about it. I have asked over and over again that you should make a complete survey of these yards. Let us know what yards are wanted and what yards are not wanted. It must mean great hardship and great dislocation. I know that. Men will have to be put out. It is far better to let the men and the towns know what they have to face than to keep on with this heart-breaking discharging of a few hundred men here and there. In the Estimates of last year I find that you are spending on oil fuel depots something like £5,000,000, and you are having them built all over the world. You are putting up oil fuel depots at Singapore, Rangoon and the Falkland Islands. In the event of war how are they to be protected? An oil fuel tank is like an enormous gasometer. How can you protect Singapore? It was with the utmost difficulty that the oil tanks were protected in this country when we had all the resources of the Navy around our shores. I am certain that the Admiralty is wasting an enormous amount of money in building these depots at the most costly period in our history.
It is the same with the putting up of houses at Rosyth. You are building them at a most costly time. We have to reckon that there will be a few years of peace after the terrible War. If that is not so, what becomes of the men who signed the Peace Treaty? Are we to be always preparing for war? If so, let us finish our civilisation. On the question of education, I see it is proposed to increase the cost of the cadet to the parent from £75 to £150 a year. I think that is a false economy. The cadet costs the nation £462 a year. For 445 cadets I see there is a staff of 529, according to the Geddes Committee. Are those figures right? There is no doubt about the extravagance. When you increase the fees of the boys, it will mean that the naval officer of the future will be drawn from that class of parent who can pay £150 a year for education.

Commander BELLAIRS: There are special provisions for others.

Mr. LAMBERT: If you put in £150 as the fee, that will be the fee. I agree that there are special provisions. I do not believe that all the brains in the country are possessed by boys whose parents can afford to pay £150 a year for their education. This arrangement will keep out many bright boys. You are to give the Navy the best material, the best that science can produce. But you are not to give them the best of the manhood of the country. At the beginning of the War we failed in explosives, in torpedoes, and in other essentials of the Navy. We ought to have for the Navy the very best brains of the country, irrespective of what the parents can pay. I ask that there shall be a little clear thinking in the matter of naval policy. New weapons have come, and come to stay, and surely you must scrap the old weapons. It is no use piling the one upon the other. My hon. Friend talks about the one-Power standard. I do not quite understand what he means by the one-Power standard. I understood the old two-Power standard against France and Russia, and then we had practically a 2-keel to one standard against Germany; but the German and Russian fleets have gone, and France and Italy only remain in Europe. Therefore the strategy of the British Fleet was based upon the narrow waters of Europe. There are only two other Powers left, the United States of
America and Japan. I observe that the First Lord in his statement talks about the necessity for keeping mine-layers. He says:
One of the main lessons of the late War was the importance in modern naval warfare of various auxiliary vessels of minesweepers, mine-layers, anti-submarine craft, etc., with which our Navy, in common with other navies, was ill-equipped before the War.
What are you going to do with these minelayers in your harbours here? How can they be of service. I exclude the possibility of fighting with America, but supposing we were by any chance at war with Japan, what good would these minelayers be here in these harbours?

Rear-Admiral Sir REGINALD HALL: To lay mines.

Mr. LAMBERT: Where?

Sir R. HALL: In Japanese waters.

Mr. LAMBERT: I do not like to get into collision with so great a naval expert as my hon. and gallant Friend, but how is he going to get his mine-layers to Japan?

Sir R. HALL: Under the escort of the British Fleet.

Mr. LAMBERT: I hope that in carrying out such an escort the British Fleet would not suffer the same fate as the Russian Fleet, because I cannot imagine anything more dangerous than to send the British Fleet thousands of miles from its base.

Sir R. HALL: May I ask my right hon. Friend does he think that nothing is more dangerous than to send the British Fleet out to fight?

Mr. LAMBERT: No, I am rather surprised at that interruption. The hon. and gallant Gentleman must know that Admiral Earl Beatty could not take his fleet through the North Sea and how are you going to take it to Japan?

Captain Viscount CURZON: Would the right hon. Gentleman say on what occasion Earl Beatty could not do so?

Mr. LAMBERT: Not without sweeping the mines.

Viscount CURZON: For the information of the right hon. Gentleman I may say that the fleet has been brought freely through the North Sea minefields by the use of paravanes.

Mr. LAMBERT: I am informed that Admiral Earl Beatty had to take great precautions before he could go through the North Sea, and it is perfectly well known that he could not take his capital ships, and would not dare to take his capital ships, from the base at Scapa Flow down, say, to Chatham.

Viscount CURZON: Does the right hon. Gentleman not know that the Fleet actually did go through the minefields, and I can give him a case if he will refer to it?

Mr. LAMBERT: Does the Noble Lord really suggest that there must not be an enormously restricted area for battleships if they are to go through the North Sea under such conditions?

Viscount CURZON: You referred to going to Japan.

Mr. LAMBERT: What is the difference? Really and truly I am astonished when I hoar a naval question being discussed in this way. What is the difference between going through the North Sea and going out to Japan?

Viscount CURZON: Because the North Sea is much more favourable to the use of mines than any other sea in the world.

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER (Mr. James Hope): I must ask that the right hon. Member should be allowed to proceed without interruption.

Mr. LAMBERT: I will state my view, which is based on the opinion of an eminent naval expert, that if you were at war with Japan you could not send the British Fleet to the other side of Singapore. I do not care what hon. Members may say. The Noble Lord may tell us that Earl Beatty was able to manœuvre his fleet in the North Sea and execute a great number of movements despite submarines and mines. I am rather astonished that he should be able to give me that information. I was referring to this one-power standard, and I was asking that there should be clear thinking on the matter. I do not believe we could defend these oil-fuel tanks which we are putting up at Rangoon and Singapore. What sort of bases are we going to have over there for a great fleet? Where are our bases and docks? Then hon. and gallant Members tell me that we could send the Fleet to Japan and
Singapore. I never heard such a thing in my life. There are no docks there big enough for large battleships. I am amazed, if it is the new naval strategy, that we are to spend money on enormous ships to send to Japan. No wonder money is being wasted. If this is the policy it will be wasted, and the Government will have a very serious reckoning to meet. If this is the naval strategy now animating the Board of Admiralty, I do not wonder that they want this very large sum of money, and it will not surprise me that they are going to spend it in an extremely inefficient manner. I am going to stand to my guns, and I am perfectly in earnest, despite all that has been said by the hon. and gallant Member.

Sir R. HALL: I never said that the Admiralty intended to send the Fleet to Japan. The right hon. Gentleman asked how mine-layers were to get to Japan. It was he who wanted to get them there, and I told him how to get them there.

Mr. LAMBERT: I do not want to get them there. I said that they were here, and I asked of what use they were here in these narrow waters, when there is no German Fleet? I asked that question in perfect good faith. You have got your mine-layers and these immense shore establishments, and what good are you doing with them. The only power you can fight is Japan, and you cannot get your mine-layers there. We have to take stock of this situation and ask ourselves as to the meaning of "a one-power standard." The instructions given to the Admiralty were that the Navy should be maintained in sufficient strength to ensure the safety of the British Empire and its sea communications against any one other naval power. Do you mean to tell me that you could defend the whole communications of the Empire against Japan? I have asked over and over again that we should have a little clear thinking. We should not be hustling and bustling in the building of capital ships, and I am glad to see we have been saved from that by the wisdom of the Washington Conference. We ought to look at the strategic position and the possible enemies we may have to meet. The only powers with great battle fleets are the United States of America and Japan. What is the good of having these bases here in this country
and spending enormous sums of money on ships that will never be used for the purpose for which apparently they are desired. The Government as a whole should take into account the whole of the naval forces, the whole of the military forces, and the whole of the air forces, and find out as to how all three forces can be best guaranteed for the security of the Empire at the lowest; possible cost.

Lieut.-Colonel BURGOYNE: I desire in the first place very humbly to associate myself with the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, in his first remarks of congratulation to the Parliamentary Secretary for the admirable and lucid introduction of these Estimates. I am rather sorry the hon. Gentleman did not tell us more in regard to the effect of the Washington Conference upon our naval policy, and if the House will forgive me I purpose to devote such few observations as I shall put before them, to that particular aspect of the question. I do not want to follow the right hon. Gentleman in the controversial cross fire which has been taking place. Probably it would upset me and my argument, more than it did him. The reason why I wish to concentrate upon this particular aspect is because in the first sentence of his explanatory statement the First Lord refers to the Washington Conference as the real reason why reductions have taken place. He does incidentally mention concurrent administrative economies, but makes no reference—leaving that to his lieutenant to what has been the result of the Geddes Report. In view of the importance to the world of this Conference, it should not go out to the public at large, that the real value of what has been done in Washington, can be summed up merely in pounds, shillings and pence. That Conference, in my view, is the most remarkable episode in the naval history of our country. It abolishes for all time the discussion of naval power on the lines of two keels to one, or two power or other standards. It stabilises naval strengths as they exist to-day and it wipes away any possibility of competitive building in the future. There is one thing, however, as to which we want no mistake made in the country, and this is where the argument of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) went wrong. It was not a conference for disarmament. Indeed the President specifically stated that was not his intention
in convening it, and if the matter is looked at in that light, I think the House will find that the economies now suggested in the statement of the Financial Secretary, are all that we could possibly hope for as the result of the agreement arrived at.
If the House will permit me, I should like to draw attention to a matter referred to briefly by the Parliamentary Secretary, and that is the state of our Fleet at the commencement of the War, during it, and at its close. At the commencement of the War we not only had a two-keels to one standard, but rather more than that, and we were supreme upon the seas. As the War proceeded, a hectic energy was displayed in naval construction, by Japan, the United States, and ourselves, and also Germany, but Italy and France, which until that time had been regarded as potential naval factors in the world, went out of existence as such, and devoted the whole of their energies to building up their positions on land. The result, as stated by the Parliamentary Secretary, was, that when the War closed, if we had proceeded with the programmes then under construction or projected, by 1925 the United States of America would have had precisely double our amount of tonnage in capital ships. I do not think that fact is sufficiently appreciated by the world at large.
We were faced, therefore, by two alternatives. Either we had to set out upon a frenzied programme of construction, to meet which the four ships suggested last year would have been illusory and silly, or else we had to be prepared in the course of two or three years to take a second place in naval strength in the world. Probably, with the circumstances of wealth in Japan and the financial burdens placed upon us, we should eventually have fallen to third place. Out of that arose two considerations—how best we could deal, in the first place, with our fleet, and, secondly, whether it would be possible not to continue the ruinous expenditure which had built it up. The Financial Secretary could have taken a little more credit to the Admiralty for a step that I have not seen quoted and which has never been appreciated. They started the ball rolling out of which arose the suggestion of the Washington Conference, by making the most drastic reductions in the commis-
sioned strength of our fleets at sea and of their own volition placing upon the list of vessels to be destroyed an enormous number of capital ships, thereby, at one fell blow, showing to the world that we were not prepared to commence competition as had been the case before the War, with this result, that although, under the Agreements of the Washington Conference, we are to dispose of 19 battleships, 15 had prior to those Agreements being published to the world, already been condemned by the Admiralty. If this fact had been realised a little more closely, I think we should have had rather less wild talk as to losing our naval supremacy.
The term "naval supremacy" is wiped out of the British dictionary; we are finished in that line, and we can be rather proud of it, for what we have done is that we have announced to the world that we are prepared to go into partnership with the other great English-speaking race and are going to ask them in the future to bear something of the burdens and responsibilities of naval control. What was it precisely that Mr. Secretary Hughes proposed? His proposition was that we should accept a naval strength based upon the then existing completed American Navy, utilizing that as a unit. That being so, and accepting that as a formula, I want to turn for a few moments to the details as they affect the Various classes of vessels. Before the War, mainly because they bulked the largest in the public eye, and also because undoubtedly—and it is a thing I would never forego in argument—they were the controlling factors at sea, we always discussed battleships as the leading unit of our naval forces, but even more so should we, in making reference to the Agreements under the Washington Conference, pay regard to our strength in these capital ships, since in them alone have the Powers accepted the unit of strength, whereas in all the other types of ships, barring protected cruisers, upon which I desire to say something a little later on, there is not only great freedom allowed to the Powers concerned, but, in the case of submarines, to come up to the strength that has been agreed, we could build another 25,000 tons weight, and, in regard to cruisers, the United States have a matter of 200,000 or more tons in hand.
As to the battleships, under that Agreement the United States have given up 15 ships that they had building, and 15 older vessels. Those 15 that they had building had already had spent upon them $332,000,000, or a matter of £80,000,000 sterling, and I suppose there has never been any parallel to such a vast cutting of loss in any national considerations before. For ourselves, we were to give up 19 old vessels, of which 15 had already been condemned, and four new ones, and Japan a matter of 8 or 10 new ones and 10 old vessels. Then came certain modifications, but before I deal with them I want the House to recognise that on the subject of battleships there are four main points to bear in mind. The first is the vessels to be scrapped, the second is the ships that we are to build and when we can build them, the third is the 10 years' holiday, and the fourth is the limitation in size to which those ships can be constructed. Let me take the 10 years' holiday first. At the end of those 10 years we are permitted to replace such ships as have reached 20 years of age from the date of their completion, and they are not to be laid down until 17 years after that period of completion. Here it seems to me is the folly of that 10 years' holiday, if it be a folly, and I want to see whether there is not something deeper behind it, which I sincerely hope, for in 1931, when the 10 years are up, it will be up to us to have to build a matter of seven ships in that year, three in 1932, and four in 1933, whereas the United States in 1931 will be called upon to maintain the then relative strength with no less than nine new capital ships of 35,000 tons. We are this year, under a modification which only came in because of Japan's desire to retain a vessel nearly finished, the "Mutsu," to lay down two ships of 35,000 tons.
I have never believed that we have seen the end of the battleship. Nothing that we can invent will do away with it as being king of the seas except one thing, and that one thing is this 10 years' naval holiday. I am wondering whether in 1931 there will be any nation which is going to be brave enough—perhaps foolish enough, but certainly brave enough—to go to its people and demand an expenditure of £10,000,000 per unit for new con-
struction after a holiday of 10 years. My own view was voiced admirably by Admiral Sims when he said that the battleship cannot be replaced, but is destined to fade away; and I go further. During these 10 years, are we to ignore the greatest coming factor in warfare, namely, warfare in the air? I do hope that we shall not get our ideas mixed up by taking the coming service and adding it to those that are going down hill, but will have developed a unity of ideas in defence so that all the three great Services shall be under one head, and by that means I really believe we can come to a proper conclusion as to the value or want of value of the battleship. Last year I ventured very humbly to suggest to this House that we should not lay-down the four super-Hoods, and I am afraid my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary rather jeered at me when I pointed out the possibility of the Washington Conference being successful. It is never very dignified to say, "I told you so," and it is of no value from a back-bench Member, but I feel the same in regard to these two ships.
What are we going to do? We are developing an absolutely new type in the first place, and there are going to be just two of them. They are not a tactical unit, and we are going to have no more for 10 years. We are going to put 16-inch guns into them, and they will be the only 16-inch guns in the Service. We are going to develop what France possessed, which was shown, when the great War came, to be an absolute danger, namely, a fleet of samples; but—and here is an argument which technical experts uphold, and far be it from me to argue upon matters in which they are the experts— if they desire to have a unit which is to incorporate all the lessons of the great War, let us put one down. Hon. Members ought to note this fact, that while before the War the cost of building a battle unit worked out at something about £100 to £120 a ton, I am convinced, although I have no figures at hand to prove it, and although two years ago it was costing America £300 a ton and ourselves £250, we are not likely next year to produce those ships at under £200 a ton, and that means that they will, cost us certainly £7,000,000and probably nearer £10,000,000. I would plead—although it is a criticism in which I am quite prepared to be swayed by arguments which might be
brought up later—I would plead that we lay down one ship, instead of two, to get a tactical unit that will be of no value whatsoever and which probably will be rendered obsolescent by the development of the Air Service.
I would like to pass to the cruisers. If there is one feature of the Naval Agreement to which exception could be taken by those who study our history as a world-wide nation, it is that we have agreed to have no more tonnage in the matter of cruisers than the United States. We are each of us to have 450,000 tons weight of light cruisers in the future. We have got that to the full; America has scarcely any worth the name. Before the War we were supreme in that matter, and very properly so, and it is significant that never have our Sea Lords been prepared to accept any standard, any ratio, whatsoever in regard to our smaller craft, having regard to the fact that the number we require is dependent upon our responsibilities overseas and the extent of our possessions there. But having said so much, I think if we have gone to the United States and said to them, "Come in with us; help us to maintain the control of the seas and all that it means," if we are going to give them one-half of the share of responsibility, we ought not to quibble at this point, important as that is to our race. My hon. Friend the Financial Secretary mentioned destroyers, and I am sure left an impression on the mind of the House that we were only to have a matter of 63 destroyers in existence, but I think the House should appreciate that at the present time, outside destroyers that are attached to our Colonial Navies, we have, of large vessels of from 900 tons to a matter of 1,400 or 1,500 tons, all of them built since 1915 and 1916, 180; and I want to ask the House what has happened to those other 120 destroyers. Here we have economies being called for. If they are needed, let him tell us so. At the present time, if we take the list of destroyers of the world, we shall find that the United States have completed a considerably larger number than we have, but what have they done in the last fortnight? They have courageously scrapped 150, all modern vessels. What do we want them for? We certainly are not going to build anything else for the purposes of war in the next ten years or so, and there is nothing in the new pro-
gramme. We find that in his explanatory statement the First Lord says:
Indeed, the Admiralty have gone further in accepting drastic economies, and consequent risks, which could only be justified on the assumption that the British Fleet will not be engaged in any great war for many years to come.
If they have taken these risks in regard to battleships, why maintain these destroyers? I know it must be a great wrench if a vessel has been completed to leave it lying up there and not to say, "Well, we will just hang on a bit, for we may require it," and then to be called upon to scrap it when you know it has cost £200,000. It is, however, infinitely-more economical to take £100,000,000 worth of a Navy, if we actually do not want it, and scrap it straight away, than to maintain it for four or five years, at the end of which time it will inevitably be scrapped, with all the resultant cost of maintaining the personnel during that period.
From destroyers, I wish to go to the smaller subsidiary craft. We were told that the economies have been scraped to the bone. I wish we could be given a few more figures. We do not want figures to worry us, but figures for information. If in regard to subsidiary craft we had been told by the Financial Secretary that in 1914 there were in all only 14 mine-layers and patrol boats considered to be efficient, we should then have understood his remarks, or the remark of the First Lord, on page 8 of his explanatory statement that the Navy "was ill-equipped before the War," but he did not tell us that when the War closed those 14 had been increased to 3,714, and he did not tell us how many of those 3,714 have now been placed upon the scrap heap. If, six months before the War broke out, we could have had a committee of expert officers at the Admiralty, and they could have had sufficient prevision to have stated that we should require in the War nearly 4,000 auxiliary craft, could they have sat down with the finest designers and given us the vessels we eventually built up? It would, of course, have been absolutely impossible. These craft invariably come with every great war. They are the creatures of circumstances as they arise. You can build them as you need them, and if you built craft that you considered were suitable for the last War now, they would be un-
suitable for the next war when it came. That is absolutely so. Each war develops the inventive genius of a race, and that inventive genius never stops still. It would be ridiculous to maintain anything like 3,000 or 300 of these craft, costing this country millions of money, when we can save that. Nor will I say, "Scrap the lot." So long as the world is prepared at times to start killing one another, there is no doubt that explosives of the mine type will be utilised, and we should have a nucleus of expert men from whom to build up mine-laying. We have too one all-pervading advantage in the men of our mercantile marine and the men in our trawlers. So long as we have those, we can always create in the smallest type of craft the particular kind the Navy demands.
I turn to submarines. I hope the House will concentrate a little upon the necessity of our Government endeavouring yet again to persuade France to follow the admirable suggestion set out by the right hon. Gentleman the senior Member for the City of London. I have always been an advocate of the submarine, but it is the most terrible weapon that has ever been invented, and if, by mutual consent, we can do away with it altogether, the better it will be for the world. This much the War has taught us in regard to the submarine: It is the most offensive weapon for the purpose of murder, and the most ineffective weapon for the purpose of attacking war craft. During the whole of the War, no German submarine sunk a single ship of the Grand Fleet, and the Grand Fleet made tours up and down and round about this island as extensive as a trip three times round the world.

Rear-Admiral SUETER: Did not they concentrate on the mercantile marine?

Lieut.-Colonel BURGOYNE: Precisely, and they did that because whenever they tried to concentrate on anything but the mercantile marine, they were sunk. Out of less than 400 submarines built by Germany and launched for attack, 203 were sunk by our craft. I do not want to decry the submarine, but I remember the manner in which it was used during the War by the Germans, and how do we know there is not a potential Hun hanging about to make similar war in the
future? I want it done away with altogether. It certainly did Germany no good, and brought in America, which eventually led to her undoing. It is the claim of France that the submarine must-be maintained, because it is the weapon of the weaker Power. If that be so, surely France and Italy would have been in a very poor plight, and we should find that the smaller Powers would desire the submarine to be continued. I have looked up several newspapers of small Powers to ascertain their views on the submarine when the "Lusitania" was sunk. In Holland the "Handelsblatt" wrote:
This act is opposed to every law and sentiment of humanity, and we raise our voice, however powerless it may be, in protest.
Then the "Tidj" said:
The commander of the submarine who performed this work can look with pride upon it—Is this not so, Satan?
The leading paper in Sweden stated that it was
an unpardonable crime against humanity.
The "Vortland," the leading paper in Denmark, said:
Whenever in future the Germans venture to speak of their culture, the answer will be. 'It does not exist; it committed suicide on 7th May, 1915.'
In Norway, the "Aftenpost," which corresponds to our "Times," said:
The mad and reckless action of the German submarine has now reached its culminating point. The whole world looks with horror and detestation on the event.
I want to say this concluding word, and it will be on the personnel. If we are going to reduce our fleet, I think we ought to reduce it with a very high regard to whether or not we are inflicting suffering upon the officers and men. We do not want any discontent and injustice to be felt by those who were engaged in such magnificent service during the War. Only those who actually served at sea, as the Noble Lord opposite will be able to testify, can appreciate the hardships they went through, and to throws officers and men upon the shelf without adequate remuneration, merely because there is a cry for economy—a very necessary economy—would, I think, be an act of injustice for which this country would never forgive the Government. Therefore I hope that due consideration will be given to them, and to the officers and men of the mercantile
marine, who helped in the War, and that the, memory of what they did will not fade in our minds.
Finally, in the wish to stabilise our position in regard to the results of the Washington Conference, I am wondering whether a suggestion thrown out as to the convening of yet another Conference will fall on deaf oars. This last Conference is half-baked. We have gone some distance, but we are not disarming, and we are not reducing expenditure. I believe the economies made are the maximum that can be hoped for under these particular agreements; but, surely, we want to come to still closer agreement which will prevent a recrudescence of this mad competition in the future. I hope the House, which has been kind enough to listen to me in years gone by, will not think I have become a peace-at-any-price man. I have always been in favour of a big Navy, but not for the joy of seeing ships on the sea, but in the face of potential enemies. If those potential enemies can be persuaded with us to come into a combine to prevent competition in the future, so much the better for the world at large. The Sceptre of Neptune has passed rather from our hands, and it has been taken up jointly with the great American nation, and I think we can feel proud that the people of the United States have joined with us to ease those burdens which have weighed upon us so heavily in the past. A great chapter in the history of this country has closed, a chapter full of proud memories of our sea-fights, but, if we face the future well, and can only persuade others to come in for further conference on similar lines, I believe the chapter now opening is equally full of hope.

Mr. ROSE: I do not propose to approach this matter from the point of view of the naval expert, but it has occurred to me that, in all probability, the point of view of a workman may be of interest, if not of much value, to the House. But before I speak upon the specific points that I want to raise presently, I wish to ask the Financial Secretary one or two questions. In a note in the White Paper we are informed that £300,000 is all that is required on Account for the building of two capital ships. It will be within the recollection of the House that last year, in Committee
of Supply, we granted £2,000,000 for the purpose of commencing work on four capital ships. I think we ought to be told where we are to look for that sum; what has been done with it; if spent, what it has been spent on; and, if it has not been spent, where it is, and whether it will be returned to the Treasury at the end of this financial year?

Mr. AMERY: It will be.

Mr. ROSE: Thank you. That elucidates one point. May I ask if it has all been returned, or if any of it has been spent?

Mr. AMERY: The sum that has actually been spent on the work done was mentioned two days ago, and the rest naturally goes back to the Treasury.

Mr. ROSE: I am very glad it is no worse. But I should like to know how this money, or portion of money, has been spent, and what the Admiralty are going to show us for the money spent. I do not know at. all what the procedure is now, but I do know that a good many years ago, when contractors undertook the construction of ships for the Royal Navy, the rule was to pay them one-third of their contract money when the keels were laid, another third when the boilers were in, and the remaining third after the ship had passed her trial. I do not know exactly what money could be spent on the preliminary stages of battleship building, unless it was money that was prepaid to contractors for work that they had not done, or for work that was in prospective, and I hope and trust, before these Estimates come out, or when the Estimates do come out, we shall have this matter fully explained, and we shall know exactly what money has been spent, and why it has been spent. That is the only reference I have to make to that. I want to direct the attention of the House to a Clause in the Geddes Report, and it is with this that I want to deal specially to-night. That portion of the Report, and its relation to the Vote we are discussing now, is, if not of the first importance, of very high importance to those who occupy these benches. This is the statement in the Report:
An average of all the home dockyards shows us that £3 is paid in wages for every pound's worth of material consumed, whereas in private shipyards and repair yards doing naval repair and construction work, the
comparable figures on such work are only £1 10s. for every £1 of material. This basis of comparison, though rough and ready, is generally accepted as a sound one. This confirms what is so often stated, that the Royal Dockyards are uneconomical. The country cannot afford to have its Admiralty work carried out at these rates, and, in our opinion, it should be clearly intimated that unless costs can be brought down by economical output and management, Admiralty work will have to be sent elsewhere.
6.0 P.M.
I want to offer my complete endorsement of the sentiments and figures which every competent engineer knows are actually ridiculous. The very possibility of the labour of constructional, naval or engineering work costing more than the material is on the face of it, to every experienced man, an utter absurdity. The House will take notice of this: that the material used in constructional work in the engine shops and shipyards is the finished material of at least two other industries and before it goes to the dockyards it is already salted with at least three labour charges and three profits. To suggest that the labour occupied in manipulating this material costs more than the material itself is utterly absurd. At the same time I am not going to suggest—nobody with any common sense is—that the work in Admiralty dockyards does not cost a great deal more than the work done in shipyards run by private enterprise and a very great deal more than it ought to cost.
Let us first of all take the labour in the dockyards. It is exactly the same, if not a shade better, than the labour employed in the private establishments. The reason for that is that dockyard work offers that great desideratum for the workmen, continuity or comparative continuity, and the best workmen gravitate to the dockyards. Hence there is nothing the matter with the labour. What about the equipment? I do not know what it is now in the dockyards, but it ought to be up-to-date and competent, because we have to pay for it. Whether that is so with the plant and machinery that are put in there now I am not in a position to say. I used to be. If labour is the same, and if the machinery and equipment are as good as they should be, how are we to account for the disparity between the cost of Admiralty work and private work, except on the assumption of bad management? There cannot be
anything else. The Geddes Report suggests that at the bottom you should turn out 10,000 men and substitute for them some sort of police raised from the Marine Reserves. But why do you want any police at all in Government dockyards? Do hon. Members know what a policeman does in a dockyard? His principal function is to stand at the gate as the men pass by and tap one or other of them on the shoulder. The man who is so tapped has to go inside an adjoining hut so that it may be seen whether he is not carrying out of the yard some armour plates, a planing machine, or anything of that sort, secreted, naturally, about his person! All that sort of rubbish is no use at all. Every competent managing engineer will tell you that the way to stop, or at all events minimise petty pilfering, is proper and effective storekeeping and a store distribution system. There is no other way. Ask your private enterprise contractor if he is prepared to undertake contract production with the same kind of overhead charges that you insist upon placing upon the dockyards? Get rid of your police at the bottom. You do not want them. They are no use. But attention to these matters is not only required at the bottom but at the top. There are a lot of admirals in dockyards. No doubt they are very admirable and agreeable gentlemen, but their place is on the water. They are no use as conductors and managers of constructive engineering places and naval establishments.

Rear-Admiral SUETER: They have managed them successfully for many years.

Mr. ROSE: That is exactly what they have not done. They have made a most horrible mess of it for many years. Here are all-round complaints that nobody can stand against or argue against that the dockyard costs are twice as much as those for work done in other shops. Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman call that success? I only say admirals, but there are a lot of chief engineers. There is all the paraphernalia of management in an exaggerated form. There are upstanding officials in our dockyards of one sort and another, from the admiral at the top to the policeman at the bottom, in the ratio of one non-producing official for 11 men employed. That is preposterous. Of course, dockyard work does not pay! Let us try to examine
why. It will be remembered that on the occasion of Vote 8, a year ago, I offered some remarks to the House in connection with the armament ring. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ecclesall (Sir S. Roberts), who followed me in Debate, reprimanded me very vigorously for having left the inference—at least, the inference—that I was mildly hostile, to say the least, to the armament rings. The hon. Gentleman, replying to my reference to the armament rings, said:
Let me tell the hon. Member there is an armament ring, and the Admiralty are part of it,
I knew that forty years ago. I did not dare say so because I could not prove it, but I was obliged to my hon. Friend for having enabled me to prove it. It is a little bit of a mistake to suppose that the Admiralty runs the Royal Navy. It does not, except in the sense that the armament ring runs the Admiralty. It is necessary in the interests of the armament ring, of which the Admiralty is a section, that Government work should be made unprofitable—and so it is—that it should be unprofitable and inefficient, and as inefficient as possible. I do not know whether or not this opens up a very wide and a very broad policy. What I want to keep clear of is the general controversy as between collectivism and private enterprise. But I do believe that all those people who have the interests of the nation and the world earnestly and sincerely at heart are agreed that private enterprise in the making of implements of war and destruction ought to cease, and that every nation ought to make itself responsible for every ounce and every inch of armaments and munitions that it may require. It does not seem much to ask that. I know it may not be quite relevant, but perhaps I may be permitted to quote an illustration of what I desire to put forward. In Wool wich Arsenal—and my own party are not altogether without responsibility in the matter—100 locomotives were laid down and the loss on these was enormous. Why? Because there was no plant, no machinery, and because they had to alter their machine system—

Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: The hon. Gentleman is getting rather wide of the question; he must confine himself to the dockyards and to the main question before the House.

Mr. ROSE: I was rather afraid I was getting a little astray, but I thought I would try it, because my illustration was so perfectly apposite. What has happened and what is happening in Woolwich Arsenal is happening every day in Government dockyards. It is, however, no use offering criticism of this kind if one is not prepared to offer some sort of constructive criticism and I put forward some alternative. What, then, is the alternative? What is a reasonable and rational alternative to begin with? The proper conception of what is the nation's duty in respect to its armaments is that, having Government factories, you shall make all you possibly can make there, and if there is more required than you can make in your own establishments, that, and only that, ought to go to private contractors. But you dare not touch a dockyard as the dockyards stand at present. Why, I remember one of the first jobs I had as a young man just out of my apprenticeship. I went down to a dockyard which is still running, and in spite of the advice given to me by my elders and betters, and of the old hands in the workshop who advised me never to go into a dockyard, because it was ruin to a young workman, and I have given the same advice since to scores of youngsters—

Mr. HOPKINS0N: Hear, hear! Private enterprise!

Mr. ROSE: I went into Chatham Dockyard, got engaged, and I was loft for two days with nothing to do. Then my chargeman brought me a job to the bench and handed it over, saying: "That will have to last you a week." It was a job that a two years' apprentice could have done in half-a-day. Yet there were scores, if not hundreds, of men in other branches of the engineering trade—my trade—I was going to say working, but not working. We got a half-day's overtime five days of the week, and this with little or nothing to do! Lower down at the shipyard end there was the old "Agamemnon" being built and a great big freak ship called the "Polyphemus" —which was never any good—and some smaller craft. Hon. Members may probably wonder how this extraordinary thing came about. In 1878 the late Lord Beaconsfield paralysed humanity by obtaining a supplementary grant for I £3,000,000—an awful sum in those days.
As nearly as I can remember, Mr. Gladstone said some very severe things about it. In the allocation of this grant to the Chatham Dockyard some genius at Whitehall sent the shipyard part of it to the engine department and the engine grant to the shipyard department, so that we were there working for 12 months—not working really, we were there getting rid of this money, the destination of which could not be altered. Somebody had made a mistake, and it was fatal. I may be told that the whole thing was not very creditable to anybody concerned. My only excuse for having worked in a dockyard was that work was so exceedingly scarce elsewhere that when there was the possibility of getting a job—and preferring work to being idle—I took the work that I could get in the dockyard. That is not as things should be, and I want to know why a practical Board of Admiralty, knowing perfectly well what the potentialities of dockyards are or may be, do not blow out these Admirals as well as the police.
They should appoint as directors competent civilian naval architects or engineers, of just the same type that the private employer would appoint to look after his work, and this would come within reasonable grounds of a free hand. If this is done, you will find that not only can Government work be done much more cheaply, but quite as efficiently as anything you can buy from the armament ring to-day. I do not see why, even with the cast-iron rules of the Admiralty, this should be considered an impracticable thing. We suggest that this work should be taken out of the hands of ex-service officers, and put into the hands of competent civilians, in which case you would find yourselves free from a great deal of blundering you are subject to at the present time, and you would be free from the armament contractors. It seems to me that the Naval Estimates this year ought to have been in our hands, and I agree that this sort of thing only adds to our perplexity when we get this curious jumble of figures thrown at us, and mixed up with the Geddes recommendations.
We have not been told yet as to what sum this £300,000 is on account of, or how much you are going to spend altogether. Does this mean that if this £300,000 is incorporated in the Estimates,
and we find that we want £3,000,000 or £4,000,000, we are to be confronted with. Supplementary Estimates as was the case this year. Generally speaking, I agree that the cuts in expenditure are amply justified. For my own part, although I am not a naval expert, I do not think that building even two capital ships, which will be obsolete before they get into the water, is a good investment. I cannot quite understand why, if we are to have two ships, they cannot at least be assembled in the dockyard. I know the dockyards cannot make the iron required for the ships, and they are only equipped for assembling, but we have a right to know why, if these two ships are to be of a modified design and come within the scope of the building docks, they cannot be brought there and the dockyards placed on an honest business footing.
Year after year we have passed these Estimates for dockyard services that we do not get. I know it is a common thing to say that the dockyard workman does not work, but he does not get a chance to work, and, under existing circumstances, he cannot work because he has not the work to do, and his efforts are mismanaged by incapacity above him. I urge the Admiralty to take, into serious consideration the necessity all round of a drastic reform in our dockyard system to enable our work to be done in our own workshops as expeditiously and much more efficiently and more cheaply than it is now done by private contractors. This is an obligation which nations have to take on their shoulders to-day. Those who are in favour of economic conditions which give private enterprise free play may easily conform to the idea of munitions of war, murder machinery, and implements of all sorts being manufactured by the State because the State ought to take the full responsibility for them and bear the whole of the cost.

Commander BELLAIRS: I am sure the House will forgive me if I do not follow the discursive reminiscences of the hon. Member who has just sat down, because I think much of what he said was more appropriate to the Dockyard Vote than to the Policy Vote. I will pass at once to the admirable speech which has been made by the hon. and gallant Member for North Kensington (Lieut.-Colonel Burgoyne). The hon. and gas-
lant Member supported the abolition of submarines, and I wholly agree with him. The difficulty is that France has wedded herself to a policy of submarines, and her policy is dependant upon the doctrine of sink-at-sight. That doctrine was originally a French doctrine and was advocated in the French Navy throughout the nineties of the last century, notably by Admiral Aube, Commandant Z, and what was so familiar to us all as the Jeune Ecole. They intended to apply this doctrine in connection with torpedo-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. Now the submarine depends entirely for its success on a sink-at-sight doctrine, and I fear that so long as submarines are in existence nations defeated at sea will use them that way, despite all promises to abandon the doctrine of sink-at-sight. The hon. and gallant Member for North Kensington said that we were limited to 450,000 tons for cruisers for the American and British Navies. That was the original proposal, but it was all abandoned after the French refused to give up their submarine policy, and the only limitations were in regard to the tonnage of battleships, the total tonnage of aircraft carriers, and the tonnage of aircraft carriers themselves, and cruisers were also limited, I think, to 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns. There was no limit to the number of cruisers and the hon. and gallant Gentleman is mistaken on that point. I think it would have been a good thing if a copy of the Treaty could have accompanied the Estimates, because there are a great many erroneous ideas as to what the ultimate Treaty was.
The hon. and gallant Member was right in saying that the American Navy, but for the Washington Conference, would have been immensely stronger than our own Navy. I think it shows the good faith of the Americans in all these matters, that under the Washington Conference she has agreed to scrap 15 of her best post-Jutland ships. In this respect America has made an immense sacrifice. As regards America's probable opponent, Japan, they agreed not to develop their bases in the Western Pacific, thereby-hampering themselves, especially in regard to oil supplies, in any offensive they might possibly have to carry out if ever they found themselves at war with Japan. The hon. and gallant Member for North Kensington discussed the programmes after the ten years' period fixed
by the Washington Conference has elapsed, and he told us what would have to be our own programme and the American programme of battleships. He seems to forget one point. The Washington Conference agreement itself provides for a meeting of the naval powers eight years hence, and we may be quite sure that a fresh agreement will be come to if the Treaty is duly carried out. For this reason I do not think it is necessary for me to discuss the likely naval programmes of America and this country in 1931 and 1932.
I pass now to the extraordinary speech made by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert). He maintained the doctrine under which the British Fleet could not possibly be sent out to the Pacific. That doctrine is absolutely untrue, and if it were true it would be the end of the British Empire, because we could not hold our Empire in the Pacific unless we could send the Fleet. By his theory there would be no more naval war of fleets for neither the Japanese Fleet nor the British Fleet would be able to get at each other, and the same would apply to the American Fleet, but that doctrine is untrue. I think the right hon. Gentleman was on much safer ground when he urged that there was still room for economy.
In regard to the controversy over the Geddes Report, which I do not wish to enter upon now, a good deal depends on the purely arbitrary standards taken up with regard to our requirements for manning. Those standards were useful when we had to provide against, a highly prepared navy like that of Germany, but they are not now necessary when the Government have laid down that we are not to contemplate another war for at least 10 years. Where I think we have got down to the bone is in regard to cutting down the personnel. The Admiralty have endeavoured, especially on the naval side, to give the House the economics it desires, and they have cut down the naval personnel to 98,500 as compared with 80,500 for Japan. That reduces the margin against Japan, and it shows that they are acting on the doctrine that we are not to contemplate a war for at least 10 years to come. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton passed on to the question of oil, and he spoke of Singapore. We must have oil fuel resources at Singapore
and the Admiralty are quite right in considering the matter. What I am anxious about is, do the Admiralty take into full account all the facilities that exist, such as the Shell Company possess? They seem to me only to think of what they possess themselves, forgetting all those resources that belong to private traders, which will be at their disposal and can be commandeered when war breaks out.
In the same way, in regard to the supply of oil, they seem to fix their minds solely on the Government property—the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I believe all their contracts are with that company. I should like to know what is the contract price at which they are going to get their oil from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company next year. I believe it is a favourable contract. I may be told that these matters are confidential and are not disclosed. That is all very well when competitive tenders are put forward, but there are no competitive tenders, I believe, in this ease, and I want to satisfy myself whether it would not be possible to get supplies from a British company like the. Shell Company, and whether it would not be possible to make a more satisfactory bargain in that way. I am told that the Shell Company are supplying the Japanese Navy with 250,000 tons of oil next year. That shows that a company on which the British Navy practically depended in the late War, and to which the Admiralty are very much indebted, is in a position to tender. It is not right therefore that the Government company should be the only one to be asked for a tender. If the Shell Company or any other company were invited to tender, I should like to be informed of the fact.
There is another possible economy to which I would like to direct the attention of the House. We are going to lay down two battleships under the Washington Agreement. The Agreement is that we are to scrap four old ships if we desire to lay down two new ones. I believe that four of the "King George" class are to be scrapped under this Agreement. We are going to lay these two ships down in the beginning of 1923. Is that necessary? We have one post-Jutland ship, the "Hood"—the Japanese have two. We had better get away from the idea that we are contemplating rivalry with the
United States. No one believes that. The real truth is that we contemplate only the Japanese Navy. The argument must be that the Japanese Navy have two post-Jutland ships, very powerful ships, while we have only one. If we are not to contemplate war, we have still a powerful reinforcement in our older ships. If we do not start these two new ships, we shall have 22 capital ships to Japan's 10. If we build the two ships, and have to scrap four old ships, we shall have 20 capital ships to the Japanese 10, and three of our own will be post-Jutland ships. I therefore do not see any danger in postponing the building of the ships, or, at any rate, one of them. If we postpone them, and we can lay them down at any time during the next nine years, we shall be able to take full advantage of all the research and inventions of the British Navy. I agree entirely with the plea put forward by the First Lord of the Admiralty that we must not starve research for the Navy, for that proved of the utmost benefit during the War. One problem alone would Justify the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of pounds, and that is the question of applying internal combustion engines to warships so as to get a high speed instead of the low speeds now possible. If we solve that problem we shall have entirely solved the difficulty of maintaining a fleet in the Pacific. Therefore, I hope the Admiralty will stick to their guns, and not cut down the expenditure on research work.
I do not wish to trench on the discussion which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the West Derby Division (Sir R. Hall) is going to raise, but I am sure he will forgive me if I mention one or two points in connection with aircraft. The Washington Agreement gives us a proportion of 5 to 3, as against Japan in regard to aircraft carriers. We are to be allowed 135,000 tons and Japan is to be allowed in proportion, while all the existing tonnage built or building can be considered as experimental and may be replaced. Aircraft are of increasing importance and every day becomes more powerful as against warships. The bombs which they can drop are capable of sinking battleships, and they are invaluable for reconnaissance work and as against smoke screens while they enable our ships to fire at the enemy at a great distance. From an offensive point of view, against the enemy fleet they are absolutely in-
valuable. It seems to me that the Navy should have the management of its own aircraft in connection with the fleet. I supported the formation of a separate Air Ministry, but then we had plenty of money to spend at that time. Aircraft were being improved every day. It was a great experiment. Now we are getting on much more settled lines, and the Navy finds itself in this position, that it does not have the training of the officers, and the aircraft are not built to naval requirements, which are totally dissimilar to Army and civil requirements. It is economically unsound. I think distinguished airmen will bear me out when I say that the life of an airman is very short. He has to come to ground after a few years.

Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: It is increasing.

Commander BELLAIRS: At any rate, there is hardly any future career for him. It must be so. If you have these officers specialising like young submarine officers, they can have a career in the Naval Service, and may become admirals. It is said that admirals do not know enough about the air. This would help to meet that difficulty. I am not, however, going to trench on the discussion which my hon. and gallant Friend proposes to raise, neither am I going to be dogmatic about the matter. I will, however, appeal to Members of the House to use their influence with the Government to set up a Commission or Committee, which we can trust, to inquire into the whole of this question whether the Navy shall have control of its own Air Service.

NAVAL AIE SERVICES.

Rear-Admiral Sir R. HALL: I beg to move to leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof the words
in the opinion of this House, the Naval Air Services should be put under the control of the Board of Admiralty for the full development of the efficiency of these services, for their better co-operation with the Navy, and for the most economical administration and expenditure.
I join with my hon. and gallant Friend who has just spoken in expressing admiration of the speech delivered by the Financial Secretary to the Admiralty. I regret that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert)
is not in his place, as I wished to express my regret at having interrupted his speech. I do not propose this evening to touch on the general question of the Navy Estimate. I will confine myself to the terms of my Resolution as it appears on the Order Paper. The Navy has a very definite function to perform in order to obtain definite ends. Those ends may be- summed up in the phrase, "Control of sea communications," which means that while an enemy is unable to carry trade or troops across the sea, we are able to do both. For the present I venture to prophesy that for some years to come the carriage of trade and troops at sea will be done by surface ships, for 1 cannot visualise our possessing sufficient air ships or aeroplanes to do the work. 1 propose, with the permission of the House, to deal with this question on three separate grounds. I am very glad to see present so many hon. and gallant Members in touch with the work of the Air Force. The whole object of my remarks is the best development of the Air Force and its best efficiency in a combined service, and my remarks will be couched entirely in that spirit. Dealing first with the passage of troops across the sea, we are faced with the problem of defending or attacking shipping carrying troops, and this involves acknowledgment of maritime conditions of transport work, of harbours, tides, and navigation. Whether aircraft exists or not, defence has to be provided by naval men against surface vessels, submarines, and mines. Since the introduction of the air weapon, assistance by and defence for aircraft have to be added. But this does not mean that the air should act separately against the enemy air forces, any more than on the introduction of the submarine that the submarine should act separately. Strength is not employed to the fullest extent by separate action but by combined action, and the most effectual employment of any type of fighting vessel can only be developed by study of its function in combination with other types. If there are two separate services the authorities of each will develop their own theories as to the best employment. We shall have two sets of people studying the problem of invasion in watertight compartments. We have suffered enough from this in the case of the Army and Navy Our difficulties will be increased out of
all proportion by the introduction of the Air Force, because not only shall we develop different ideas, but a new factor comes into the game which does not exist in the case of the Army, and that factor is this. Two services fighting in the same area will be proceeding on different lines. There will be two sets of strategical ideas governing the action of the forces on a common fighting ground which are spared this clashing in the case of the Army, because the Army fights on land and the Navy at sea. It is a commonplace in war that command in a given theatre should be exercised by one authority only. To have two commands of separate arms, when it is possible for each of them to have their own views as to how the object is to be attained, is unworkable. We tried it in the War and it failed, and we had to get back to the single command. This is not invalidated by the fact that in a combined operation a dual command is possible. In the case of the Army and Navy, there is a clear division of interests between sea and land, and each service is the servant of the other at various well-understood points. No such division is practicable in the case of the sea and the air, working in combination to maintain control of a given water area for a prolonged period. There must be single control in that area. The problem of control of trade routes and of trade defence has two parts— attack upon and defence of sea-borne commerce. The problem of attacking commerce involves an acquaintance with maritime trade, trade routes, shipping, ports, and seasons. It involves acquaintance with certain broad outstanding principles. Are we to have two sets of authorities, Naval and Air Force, studying these problems, each preparing its own solution; or is the Air Service to decide what allocation of aircraft is to be made for the purpose? Unless it has made a study of all these subjects, it has no basis on which to form its opinions, and if the Air Force makes a study of the subject, it may arrive at a different conclusion from that of the naval authorities. There may be, as there frequently are, two solutions, both correct; but only one can be used at a time. Who, then, is to decide which shall be put into force in such a case? That is no mere casuistry. It is, I regret to say, a precise representation of what is going on
at the present time. I believe there is a school which is advocating methods of attack on trade by air which are wholly at variance with the opinion of the other Service. This is to be regretted, because it is waste of effort, and this difference of opinion can only lead to friction between the two Services. That is what we have to try to overcome. The defence of trade involves practically the same considerations. In the late War there were many lessons which the Navy learned and assimilated, and upon which it is improving to-day. If the Air Force undertake the defence of trade, they will have to start at the beginning where the Navy began. They will have to set up their own intelligence organisation, their own shipping officers, and all the other organisations that the Navy had to establish. If they cannot do that, they must leave the defence of trade to the Navy, and it will be for the Navy then to decide, as ever, in what manner the Air Force shall act under its direction and in combination with it in order Jo ensure the security of commerce.
In minor strategy the air arm is part of the naval arm, and must be worked in combination with it. It has been said that long-distance reconnaissance, is a function demanding a separate service. There is, however, no difference between long-distance reconnaissance and any other reconnaissance. We do not say that the submarine should be a separate service because it is capable of long-distance reconnaissance and of supporting itself at a long distance away from its base; nor docs the monitor become a separate service because it can bombard at long range. It remains a part of the naval service. The Air Force, in naval warfare, has to assist the Navy to obtain control of the waterways. How that control is to be obtained and maintained is a naval question, and how the Air Force can contribute most effectively to that end is also, I venture to think, a naval question. If, however, the Air Force is to contribute effectively, the operations must be planned by the Navy. As it is the naval commander who will use that arm, so it is he who must define what he desires that its personnel shall be capable of doing. It is believed by many officers that scouting can be performed by anyone, that an air officer has only to be sent up to report what
he sees. It is not sufficiently understood I that an untrained man does not recognise what he sees, and those who have studied naval history, and have had practical experience at sea, know well how brimful of mistakes operations have been through wrong observations and deductions from what, people saw. If such mistakes at sea can be made by experienced seamen, it is not necessary to enlarge upon how much greater mistakes may be made by men who have not been bred to the sea.
A separate air service necessitates a separate air staff and the development of a strategy of its own, and, accepting that premise, it involves the inevitable claim that it should put that strategy in force. That must lead to dissipation of effort, the creation of types different from those needed by the Navy, training on lines that may not coincide with those required by naval strategy, and, worst of all, the weakening of that association of the Air Force with the Navy which is vital to efficiency. If you come to the question of battle, and the tactical side of air operations, the same must hold good, though in a smaller degree than I have tried to describe in regard to the larger strategy. A fleet in battle, at present consists of a set of units—battleships, cruisers, destroyers, aircraft—all under one directing authority in accordance with one common doctrine. The Air Force is capable of performing many important functions, like reconnaissance, artillery spotting, torpedo attack, bombing attack, air fighting, or direct attack on exposed personnel by gunfire. In battle it must be for the naval authorities to determine how many of these functions require to be developed. It is for the naval authorities to decide which type of vessel is best suited to develop torpedo attack. It is for the naval authority to decide whether tonnage is better employed in carrying aircraft and in defending them, or in the form of ships of fighting capacity capable of attacking the enemy. In fact, there is at sea no place, for a separate air service; all arms in battle require to belong to one service, to subscribe to a common doctrine, and to be trained in accordance with that doctrine. I have heard future naval battles described as fought by a host of aircraft, bombing, scouting, spotting for artillery, and other things, without sufficient carrying capacity to. carry a quarter of the aircraft required for such services.

Captain W. BENN: Have more carriers.

Sir R. HALL: I am glad the hon. and gallant Member made that interruption, because the last speaker pointed out that our tonnage of carriers is limited by our agreement with Washington, which limits the extent of the form of naval battle thus visualised. We hear a great deal of the need for a separate air service for independent work, but I venture to say that those who have studied naval strategy and know the sea will agree that there is no place at sea for a separate air service. All operations at sea must be part of the common whole, the ultimate object being the control of communications and the provision of the most effective means of destroying the enemy's fighting forces. Whether the strategy of the fleet is directed towards destruction of the enemy's fighting forces by direct attack upon them wherever they can be found, or towards forcing the enemy to fight, is a matter for consideration by those who are able to take a complete survey of the maritime position. Going back to the late War, I venture to say that one of the prime causes of the failure of the German submarine campaign was that in the German Navy the submarine was practically an independent service. The operations were not co-ordinated with those of the High Sea Fleet, or the commerce destroyers that they had in the open sea. The only form of common connection in an active sense, and that very limited, was the work of the surface ships in the Heligoland Bight in keeping open the channels through the mine fields that we laid. Valuable as this was, it only enabled the submarine campaign to continue, because without it the submarines could not have got out. Had they used the submarines and their Fleet in combination as a tactical whole, I venture to think that our task in the Navy would have been far more difficult. The German submarine campaign failed, and it failed largely because it was based on false strategy. The failure was not due to personnel or to material. The Geddes Report says that all the arguments for amalgamation of the Air with the Navy and Army are equally applicable to the amalgamation of the Navy, Army and Air Force in a Ministry of Defence, but I repeat that this is not so. The Army does not fight at sea: it is not a tactical unit of the Navy, while the Air is; and I do not think that that conclusion of the
Geddes Report will be substantiated by those who have made a close study of sea strategy. During the War the Air Ministry was set up and a separate Air Force was formed. It was my good fortune to be at the Admiralty in the early part of the War and during the latter part, and I have a distinct recollection of the very fine work of the Royal Naval Air Service. I have a still more lively recollection of the way in which they supplied the best machines and how they secured the best engines; and, although I do not wish to make invidious comparisons, I venture to say that they got the best personnel, too. I am glad to see present an hon. and gallant Gentleman who was a distinguished member of that force, and has occupied various important positions at the Admiralty, and I venture to think that he will not be prepared to say that the Royal Naval Air Service was so inefficient, so badly manned, so badly engined, that it should be compelled to amalgamate with other forces. I am afraid that some arrangements made during the War will have to be revised. I am sorry that the Colonial Secretary is not here, because much is due to him for his initiative in starting the Royal Naval Air Service. The Air Ministry, however, was started under the stress of war. So was the Ministry of Propaganda. I believe I am right in saying that the Leader of the House the other day, in reply to a question, stated that each Minister now does his own propaganda, and that there is no Publicity Department. On that ground alone I venture to think there is a case for a revision of the establishment of a separate Air Force. Further, I do not know any foreign nation which has a separate Air Force, and I do not know of any Admiral of a foreign nation, who held high rank in the War, who recognised a separate Air Force; nor do I know any distinguished British Admiral holding a high position at sea to-day who recognises a separate Air Force. There may be such officers; I do not know. I only speak from my personal experience, and shall be glad to be corrected if I am wrong.
7.0 P.M.
On the last part of my Motion, the economic and technical side, I will put only a few points. I venture to think economies could be effected by a revision
of the present arrangement. We have a very largely reduced Navy, we have very large barracks which are half empty, staff colleges at Greenwich which will bear filling up, and which perhaps might relieve the expense of building further staff colleges and barracks in other parts of the country. In regard to the point of moral, with a largely reduced fleet in being and a reduced amount of personnel moving about at sea, opportunity must be given in the Navy for young men to specialise on adventurous and daring lines, or on scientific research for men given that way. Opportunities must be given in the Navy to retain the officers and not to offer them the attraction of adventurous and scientific work outside, because if we have had the task of training the young officer in the Navy and we afterwards allow him to go to another service it means that they will take the really adventurous and scientific and leave us those who are not so well gifted. I think on that ground alone we in the Navy are entitled to some consideration. I would go further and emphasise the point raised by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) that if the Navy had its own Air Service they would specialise in air as they do in submarines. When submarines were introduced, did we draw our personnel from outside? We drew it from the Navy. They do a period in the submarine, and one of the most valuable things we have to-day, and which we are careful in the Navy to try to carry out, is the system that no destroyer officer goes to a command unless he has had experience in a submarine, and vice versâ, because he knows what his enemy can do, having tried it. If you have your officers in the Navy who specialise in air, perhaps when the attractions of flight are not so great, or age creeps on them, they can give up active service in the air and return as specialists, become staff officers in air, and eventually Admirals who know-something about the air. At present the jibe we have in the Navy that Admirals know nothing about air may or may not be true, but the present arrangement absolutely prevents them or their staff knowing anything about the air.
I admit that when you come down to first principles in the matter of personnel it comes to this. At sea we have an expression which for years I have always believed, and still believe, to be true,
namely, "A seaman first; a specialist afterwards." I think on the personnel side that air is a speciality of the sea, and that they should be trained as seamen and specialise in the air. I have endeavoured to deal with these matters from the practical point of view of those who have to decide operations of war, and to show that there is a case for consideration. I have endeavoured to show the technical side, in which economics could be effected. I have endeavoured to show that from the moral and personnel point of view there is another side of the question, and, in conclusion, I would emphasise that with which I began, namely, that I raise this point out of no hostility to the air. I have a great belief in it, I desire to see its development, and I honestly believe its interests will be served best by having behind it the prestige of the British Navy, and by being able to draw on its fine personnel, with its tradition for daring and resource, which has never failed. If the question is looked into from that point of view, the Government can hardly fail to think there is a case for consideration, and it is on that ground that I move my Motion.

Viscount CURZON: I beg to second the Amendment.
What has struck me about the present Naval Estimates is that there does not appear, so far as I can make out, to be one single solitary word about the employment of aircraft at sea. If you look at the explanatory memorandum of the First Lord, you might imagine the Navy had no aircraft at all. I think there must be something wrong. Aircraft carriers are the only class of ship not specifically referred to in the explanatory memorandum, and I think that should not be forgotten. I do not wish to make an attack upon the Air Ministry, or upon the present Royal Air Force—far from it; I only look upon the problem as I have seen it myself, and as I know it to exist from various sources of information to which I have access. There is one fallacy. I know it to be a fallacy, though it is a belief largely held amongst people who are interested in flying. I am not sure that it exists in the Royal Air Force, but it is a belief largely held. It is that the Admiralty have no sympathy with the Royal Air
Force and the employment of aircraft. I know there is no more fallacious argument or statement that could be made to-day. I know the Admiralty are profoundly impressed by the enormous strides made by aircraft, by the march of modern invention, and by the enormous tactical questions which the skilful employment of aircraft has conjured up. To show exactly what I mean by that, I would point out that aircraft can be used at sea now for the carrying and discharge of torpedoes, for the carrying and dropping of mines, for the carrying of bombs, for attack with machine-guns on the control positions of hostile ships, on observation balloons, on spotting for guns, for the mass firing of torpedoes, for scouting and attack on hostile bases, for creating smoke screens, for attack on hostile aircraft, and so on. That is their present function as they are used to-day. But the march of modern invention may make that far more important to-morrow, and I should not be surprised if in the future war, with invention going on at the same rate as that at which it has progressed in the last few years, the Commander-in-Chief himself has to go up in an aeroplane in order to direct his fleet.
From what I have said, I think the House will realise that the employment of aircraft at sea nowadays is of vital moment to the Navy. I maintain that it is of vital moment, that all officers and men at sea should have full acquaintance with and full responsibility for the control of all the officers and men under their command. You cannot have in any sense in a ship at sea dual control. You can only have one man in command. If you judge things from that point of view, and if it be admitted by most people— as I think it is—what is the present state of affairs? The fleet to-day has aircraft carriers, but neither the admiral in command nor the Admiralty have any control or responsibility for any of the machines carried in the carriers, or for the personnel working them. The Air Ministry at the present time may do anything it likes with the pilots who fly the machines, or with the observers. The Air Ministry may withdraw pilots if they want to do so, and send them to another quarter of the globe, or they may do the same with the observers. A notable case occurred a little while ago, I believe, where
machines were required in Iraq. No others were available, so orders were given by the Air Ministry that a squadron—I am not quite sure whether it was a full squadron, but it was a certain number of machines with pilots and observers—which had been allocated to the Navy should be withdrawn and sent to Iraq. That state of affairs is thoroughly unsatisfactory, because had the fleet required to use its machines or to carry out tactical exercises at the time requiring the use of aircraft it would not have been able to do so as the machines were in Iraq.
Take officers who are skilful pilots in the flying arm. The flying arm is a thing which only a very few have or can ever accomplish. At the present time it is open to the Air Ministry to withdraw one of these super-officers required for special and difficult operations and send him to an aircraft station employed in the guarding of oil-fuel tanks in some other parts of the world, at Aden or some other place. I do not say it will be done, or that it has been done, but it can be done. The Admiralty have no say at present, I gather, in the qualifications of a pilot or in any recommendations they may wish to make about a pilot. The Admiralty may make their recommendations, but they go to the Air Ministry. While the Admiralty may recommend an officer as very suitable for work at sea with the Fleet, when his recommendation comes to the Air Ministry it is not necessarily dealt with solely by Air Force officers concerned with naval affairs, but may be judged by Air Force officers who are military officers, and that recommendation may be turned down on quite other grounds.
Take another aspect of the matter. The increased use of aircraft at sea may possibly lead to very great economy of naval power. At present a naval scouting group consists, as a rule, of a squadron of light cruisers. That, during the War, was anything up to six. It may be possible in future, by the use of aircraft, to economise in the number of light cruisers, and a scouting group might consist of three light cruisers with an aircraft carrier, and a certain number of machines taking the place of two or three ships. I do not know that the Admiralty have any power to set up
such an organisation at the present time, because they are in no way responsible for the supply of machines. The Admiralty may ask the Air Ministry for machines, but the Air Ministry may or may not grant them.
I should like to ask the Admiralty this question: First of all, what were the aid squadrons allocated to the Navy in 1921? I have searched the Geddes Report, and from that I gather that, roughly, 6½ squadrons were working for the Navy in 1921. I should also like to know what reduction is actually going to take place in the numbers for 1922? Another thing I should like to know is, was that reduction settled on the Admiralty's recommendation, and did the Admiralty concur in the reduction made? I particularly want to get an answer to that question, because upon it will probably hang the crux of the whole matter.
There is another point about the Admiralty controlling its own aircraft. During the War, it is said by the hon,. and gallant Gentleman (Sir R. Hall) that the Air Ministry was set up, and the Services still continued to control their own aircraft, and therefore, if that arrangement has been departed from, I should like to know on what grounds. I want to urge as strongly as I can that the Government should consent to have the whole question inquired into. Those who care for the Navy are all anxious to have a reduction of the Air Force to meet the present situation. We think the present situation does not lead to the efficient or the best use of aircraft from the point of view of the Navy, and I believe the way to reassure people throughout the country on questions of waste and economy of strength, and everything else, would be if some impartial inquiry should be set up to assure the country if possible, or to make recommendations with regard to the present status of aircraft, at any rate so far as the Navy is concerned, and I daresay the same question arises in connection with the Army. But I particularly want the Government to give consideration to this point, whether some Committee could be set up which could inquire into the use of aircraft by both Services, and which could assure us that we are, at any rate, getting value for the money we spend,. and reaching 100 per cent, of efficiency.

AIR MINISTRY: GOVERNMENT DECISION.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: If the matters raised by my hon. and gallant Friends related solely to the Navy, I should not have thought it necessary to intervene. It would be left to the very competent hands of the Admiralty representatives in this House. But as my hon. and gallant Friend and my Noble Friend have raised a question which cannot be confined to a single Service, which even as they have raised it affects two Services, as also two Ministers at present, and in all its implications affects all the three fighting Services and the fighting Ministries, it seems proper that the statement of Government policy should be made by a Minister, not the head of one of these various Departments, but on behalf of the Government as a whole. It is certainly due to no lack of respect to other Gentlemen who intend to speak, but I think it is for the convenience of the House that I should take the earliest opportunity of stating what are our views.
I do not pretend to-night to lay down a policy for all time. The Air man has had, during and since the War, an extraordinarily rapid development, but he would be a bold man who would attempt as yet to define the ultimate potentialities of the Air Force, or the place which it will hold in warfare, whether over the sea or over the land. I can imagine, without an undue strain upon my imagination, developments which may change the whole course of war, and which may quite conceivably lead the world in a short time to think that limitation of battleships or limitation of armaments is of very little use unless the new weapon is subjected to limitation of a similar kind. Accordingly in what I say I am declaring the policy of His Majesty's Government as things stand, and it is essential that that policy should be known, because it is not fair to any Service, nor can the best be expected from any Service, unless they know clearly what is our present policy.
I think my hon. and gallant Friends who have moved and seconded the Amendment have said everything that could be said in support of their Amendment from the particular point of view from which they approach the question. It was essentially and admittedly a
rather narrow point of view. They were considering the interests of the Naval Service, even to such an extent that my hon. and gallant Friend at one point in his speech made the point that it was not fair to take enterprising officers, or officers of ability, from the Naval Service for the service of the country in another sphere. I must remind my hon. and gallant Friend of what indeed he will readily admit—that we have a common country, and that all these Services exist and only exist for the defence of that common country. We must look at it, therefore, from a wider point of view than that taken by my hon. and gallant Friend. I think it will be not without service to the House in coming to a judgment on the subject if I give a review of what has been the history of this arm up to the present. Some knowledge of the experiments we have already tried will not only be serviceable, but will be necessary to the formation of a correct judgment as to what is best to be done at present.
In 1912 a scheme for the creation of a Royal Flying Corps was laid before Parliament. The theory on which that scheme was based was that the needs of the Navy and Army differed, and that each required a technically developed arm respectively for sea and land warfare, but that the foundation of the requirements of each Service was identical, namely, an adequate number of efficient flying men. The aeronautical service, therefore, was to be regarded as one, and was designated at that time the Royal Flying Corps. It consisted of a naval and a military wing, maintained at the expense and administered by the Admiralty and the War Office respectively. There was established further a single Royal Aircraft Factory, common to both Services, and a central Flying School, all graduating at this school to remain to specialise in naval and military flying. And, in order to secure co-ordination between the two branches of the Royal Flying Corps, an Air Committee was set up as a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. My right hon. and gallant Friend (Major-General Seely) was the first Chairman of that Committee. But even from the first there was a tendency for the two Services to drift apart, and in 1914, before the outbreak of the War, the Naval Wing of the Royal Flying Corps had already changed its title to the Royal Naval Air Service. With the outbreak
of hostilities, the separation of the two Services was virtually complete That is the first stage in the history of this arm. When war broke out, the War Office were responsible for the aerial defence of the country. But all the squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps were engaged in France, and at Lord Kitchener's request the Admiralty took responsibility for home defence against aircraft, early in September, 1914. Therefore, for the first two-and-a-half years of the war expansion of the two branches of the Air Service was developed independently, both as to organisation and supply, by the naval and military authorities. What was the result?
My hon. and gallant Friend proudly boasts that the Navy got all the best machines and all the best officers. How did it get them? Was that distribution dictated by the country's needs at the moment, or by any consideration of the country's need? It was dictated by a fierce inter-departmental competition in the market, the resources of which at that time were wholly insufficient to supply the Services. It was a haphazard and, therefore, a dangerous arrangement. It was an accidental, and, therefore, could not be a considered, arrangement. It resulted in overlapping, waste of effort, one Department bidding against another in the distribution and application of the resources of the country, not according to a considered view of the country's needs, but according to the relative skill and relative quickness of the different Departments in getting hold of what resources were available. Those are the great and glorious days the hon. and gallant Gentleman (Sir It. Hall) holds up to us as providing that which his Amendment would provide, and which the present system does not.
Towards the end of 1915, so patent were the facts that there arose a strong movement for co-ordination, though it was not at the time proposed to combine the two Services, because it was clear that for a considerable time to come the great bulk of the work in the air would be of a definitely naval or military character. There was already a strong body of opinion in favour of an Air Minister, who should have entire control of the Services, and a status equal to that of the First Lord of the Admiralty or the Secretary of State for War.
The next step in co-ordination was that in February, 1916, a Joint War Air Committee was appointed to collaborate in and co-ordinate questions of supply and design of material for the Naval and Military Air Services. That was not without some relation to the state of things on which my hon. and gallant Friend (Sir E. Hall) so lovingly dwelt. The Committee failed to present an agreed Report, and it was brought to an abrupt end by the resignation of its chairman (Lord Derby). That committee was succeeded by an Air Board, constituted on 11th May, 1916, under the Presidency of Lord Curzon. This Board was free to discuss matters of general policy in relation to the Air, including combined operations of the Naval and Military Air Services, and to make recommendations to the Admiralty and the War Office thereon, as well as to discuss and make recommendations on the types of machine required for the two Air Services. If either Department declined to act upon its recommendations, the President had the right of reference to the War Committee. The Board was also charged with the task of organising and co-ordinating —observe how often the word co-ordinating comes in; I emphasise it because it means that the system was not working smoothly, that there was not one policy, but two policies, often clashing and constantly overlapping—the supply of material and to prevent competition between the two Departments. Finally, it was responsible for the co-ordination of research in aerial matters between all the bodies concerned.
After further experience—in November of that year, 1916—the Government, after prolonged inquiry, decided on further developments, providing for the Admiralty and War Office to concert their respective aerial policies in consultation with the Air Board, and to submit their programmes of aerial production to the Air Board, which was to decide as to the extent to which the Departmental programmes were to be approved, having regard to the rate of production, the needs of other Departments and the respective urgency of the demands. Every one of these steps was necessary because the profound lack of co-ordination and of a central control had landed the country in difficulties, and had failed to provide us with a satisfactory defence. A change of Government took place in
December of that year, but the new Government confirmed the decision of its predecessor; and the new Air Board was actually constituted on 6th February, 1917. Up to the middle of 1917 all the aerial output was absorbed by the older Services. The supply could not overtake the demand. The constantly growing series of activities to which aircraft was successfully applied outstripped the progress of manufacture, and forced us to apply all the machinery available for a purely naval or purely military purpose, and the building up of a reserve for an independent aerial campaign against Germany was impossible. By July, 1917, however, the Ministry of Munitions had the supply position well in hand. A deadlock appeared to have been reached both in the naval and military theatres, and it seemed conceivable that a sustained air offensive might contribute more powerfully than any other factor towards undermining the moral of the enemy, and disposing him towards a reasonable peace.
It was perfectly clear, however, that unless there were a properly constituted Air General Staff, under an Air Board or under an Air Ministry, aviation, output, however large, would continue to be absorbed by the two Services already existing. Accordingly, in August, 1917, the Government decided in favour of the principle of uniting the Air Services, and of providing a special branch for the systematic raiding of German munition centres. And an Air Organisation Committee was appointed, under the Chairmanship of General Smuts, to work out the details for an Air Ministry, an Air Council, and a combined Air Force. The Air Council was set up by Order in Council on the 21st December, 1917.
The independent Air Force was constituted on 8th June, 1918, under the then General, now Air Marshal, Sir Hugh Trenchard, who was placed directly under the Air Ministry, although for purely operation purposes General Trenchard was under the supreme command of Marshal Foch. It was during this latter period, subsequent to the formation of the Air Ministry, that our Air Services achieved their maximum successes in the War. Although in 1918 a serious shortage in the supply of high-powered engines curtailed that programme, the limited amount of raiding which took place had a considerable effect on the enemy. It is well known that if the War had lasted a little longer,
the range of our bombing squadrons would have greatly increased, and would probably have included Berlin. From that time to this the Air Force has remained a separate force under the Air Ministry.
I hope the House does not think that I have taken too long with the summary, which I could not well have made shorter if I were to give the House all the events that led up to the formation of the Air Ministry and of a separate Air Board by an Act of Parliament on the decision of this House. It will be seen that it was war experience which led to the creation of the Air Ministry, and to the constitution of a separate homogeneous Air Force. It was not theory derived from speculation in the past, but it was practical experience, after trying a great many other experiments, and the deficiencies which they left, that proved to the Government in the pressure of the War, and for the successful conduct of the War, the necessity of creating the system now in force.

Viscount CURZON: After the Air Ministry was constituted, did the Services retain control of the aeroplanes working with them, or were they controlled by the Air Ministry?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The independent force was directly under the Air Ministry, subject to the supreme control of Marshal Foch. Air squadrons working with the Army were under the Army Command, and air squadrons working with the Navy were under the Naval Command. Now I return to the lessons which we derived and the inferences which we formed from this war experience. However elaborate the machinery for coordination, whatever the goodwill and the desire to co-operate between the different Departments, it was found during the War supremely difficult to achieve, full efficiency in the Air Services as long as those Services remained divided—part under the War Office and part under the Admiralty. As long as the supply of machines and engines remained under the two Departments, there resulted only a disastrous and wasteful competition. We were driven step by step to a greater concentration of responsibility for the Air, until by Statute the Air Ministry and the Air Board were constituted as they exist to-day. It was only after the Air Ministry was constituted, with its air
staff, that the aeronautical aspects of the War were considered from a distinctly Air point of view and by aerial officers. Until that time the Air was under purely naval or military command, and was only thought of in terms of naval or military warfare.
I do not want it to be thought that the Government are blind to the real difficulties which arise out of the present system. I do not pretend for one moment that it works with perfect harmony or smoothness, or gives satisfaction to everybody. But our view is that the objections to the re-absorption of the Air Forces by the Army and Navy are far greater than any objections under the present circumstances and for the time to which we can look forward—as I have said before, I am not pretending to lay down a policy for all time—which can be raised against the existence of a separate Air Ministry and Staff. If the Air Services were required only as an adjunct to the Naval and Military Services, there would be much to be said for their re-absorption, thought I do not think that even then the case would be conclusive, for there would remain the necessity for preventing the kind of competition which took place with such unhappy results during the War.
It is imperative that there should be the closest co-operation and the closest communication and understanding between the heads of the different Services of the needs, requirements, and capabilities not only of their own Service, but of the other Services with which they have to act in common. These are points for which we must provide, but we have, in addition, to consider the development of the Aerial Forces in their own elements, and use those forces for operations independent of both the Navy and the Army. Already great progress has been made in that direction. My right hon. Friend, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, recently gave the House some very interesting information as to the success of the Air Force in carrying out independent action, and as to the use which we are making of it in Mesopotamia at the present time, as also in Somaliland, but not wholly independent there. The Government believe then that if the Air Service were reabsorbed by the Navy and the Army, this aspect of the service to be rendered by the Air Force would
inevitably be relegated to the background. Sailors and soldiers would continue to think of the force in terms of their own service, and would not pursue and could not be expected to pursue its development as an independent force outside the purpose with which it was associated, and for which they desired that it should be employed. Believing, however, as we do that the Air Forces have immense potentialities of their own, and in their own element, distinctive from their other and vitally important duties in connection with the Naval and Military Services, the great importance of which is not in the least underrated, and convinced as we are that in the future the greatest danger to this country may well be from the action of Air Forces, rather than of Naval or Military Forces, we consider that it would be a retrograde step at this time to abolish the Air Ministry, and to re-absorb the Air Service into the Admiralty and the War Office.
It is true that no other nation as yet has followed our example in this matter, but 1 think that I am correct in saying that some high authorities in other countries think that the course which we have taken is the right course, and are contemplating, or discussing, the advisability of following it in their own case. It is notorious that more than one great Power is most anxiously canvassing the whole situation, and I think it not unlikely, to put it no higher, that we shall find our example followed if we do not ourselves abandon it.
The House will be anxious to know in these circumstances how we propose to secure the proper co-operation and co-ordination of the services, and what rules we shall lay down to secure that the Army shall have the aid from the air which is required, and that the Navy shall have the aid front the air which it requires. This is a subject which has for a long time been very carefully considered by a Standing Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, under the chairmanship of my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council. As the result of that inquiry, we have come to certain decisions, which I hope I may be permitted to give in their entirety, though they are not confined to co-operation between the Air Force and the Navy, because, as I said at the beginning of my speech, it is impossible for the
Government to treat this matter as the hon. and gallant Member for the West Derby Division of Liverpool (Sir R. Hall) very easily and fairly put it in moving his Amendment as one to be decided in the light of Naval considerations alone. We can only come to, and defend, our decision by a survey of the whole position. These are the conclusions at which we have arrived:—
In the first place, that the Air Force must be autonomous in matters of administration and education.
Second, that in the case of defence against air raids the Army and Navy must play a secondary rôle
Third, that in the case of Military operations by land or Naval operations by sea, the Air Force must be in strict subordination to the general or admiral in supreme command.
Fourth, that in other cases, such as the protection of commerce and attacks on enemy harbours and inland towns, the relations between the Air Force and the other services shall be regarded rather as a matter of co-operation than of the strict subordination which is necessary when aeroplanes are acting merely as auxiliaries to other arms.
Lastly, the Government have decided to appoint a Committee which will, I say without hesitation, consist either of the Standing Committee or the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to examine carefully into the system of Naval and Air co-operation, and to advise us how we can best secure that the Air Force should be enabled to render to the Navy, and in connection with the Navy other services, the aid that they may require.

Colonel MILDMAY: Does that apply to the Army also?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The case of the Army has been covered by the inquiry which has been already held, but that inquiry has not dealt in the same detail with the Navy. I do not think at the present time that there is likely to be any need for a further Committee of Inquiry as regards the Army. If it should prove to be necessary, of course, the Cabinet will order such an inquiry to be held.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is the Air Force to be responsible for the defence of all the
naval depots, oil fuel depots, and naval dockyards?

Sir R. HALL: The terms of reference are to advise as to what steps the Air Force is to take to reinforce the Navy. Is there anything in the terms of reference as to what assistance the Navy would have to give to the Air Force?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No, I was not professing to give the exact terms of reference. I give the substance of the terms of reference, but what the terms of reference are intended to cover is what is the essence of the question—how the two services are to work together for the common defence of the country. As regards the question of my right hon. Friend the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert), we hold that the Air Force must be held responsible for defence against air raids. As regards them, the Army and Navy play a secondary role.

Captain BENN: That includes antiaircraft batteries?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, for antiaircraft defence generally the Air Ministry is the predominant partner. As I have already said, during the War the antiaircraft defence was undertaken, for a time at any rate, at the request of Lord Kitchener, by the Admiralty.

Mr. LAMBERT: Is the Air Force to be consulted as to where the naval depots should be, if they are responsible for the aerial defence?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: No new naval depots are being created at this moment. The existing depots were established before the Air Force came into existence. The new possibilities of the situation must be taken into account, of course, in the ease of any future development.

Colonel Sir C. YATE: Are the Air Force to have their separate medical hospitals?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I should already have informed my hon. Friend on that point, had it not been for the way in which I have been heckled as if I were in a Scottish election campaign. Now as to the question of economy, which is of vital importance at the present time. In the first part of the Report on National Expenditure, attention was drawn to overlapping and duplication in the services of the Navy, Army, and Air
Force, and the Committee as a remedy proposed a Ministry of Defence superior to all. The hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) has, I think, given notice of an Amendment raising that question. Such a proposal as that would require a great deal more consideration than the Government have been enabled to give, and, speaking as a layman, and I hope with all humility, I think that it would require a long preparation to train a staff sufficiently conversant with the work of all services to act as a staff to the new super-Ministry. At any rate, we do not think that we could adopt that remedy at the present moment, or without much further consideration, and I believe that in present circumstances we should not facilitate the securing of the necessary economy from each of the three Services if they believed that their individuality was being suppressed, that they had no spokesmen of their own who could express their view, and were all under the super-Minister who was common to all, yet belonged to none of them.
But there is something which ought to be done. There are ancillary services—intelligence, supply, transport, education, medical, chaplain, and perhaps others, which are required by each of the three Services, in the case of which it would seem that there is no particular differentiation in what they do for the respective Services; and we have decided, in the hope of reducing expenditure and securing economy on these ancillary services, to appoint a Committee to make proposals for amalgamating as far as possible these common ancillary Departments of the three great Services.
To sum up what I have said, the Government believe that to abolish the Air Ministry, to re-absorb the Air Service into the services of the Army and the Navy, would be a fatally retrograde step. Even if it removed a little friction, and improved and facilitated the co-operation between the Air Services and purely Naval and Military operations, which is very doubtful, it would unquestionably retard the development of the Air Services in their own element, in which it may be that the future of national defence lies. To take this step would be to bring back also all the evils of divided control which existed in this matter in the early part of the War. The decision of the Govern-
ment to establish a separate Air Ministry-was based, as I have said, on war experience. What is now required in order to ensure the success of the present scheme is close and intimate co-operation, and that the three Services should regard themselves as the common servants of the nation in endeavouring to attain a single object. This cannot be achieved so long as the existence of the Air Ministry and the Air Force remains in doubt, and the Government thought it right and fair to that service and to the distinguished officers who are at its head, and no less fair to the other two great Services, that they should define their attitude in this matter, so that all may know what is expected of them, and what system they would have to follow.

8.0 P.M.

Major-General SEELY: I wish to say merely with what immense satisfaction many of us have heard, and many outside will read, of the definite and final decision of the Government, in the interests of Imperial defence, to maintain a separate Air Ministry and Air Force.

Captain ELLIOT: Will it be open for us subsequently to discuss the statement of the Leader of the House with reference to the amalgamation of the ancillary services?

Mr. SPEAKER: That can be discussed when the House goes into Committee, so far as it relates to this particular service.

Rear Admiral SUETER: I am quite satisfied with the very clear statement on Government policy of the Leader of the House. I can only express regret that the Government cannot set up a Ministry of Defence. It is said that there is no staff upon which to draw. Why cannot the Government draw upon the existing staff? On page 8 and page 99 of its Report the Geddes Committee very clearly lays it down that very great economy can be effected by the establishment of a Ministry of Defence. I submit that the Government ought to take that course forthwith.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: May I appeal to the House now to allow Mr. Speaker to leave the Chair. The discussion can continue on the Vote that is to be submitted. The discussion on Vote A is as wide as the discussion on the question that Mr. Speaker leave the Chair. That being so
perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend who moved the Amendment will allow it to be withdrawn.

Sir W. JOYNSON-HICKS: Before that is done may I, as one who took a humble part in the Air Service and who came prepared to make a speech in answer to my hon. and gallant Friend who moved the Amendment, say to the Leader of the House, who has, I believe, made his first air speech, that I cannot do better than say "ditto" to his remarks.

Sir R. HALL: I fear it will be a great disappointment to many Members who came to the House primed with speeches, but after the statement made by the Leader of the House I beg to ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I must make a protest against the Question "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair" being put now. In the years before the War it took more than one day to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on the Navy Estimates. I see no reason why we should curtail the general discussion on this Motion at 8 o'clock at night. We are told that the discussion can be continued on Vote A, but it cannot be continued on so wide a basis as the present discussion.

Mr. AMERY: Not only will the discussion on Vote A be exactly as wide as this discussion, but it will enable me to reply to points raised in this and later discussion. I cannot reply now.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I believe the hon. Gentleman will be quite in order in speaking a second time by leave of the House. Here we are entering upon most important Estimates, which before the War occupied more than a day. In view of the financial situation, it is important to discuss these matters fully now, and I must make my protest against the course suggested.

Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.

Considered in Committee.

[Mr. JAMES HOPE in the Chair.]

Motion made, and Question proposed:
A. "That 118,500 Officers, Seamen, Boys, mid Royal Marines be employed for the Sea
Service, together with 2,900 for the Coast Guard and Marine Police, borne on the books of His Majesty's ships and at the Royal Marine Divisions, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923.

Mr. ADAMSON: We had a very interesting statement from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, who outlined in great detail the economies for which his Department was arranging. We on the Labour Benches are at one with him in the effort to reduce the colossal expenditure incurred on the fighting forces for some time past. We hold that the expenditure on the Navy-could very well be kept within the figure named by the Geddes Committee. We do not agree with the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary that, in looking round for economies, they have scraped the Admiralty to the very bone. Were the world situation properly examined there would be room for expenditure to be kept well within the figure suggested by the Geddes Report. We hope the Admiralty will not cease their efforts to economise. The Parliamentary Secretary told us that the economies which are to be effected would be distributed as evenly as possible among the various naval centres. On that point I join issue with him. As far as one can see from the statement placed in our hands, and from what has already occurred, the economies are not falling evenly among the various naval centres. As a matter of fact there is only one part of the country in which the economies are mainly falling, and that is Scotland. One needs only to look briefly at what has occurred since the War. The naval station of Invergordon has been practically closed. There is nothing left there but a few officials in charge of the buildings and plant. We have been told also that the Scottish Command is to be abolished. In addition, the remaining "Hoods" are not to be built, and three of the four were to have been built in Scotland. We have had the intimation that Rosyth is to be placed on the footing of a docking yard and that there is to be a reduction of the personnel of possibly 50 per cent. I do not know on what ground this action has been taken at Rosyth, and it is very difficult to understand why Scotland is being called upon to bear such an extraordinary share of the burden.
Certain of the economies it is very difficult to understand. Take Crombies and Rosyth, for example. I do not know
on what ground this very large reduction in personnel is being made, in comparison with some of the other naval stations. Rosyth is possibly the safest naval station to be found on the British coast. It is the best oiling station on this side of the Atlantic, and is within closer roach of a native supply of oil than any other naval station in the country. It is very difficult to understand why such a station should be treated in this way. One can only guess at some of the likely reasons for a policy of this kind. I do not know that it would be politic to ask the Parliamentary Secretary some of the questions which immediately rise to one's mind on examining the economies which are being effected in this instance, as compared with those which are being effected at the other naval stations of the country. If there is any danger from the national standpoint in doing so, I do not ask the Parliamentary Secretary to reply, but one is strongly inclined to ask: Can it be that the potential enemy of the future is France, one of our greatest and closest allies in the trying times through which we have passed? Whatever may be the reason, this great change is being made, and it does not give effect to the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary that these economies—with which we agree—were to be evenly distributed among the naval stations of the country.
If we take the position of Rosyth and compare it with the position of the other naval stations, what do we find? I am now quoting from the Parliamentary Secretary's own figures, given a month ago in reply to the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy. He said that, during 1921, the average number of workpeople employed in Portsmouth was 15,724; Devon-port, 13,455; Chatham, 9,936; Pembroke Dock, 2,516; Rosyth, 5,143; and that the discharges which had been made from 31st December, 1921, until the date of the answer to the question, namely, the 9th February, were as follows: Portsmouth, 367; Devonport, 281; Chatham, 109; and Pembroke Dock, 75; whereas in Rosyth there had been no fewer than 544 men discharged. Comparing Rosyth with Portsmouth, we find that in Portsmouth, where nearly 16,000 men were employed, only 367 have been discharged, while in Rosyth, where 5,143 men were employed,
there have been 544 discharges. These discharges have been going on ever since, at the rate of 200 men, or thereabouts, per week. I have suggested one reason for this, but there are other reasons which arise in one's mind on seeing the great disparity between the number of discharges from this naval station and the number of discharges from the others. One is forced to the conclusion that there must be either political or social influence behind it, or both.
Not only have we this great disparity existing between the naval station of Scotland and those of England, but if we examine the position at Rosyth, we find that there is unfair treatment in the discharging of the men from that dockyard just as there is unfair treatment as between that dockyard and the other dockyards of the country. I have already said that there are about 200 men being discharged weekly since the figures I have quoted were given by the Parliamentary Secretary. I should like the Committee to understand that the men who are being discharged in Rosyth are the men who have been taken on locally—the Scotsmen —and the men who are being kept in Rosyth, in its depleted state, are Englishmen. I would be the last person to try to make, invidious distinctions as between one country and the other, but the difference in treatment, first, as between Scottish and English yards, and, secondly, between Scotsmen and Englishmen in Rosyth, is so plain that one cannot help calling the attention of the Committee and the attention of tin Government, and the attention of the country to it. As a matter of fact, Saturday after Saturday as the discharged men are leaving the yard it is a common expression among the workmen, "There goes the Scots Brigade."
We may have the Parliamentary Secretary telling us that the men transferred from the southern yards are established men. I want to show the Parliamentary Secretary before he comes, to reply, that he cannot ride off on that excuse. A considerable number of the men transferred from the southern yards are not established men. There are a number of men employed in Rosyth, transferred from the southern yards, who were offered establishment a considerable time ago, but I understand they refused to take establishment and are not now established
in Rosyth any more than the Scotsmen employed there, or, if they are established, they have been established as a cover, since this trouble arose and since this question was raised in the House. It would be very interesting to discover why these men refused establishment, but I am not going to discuss that. These men who are not established and who are transferees from the southern yards were dismissed along with the locally engaged men, but curiously enough while the locally engaged men go at the rate of 200 a week the dismissal of the transferees, who have not been established, has been withdrawn and they are kept on. Meantime the weekly procession of dismissed local men goes on. If cither the Admiralty, or the Government, or this Committee think that that sort of thing can go on without trouble arising, they are simply deceiving themselves. As I have already stated, I am at one with the Government, and the party with which I am associated is at one with the Government, in these economies, and, as a matter of fact, we think they could effect more yet, but we say that when they are effecting economy, it will have to be on the basis of fair play as between one section of the community and another. That is our complaint, and that is the reason why I am taking this opportunity of bringing to the notice of the Parliamentary Secretary, the Government, and the Committee the anomalies that have taken place as between Scotland, on the one hand, and England, on the other, and as between Scotsmen, on the one hand, and Englishmen, on the other, at the dockyard of Rosyth. I will say quite frankly to the Parliamentary Secretary that it is time that he or somebody else was making inquiries into these things and dealing with them on the basis of fair play.
There are one or two more points I want to bring before the notice of the Committee, but I want to say that to deal with the subject in the way in which I have done is very distasteful to me as an individual. I would rather that I had not to deal with it in the frank way in which I am dealing with it, but the anomalies are there, they have got to be dealt with, and I am quite willing to deal with them in my effort to get them remedied. In giving treatment to Scotland as compared with England in the way which I have outlined, the Admiralty is only
adding to the unfair treatment that Scotland gets as compared with England year by year. I do not say that the people in Scotland are asked to pay a higher proportion of taxation than the people in England or in Wales. I do not think they are. I think we are pretty equal in that respect, but where the unfair treatment comes in is this, that after we have paid our taxes there is a far bigger proportion of the money spent in England than there is in Scotland. There is a growing demand in Scotland for Home Rule, and points like this that I am discussing so frankly to-night are the very things that will increase the demand for Home Rule until you will not be able to withstand the demand for Home Rule in Scotland any more than in Ireland.

Mr. J. WALLACE: We will have a Navy of our own.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: You would have to pay for it.

Mr. ADAMSON: I might remind my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline (Mr. Wallace) that we have had a Navy of our own before, a Navy that gave a good account of itself in its day. Not only are the things which I have been dealing with unfair from the point of view of Scotland as compared with England, but there is smother aspect of it, and it is possibly more critical than the one I have already alluded. The aspect that I now want to deal with in a word is the effect that it is going to have on the Burgh of Dunfermline and on the Dunfermline District Committee of the Fife County Council. As the Secretary to the Admiralty very well knows, both these bodies have incurred a very heavy liability. They were encouraged by the Admiralty to incur that liability. They were told that there was to be a large amount of work at Rosyth, that in all probability there would be an increase of the population of from 20,000 to 40,000 persons, and that they as the local authorities would require to make the necessary arrangements as to public health, supplying all the conveniences that are required by such a great population, and so forth. I cannot give you a figure as to the expenditure of the Fife County Council, but I know that, so far as water is concerned, their expenditure has been very heavy indeed, and, if I take the
Burgh of Dunfermline, I find that the Burgh has incurred an expenditure of no less than £430,000.
If Rosyth is to be cut down to a mere shadow of what the Admiralty has led the local authorities to expect, you are going to place on those local authorities an almost intolerable burden, and the Secretary to the Admiralty is requiring to examine the position much more closely than has been the case up to the present. I can assure him of this, that unless the spirit of fair play is to enter into these economies to a far greater extent than has been the case up till now, not only will you have a critical situation arising locally, but you will have the Scottish people taking up the position that they are no longer going to be treated in the manner in which they have been treated up to the present. Unless we have this question dealt with in an entirely different spirit from the one that has been adopted up till now, this will be made a national instead of a district question, and I hope that the Admiralty and the Government will examine this question much more closely than they have done, and in, as I say, the spirit of fair play.

Sir MALCOLM SMITH: We have had a very interesting discussion, and I think we may congratulate the Secretary to the Admiralty that the economies that are being effected are so substantial, although at the same time it might be desired that they could have gone even a little further. In any case, with regard to these economies, there are certain national services that it is necessary to maintain in their entirety. It would be a misfortune if, in economies affecting the Navy, we were to take our Fleet away altogether, or even to a diminished extent, from foreign waters. Our flag has always a very salutary influence in foreign parts, giving confidence to traders and to shipping in various parts of the world, particularly in the Pacific and in the South Atlantic, and then again, with regard to the protection of our fishing fleets, we have complaints occasionally that in such distant places as Iceland, or on the coast of Russia, our fishing fleets are not treated with that consideration which is due to them, and that the presence occasionally of one of His Majesty's ships would have the necessary salutary influence. We have had discussion to-day regarding the sub-
marine and the aeroplane. At the Washington Conference the suggestion was made by the representatives of our country that submarines should be prohibited, and that, no doubt, would be desirable. Unfortunately, other nations objected, particularly France, and we have not, in the meantime, made any satisfactory progress in that direction. To-day we have had some discussion regarding the aeroplane. My view is that the aeroplane should be used only for observation purposes, and that it should not be used for destructive purposes any more than the submarine, which we desire to prohibit. That, of course, could only be arranged by international agreement. It would be difficult to carry out, no doubt, but we are approaching the time when we hope the League of Nations will have more influence—

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Never!

Sir M. SMITH: — in the pacific control of affairs than hitherto has been the case. If that is not going to become a more definite reality than hitherto it has been shown, then we may almost say good-bye to civilisation. I have listened with a great deal of attention to the previous speaker. He has brought forward complaints about the treatment of Scotland by the Admiralty, and he has done so with very good cause. Unfortunately, I also have to bring forward a complaint regarding the treatment by the Admiralty in my constituency in connection with the naval base at Scapa Flow. As the House is aware, Scapa Flow was occupied by the Grand Fleet almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, and continued to be the basis of the Grand Fleet in the North up to the time of the Armistice, and later. In order to protect the Grand Fleet from the attacks of enemy submarines, all openings into Scapa Flow had to be closed, and two important channels leading from the east of Scapa Flow into the North Sea, namely, Water Sound and Home Sound, were blocked by the Admiralty putting down there obsolete merchant ships to the number of five or six, the result being that these channels were effectively closed. Elsewhere in the country, where such precautions have been necessary for the purpose of protecting the Fleets and other Services, these obstruction have all been removed. Take, for example, the Firth of Forth and Rosyth. Quite a number of navigation
obstructions were put down there, and were maintained there until considerably after the War, but they have all been removed by the Navy.
The question has been under consideration for some time, and the Orkney County Council, the Shetland County Council, and the Town Councils in both Orkney and Shetland have all sent petitions to the Admiralty urging upon them the necessity for removing these obstructions. Men of the British Legion, shipmasters, and shipping companies have also asked the Admiralty to have these obstructions removed, and the latest petition is from 75 fishermen and others in an island adjoining there. Many of them served during the War, and came back after the War to carry on their ordinary avocation of fishermen, but they are prevented from doing so owing to the obstructions not having been removed. It is a very serious matter for the inhabitants of these parts that these channels should still remain practically closed for nevigation purposes. The fishing grounds lie out to the east of the island, and the channels have to be used by the fishermen coming into the fishing stations. These men are now unable to carry on their avocation. The curing stations in the neighbourhood are now practically obsolete stations, erected at the cost of many thousands of pounds. Harbours, in use from time immemorial, are now practically deserted, and all this in consequence of these navigation channels still remaining obstructed. I appeal to the Admiralty to have this remedied. Their Objection, in the first place, is that, as all these obstructions were put there in a national emergency for the purpose of protecting national interests, they are under no legal obligation to remove them. A statement of that kind is the height of irony, seeing that obstructions, which were put down for the same purpose elsewhere, have been removed. Why, then, have not these been removed from Scapa Flow?
I am inclined to concur with the remark of the previous speaker, that this is another instance of the way in which Scottish interests are being neglected, or that Scotland is being punished by the Admiralty, as it suffers in other connections. It is hard on these people that this state of affairs should continue. The men from these islands went forward at the outbreak of War voluntarily to serve
their country, and it is very hard treatment of them now that, having returned, they should not be able to carry on their pre-War avocations. It has been the professed intention of respective Governments for many years to keep the people on the land in these country parts, and to make their opportunities there more favourable than hitherto, but here is an instance of a Department doing its utmost to drive the people from the land. If these obstructions are not removed, there will be more people driven away from these parts than the Board of Agriculture, or the Land Courts, or the Development Commission will be able to introduce for many years to come, and the money that is required to remove these obstructions is not by any means very heavy.
The Admiralty tell us, in the second place, that it would be impossible to remove the obstructions except by explosion, which might do a good deal of damage in the neighbourhood. I cannot think that that statement is seriously meant, because I have consulted salvage companies, who are prepared to submit estimates to the Admiralty for the purpose of having these ships removed; but the Admiralty, however, tell me that they are not inclined to give further consideration to the question. I appeal to the Admiralty, therefore, to see that justice —because it is only justice that is asked by these people—is done. It should not be necessary even to ask for these obstructions to be removed. They should have been removed, as they have been removed in other parts, without any appeal having to be made to the Admiralty, but I make this appeal to the Admiralty, and I trust it will not be made in vain. If this be not remedied, it will be another grievance which Scotland will have. This is one that ought to be remedied, and I trust the Admiralty will give it consideration, and see that these obstructions are taken away without loss of time.

Mr. J. WALLACE: I welcome in this Debate to-night the support of my right hon. Friend and constituent the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Fife (Mr. Adamson). I am sorry he is gone from his place at the moment, because I wish to say that, while I generally find myself in the opposite Lobby from himself, to-night, were there a division on this particular Vote, he and I could vote together. I am glad that he
has intervened in this Debate, because he is a resident and knows the position at first hand. I took the opportunity on the first day of the meeting of this Parliament to raise the question of the reductions at Rosyth, and in this important matter I welcome any help I can possibly get from Scottish Members. Up till now that has not been offered to any very-noticeable degree. But I really think that this is a national question which Scottish Members cannot possibly afford to ignore. What is the position? At Rosyth, where you have something like 6,000 workmen of various kinds, you are reducing them at the rate of 200 per week. At the southern yards, as my right hon. Friend has said, you are proceeding at a very much slower rate. In so far as Admiralty policy at Rosyth is governed by strategical reasons, it is not for me as a layman to criticise, but I do wish to point this out. You have in the south out-of-date yards, in some cases quite incapable of doing the work on big ships, whereas at Rosyth you have the most up-to-date naval base in the world with the very latest plant and equipment, and yet, when a policy of economy is adopted by the Government, it is at the very latest plant and machinery that they aim the shrewdest blow of the economy axe. I confess, unless there are very strong strategical reasons, that I entirely fail to follow the policy of the Admiralty at the present time. What does the First Lord say on this question in his memorandum? He announces that the reduction will fall on some of the yards at home and abroad, and continues:
Rosyth will be especially affected in so far as it has been decided, after careful consideration, to place this establishment upon the footing of a docking yard.
That statement was confirmed by the Parliamentary Secretary this afternoon. The First Lord goes on to say:
One of the influences which has governed this decision is the question of the payment of inconvenience money and railway fares to the workmen living outside the area.
In January I asked the Admiralty whether, if the workmen who are being paid inconvenience money agreed to forego that payment, the question of the rate of reduction of the staff would be reconsidered, and I received a reply in the negative. Therefore I see no point in this statement of the First Lord, con-
firmed by the Parliamentaiy Secretary that the payment of inconvenience money-has influenced the decision. In this statement the First Lord makes reference to Pembroke. Is it contended that Pembroke is of the slightest use as a dockyard. I have not heard any serious statement made that it is of any use, now that the War is over. The statement of the First Lord says:
It has been decided hot to close Pembroke—
Why?
On account of the distress that might be caused by the dismissal of the staff at Pembroke dockyard.
It is quite clearly demonstrated by the First Lord himself that preference is being given to Pembroke on account of the distress which would result from dismissals there!

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: No, no!

Mr. WALLACE: With the utmost respect, I prefer the reason that is given by the First Lord in his written statement. What is the reason? I do not associate myself with my right hon. Friend the Member for West Fife (Mr. Adamson) when he referred to social and political influences being at work. I know nothing of these: but I do want to know why distress in the South should preclude dismissals and distress in the North have no effect. That is a question which my hon. Friend opposite is bound to answer. I am extremely sorry that the question of racial prejudice has been introduced into this Debate I know no distinction at all of that kind. I do suggest, however, that the policy of the Admiralty has encouraged and inspired that racial prejudice which, personally, I so much deplore.
At Rosyth at the present time you have H.M.S. "Furious" under repair and refit. There is work on the "Furious" for 2,000 men for something like 18 months or two years. What is the policy of the Admiralty? It was decided definitely that that work should be done at Rosyth because there we have all the necessary equipment to do the work in the best possible manner. The Admiralty have now decided to tow the ship to a Southern yard for repair. Why? You must expect that that will cause prejudice in Rosyth. The Scottish people there will reason, and quite naturally, that unemployment
does not matter in Rosyth, but that it matters very much in the South of England. You are taking all that work away from Scotland and I am not surprised that the Scottish workmen—and the English workmen, too—at Rosyth resent very much the policy of the Admiralty in moving the "Furious" to a Southern yard. I have not heard the slightest defence of that policy which, in my judgment, will hold water for a single moment. I do hope that my hon. Friend whom I have found most sympathetic in this whole matter, when he gives a reply, will give some explanation which will satisfy this Committee as to the Admiralty's policy in removing the "Furious" from Scotland to England. I also hope that he will state clearly, if possible, what the policy of the Admiralty is regarding the transference of English workmen who are established to Southern yards with their full Rosyth status. He told me yesterday, in answer to a question, that the redundant men under 50 would be offered employment in the Southern yards and that the redundant men over 50 would be dismissed on superannuation allowance. Why are there any redundant men at all in Rosyth at the present time, whether established or unestablished? Simply because the Admiralty are going back upon their own policy so far as the "Furious" is concerned. If it is not too late I beg my hon. Friend to endeavour to get a reconsideration of the decision regarding the removal of the "Furious" to a Southern yard. The naval base at Rosyth was referred to yesterday by the Noble Lady the Member for Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) as a mushroom growth. I do not know if the Noble Lady ever heard of the battle of Jutland and of those great ships which came limping up the Forth battered and torn and which could only be received and refitted at the Rosyth Naval Base. No yard in the South could accommodate them and it was only at Rosyth that they could be repaired and made fit for the fighting line again. A mushroom growth, indeed! I am sorry the Noble Lady is not present, because I informed her to-night that I should state my opinion upon her statement about Rosyth being a mushroom growth. If I were to give the Noble Lady any advice it would be that she had far better confine her attention to the advocacy of women's rights
or pure milk for babies than attempt to compare the respective merits of our naval dockyards.
There is one other subject about which I wish to say a word. My right hon. Friend has spoken about the responsibility of Dunfermline regarding Rosyth. I happen to represent Dunfermline and I know the local authority there was very unwilling to include Rosyth within the town boundaries, but they did so under the most alluring promises by the Admiralty. The town councils of Scotland spring as a rule from a cautious race and do not relish the idea of great responsibilities of this kind without some definite assurance of being able to meet their obligations, and Dunfermline hesitated long before they took over Rosyth. They hesitated so long that a visit was paid to them by the present Minister of Labour, who was then Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, and still finding it difficult to persuade them he assumed the mantle of the prophet, and addressing them with that eloquence to which we are accustomed in this House from him, he said:
Ye fearful saints, fresh courage take!
The clouds ye so much dread,
Are big with mercy, and will break
In blessings on your head.
I do not know whether my right hon. Friend succeeded in that way, but at any rate the Dunfermline Town Council gave in after that, and they agreed to take over this great responsibility. They saw the clouds and of course they broke all right. They broke in January this year, not in blessings, but with black disaster. On the 22nd of January this year at Rosyth the fateful notice was posted regarding the reductions in the staff, and now Dunfermline is left with a very serious financial responsibility. In the atmosphere of war it was quite easy for the Admiralty to make all kinds of promises and we now look to the Admiralty to make those promises good.
9.0 P.M.
In anticipation of the development of Rosyth the Dunfermline Town Council spent something like £200,000 entirely in anticipation of that development. Ever since then they have had a loss in annual revenue since they took over the responsibility of Rosyth of something like £44,000. Last year they lost nearly £10,000 in revenue alone; in other words, their provision for public services in con-
nection with the Rosyth development has resulted in a loss to that corporation of £44,000. I ask my hon. Friend who represents the Admiralty what he is going to do about this matter. Surely it is unfair that in a great national project of this kind for a great national contingency, namely, the menace of war, when Rosyth came into being, that the financial results of the abandonment of that policy should rest upon a community like Dunfermline. Surely in fair play, in common honesty, the Admiralty must consider the reimbursement of Dunfermline in so far as their expenditure in the interests of Rosyth has been excessive and unremunerative. I do hope that when my hon. Friend comes to reply he will consider that matter very seriously, because I can assure him that it is at the present time a subject of the greatest possible anxiety to the Dunfermline municipality, who find themselves with this serious financial burden upon them, caused entirely by the reversion of the policy of the. Admiralty, and which they were led to believe would be permanent. All along towards Rosyth the Admiralty have pursued a vacillating policy, and we have never known where we were. In a recent conversation with the Provost of Dunfermline I was asked to find out what is the worst about Rosyth. I received a telegram from the Parliamentary Secretary in January in which he said that the staff there was to remain a permanent staff of something like 3,000. I want to know whether there is any change of policy since January, and whether the reference by the First Lord in his statement about the future status of the Rosyth dockyard means that there are still to be 3,000 kept as a permanent staff, or whether that number is to be still further reduced.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: I have listened very attentively and with a great deal of sympathy to the speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down. I have a great deal in common with him, and I regret very much that the dockyard at Rosyth is to be reduced in the way suggested by the Parliamentary Secretary to-day. I take it that the real reason is that Rosyth Dockyard is the only one that can take in very large ships like the "Hood" or ships like the "Hood." At the Washington Con-
ference we agreed not to build ships anything like that size, and therefore I take it that the Rosyth Dockyard would be of no further value.

Sir B. FALLE: My hon. and gallant Friend is wrong in saying that Rosyth is the only dockyard that can take the "Hood," because she could come into Portsmouth at any time.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: I am much obliged for the correction of my hon. Friend, but I think he is in error. To return to the matter on which I was speaking. I would like to say this. Naturally, the hon. Member opposite will expect of me, as a Member for a dockyard constituency in the South, that I should at once say how pleased I am to receive men who are unfortunately to be dismissed from Rosyth. But I cannot say that I am very pleased to receive them, because I know that the influx of the men from Rosyth will naturally send down labour in my own dockyard, especially with regard to the established men. There are a number of established men who must get out of Rosyth Dock yard, and we are told that they are to find refuge in southern dockyards. Naturally, that will be to the detriment of the established men in the southern yards, and therefore I cannot extend the hospitality I would like to to these men from Rosyth. I certainly was surprised to hear both the hon. Member and the right hon. Gentleman who spoke before him talk about the treatment of Scotland in the way they did. I have English and Scottish blood in my veins, and naturally I am most anxious that both Scotland and England should be properly represented and properly treated by the Admiralty. I have travelled a good deal about the world, and wherever I have been I have always found Scotsmen on top. Even in this House we find gentlemen representing Scotland coming to the front—

The CHAIRMAN: Thai has nothing to do with Vote A.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: I will not pursue what is certainly a very pleasant controversy on the question of Scotland versus England. The Debate to which we have listened to-day has practically been one on economy, to a great extent founded on the Geddes Report. I am
most anxious, like all hon. Members, to do everything possible in favour of economy. We all want to economise. The question whether we ought to economise in the way suggested in the Navy is, however, quite another matter. I am extremely pleased to find that the Financial Secretary was able to put up so good an answer to the somewhat foolish and unwise suggestions made by the Geddes Committee, because if those suggestions were followed out the result would be not only to do away with the one-Power standard, but to do away with a standard altogether. The Financial Secretary, representing as he does the First Lord, has endeavoured to put forward Estimates which will at any rate give us something approaching the one-Power standard. But in order to achieve this economy, which I admit the financial situation of the country calls for, the Admiralty have accepted a very grave responsibility. In point of fact, and I think no one will deny it, the naval security of this country at the present moment depends upon a Treaty which has not been ratified. That being the case, no one can say we are not taking a very great risk. In other words, our naval policy at the present moment is nothing more nor less than a gamble. I ask, is that wise?
We had a statement made in the House yesterday, by a Field-Marshal of great experience and knowledge, to the effect that our liabilities to-day were much greater than they were before the War. Unlike the United States, we have a scattered Empire to defend. We are not a self-contained country. Four-fifths of our food stuffs are brought in from overseas. At the present moment Bolshevism is rampant in all parts of the world. It may break out on any day at any place. Shall we be ready to meet it with a Navy whose principal recommendation according to the Financial Secretary is that it represents the last thing in economy? I submit it is possible we shall not. In the cuts made in the Naval Estimates I think we have gone somewhat too far. In looking through the Memorandum of the First Lord of the Admiralty I find no mention made of the Dominion Navies or of Dominion co-operation. The Financial Secretary to-day supplied that omission to a certain extent, as he told us again what passed at the Imperial Conference last year. What we want to
know is, what is going to be done with regard to the Dominions? Are we going to have some arrangement with them? The Financial Secretary spoke about an Imperial Navy and an Imperial system, but there is nothing in the First Lord's Memorandum telling us anything about that Imperial system, and no mention is made of the Dominions or of Dominion co-operation. I would suggest to the Financial Secretary that the best thing to do now is either to call a special meeting of the Imperial Conference, or else to have an Imperial Naval Conference, to consider what the Dominions propose to do, seeing that our Navy at the present moment is cut down to such a very low point that unless something is done by the Dominions I fear we are in danger of not having sufficient security for the Empire. The only way we can get such security is by having some co-operation from the Dominions over seas. Therefore at the earliest opportunity I would urge the Financial Secretary to suggest to the First Lord that he should in turn suggest to the Government that a special meeting be called of the Imperial Conference.
I now pass on to the non-effective Vote. We are told there is to be ample compensation. I am sure in that matter we are all agreed. I was very glad to hear what the Financial Secretary said with regard to the attitude of the Government towards those men who are to be displaced either in the Royal Navy or in the dockyards. He told us it was to be a very generous attitude. It would not be proper for me at this stage perhaps in suggest schemes, or even to hint at what the gratuity or pension should be. But the other day some Members of the House, in conjunction with myself, received a deputation from the Royal Naval commissioned and warrant officers who suggested a scheme of compensation which to them seemed to be a very useful one. If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I will state what that scheme was. It was that 60 per cent. of the difference between the pay and pension at the time of the officer's retirement should be added to the pension until the age of 55 is reached, after which the officer should receive the pension he would be entitled to at that age of his rank. I make no observation upon it; I merely throw out the suggestion; and I trust that, when the claims are being considered, this
suggestion, which was the unanimous suggestion of a very large number of Royal Naval commissioned and warrant officers should receive consideration.
With regard to the reduction of personnel, we have heard to-day that the reduction has been carefully considered, but no mention has been made of the United States. I have seen many paragraphs in the newspapers to the effect that the reduction of personnel in the United States is not quite the same as the reduction in our Navy, and I should like the Parliamentary Secretary, when he comes to reply, to be kind enough to say exactly what the personnel of the United States Navy is to be, and exactly what the personnel of our Navy is to be. I think that that would clear up the matter of personnel to a very great extent. As regards capital ships, there is nothing to be said, because the question has been decided by the Washington Conference, and, if the Treaty which is the result of the Washington Conference is ratified, of course the capital ship programme will be on the basis of the Treaty. I would, however, ask the hon. Gentleman once more to think over whether it would not be possible to consider the question of laying down one of the new capital ships in the Royal Dockyards. I do not wish to suggest Devonport, because it would be said that I was merely suggesting the dockyard for which I was the sitting Member, but I can assure the hon. Gentleman that either Devonport or any other Southern yard would be very pleased to construct one of the new capital ships, or two if possible; and, in spite of what was said by an hon. Member on the Labour Benches, whom I do not now see in the Committee, but who made a very useful addition to the Debate—in spite of what Tie said, I assure him that this ship would be constructed in one of the Royal Dockyards just as quickly and cheaply as in any private yard.
The next matter to which I should like to call attention is that of the marriage allowance. I understand that this, so far as naval officers go, is not to be granted. I think that that is a very great mistake. The married Army officer is granted an allowance, but this privilege is to be denied to the naval officer. Surely, the responsibilities of marriage are the same in both Services; if any-
thing, they are greater in the case of the naval officer, whose place of residence is not permanent. I should like to know why this difference is shown. The Secretary of State for War, in March last, made this announcement:
Certain increased lodging and other allowances are made to every officer over 30 who is married.…The State has thus recognised that officers over 30…may be expected to be married, and it no longer refuses to recognise the increased responsibility that marriage brings."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March, 1921; col. 1289, Vol. 139.]
If that is the case with regard to the Army officer, why on earth is there to be a difference with regard to the naval officer? During the War the State allowed all naval officers £24 a year for the education and bringing up of each child. The Oliver Committee, which reported in January, 1919, suggested that, in addition to a bonus, married naval afficers should receive married quarters allowance. What was the result? No bonus was paid, and no married quarters allowance was given, but, on the other hand, the children's allowance was taken away. Then we had, in May of the same year, the Halsey Committee's Report, and what did they say? They suggested the continuance of the children's allowance, and that the Service rate of Income Tax should be levied. What happened then? The children's allowance was not continued, and the full rate of Income Tax was charged. This was specially hard upon the naval officer, and it was, moreover, particularly hard upon the Royal Naval commissioned and warrant officers. I am sure that every Member of the Committee will recognise the great work that was done in the War by the Royal Naval commissioned and warrant officers. True the cost of living now is only some 100 or 110 per cent. above the pre-War figure, but the cost of children's education has very much increased since the War. How can these men, who have risen from the ranks, and who have not, perhaps, had the same advantages as some other naval officers, keep up a home on land, pay their expenses at sea, educate their children as they should be educated, and maintain the position of officers in the Royal Navy, without the marriage allowance? I say it is impossible, and cannot be done. At any rate, however, that is not the point, because, as I have said, the State
has acknowledged that Army officers should be married, and if that is done in the case of Army officers, why should it not be done in the case of naval officers? If the marriage allowance cannot be given, then, much as I regret it, I would venture to plead with the Parliamentary Secretary to see if he cannot persuade the Government, at any rate, to restore the children's allowance. I will not labour that question any more, because I have no doubt that many speakers, more able than I am, will take up the cudgels and do it far more justice.
Now I come to the dockyards. The statement made in the memorandum is that 10,000 men of the Royal Dockyards are to be discharged, but I should like to know how many are going from each dockyard. How many are going from Devonport? We know how many per week or per month are going from Rosyth, and how many per week or per month are going from Devonport and Portsmouth; but what I want to know is the total number that are to be discharged. I am sorry to see that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert) is not in his place. He never is in his place after he has made his own speech. Directly after he has made his own speech he calmly walks out of the Committee and is never seen again. The right hon. Gentleman made his usual tirade against the Royal Dockyards. He talked about the expenditure before the War and after the War, and the various old questions which he has raised time and again, and which I have had the opportunity of answering time and again; but, for some reason or other, he is never here to take the licking. Unfortunately, although he himself was born and lives in Devonshire, he always has something to say against the Devonport Dockyard. He tells us that in Devonshire he hears that there is great waste in the Devonport Dockyard. I can tell him that there is no waste in the Devonport Dockyard, but that there is a great deal of waste in South Molton. When he suggests that I am interested in the men of the lower deck and dockyards because I happen to represent Devonport, that is hardly fair, because I might retort that he only represents the farmers and labourers because he happens to sit for South Molton and is, I may say, a very important authority on agriculture. Though he knows a great deal about agriculture, he knows nothing
whatever about dockyards and the Navy. I am only sorry to know that I have had to say these words in his absence, and I hope some kind friend will convey to him my views on this matter.
The First Lord states that the reductions in dockyards necessitate delaying or the abandonment of a great deal of important ship construction and reconstruction, as well as the restriction of necessary repairs and refitting of ships of the Fleet. I think it is a very unfortunate thing that the Financial Secretary should have to come here to bear out that statement by the First Lord. Why should we have to do without this necessary and important ship construction? If it is so important, why should it not be carried out? If repairs and refits are necessary and should be done, why are they not to be carried out? The only excuse given is, firstly, on the score of economy, and, secondly, we are told that it is only a temporary arrangement. Will the Financial Secretary tell us to-night that, while he finds it necessary to discharge a great number of men from the dockyards, as soon as he is able to abandon this idea of a temporary arrangement he will take them all back again, because after all that will be a very necessary step to take, although I am very much afraid he will not find them there? Would it not be better to keep what you have? You have very many good men there now, and if it is a temporary arrangement I suggest you should make a compromise in regard to these discharges, and that you should not discharge quite so many as you are doing now.
I pass on to oil fuel reservation, which is a very, very important matter. I greatly regretted to hear the right hon. Member for South Molton talk about oil fuel as he did this afternoon, but, then, as I said before, the right hon. Gentleman knows a great deal about farming, but nothing about the Navy—

Sir F. BANBURY: Does the hon. Gentleman forget that the right hon. Member for South Molton (Mr. G. Lambert) was a Civil Lord of the Admiralty for at least 10 years?

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Yes, I remember he was a member of the Board which cut down the establishment in the dockyards to such a low point that it was disastrous, that when I came into Parlia-
ment I had to get it put up again, that the first thing I did was to get it put up, and the first thing the right hon. Member for South Molton had to say was that he had to do it himself. It is no good talking about that. Let us go back to oil fuel. It is a great mistake to economise in this direction. The right hon. Member for South Molton desired to do away with all the bases for oil fuel, and he mentioned a lot of places where he said we had tanks for oil fuel. It is perfectly true that not very long ago the Admiralty decided that these places were necessary when they decided to adopt oil for the Fleet, and now it is said some of these places, I do not say are to be abandoned, but are to be economised on to such an extent that they will not be very much use. I would like to remind, again, the right hon. Member for South Molton that the ocean routes cannot be separated from strategical problems. He does not quite appreciate that point. He talks about strategy, the necessities of war, and that sort of thing. That is not the point. You must have your proper bases on our ocean routes, and these bases ought to be kept well supplied with oil. The Committee must remember that the mobilisation of the chief units of the British Fleet would be severely restricted if you did away or limited in any kind of way the supply of oil from those bases. You have done away with coal, and have turned your ships into oil ships, and you now say, do away with bases for the oil. If you do that you will make your ships like toy ships sitting on the waves of the ocean, and they will be of no good whatsoever. That is an entirely false economy. I hope the Government will reconsider that matter and restore our reserves. One word about travelling expenses. Even the Secretary of the Admiralty thought fit to say that he regretted very much the cutting down of the travelling expenses. I forget what it was, but I think it was a fare-and-a-half—

Mr. AMERY: Return for single fare.

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: It was a return for single fare which was allowed to the men of the Navy. That is to be absolutely taken away, and the men of the Navy, when they go on their holidays, go away for a few days, travelling from one town to another, or home to see their
wives and to see their children, have to pay full return fare. I do think this is a very unfortunate measure. These men, although they do receive now very much better pay than before the War—and thank God for that!—suffer a great hardship, it seems to me, when they have to-pay full fare in circumstances of this kind, and I join in the appeal which I think the Parliamentary Secretary made to the railway companies that they should give the same concessions as they did before to these men. There is one point I think we will all join in thanking the Admiralty for, and that is with regard to the scientific services. To think of reducing the scientific services at the present day would be nothing short of a calamity, and it is satisfactory to know that the Admiralty have taken a firm stand on this point. If the personnel is to be reduced, let us at least have a naval force efficient so far as science can make it; let nothing be left undone to make up in quality for what is lost in quantity.
With regard to allowances for the upkeep of uniform, the question of these allowances for officers has been under consideration for a considerable time. No answer has yet been given on that point, and I hope to-night the Parliamentary Secretary will possibly be in a position to give an answer on that question. I feel sure my hon. Friend the Member for Central Portsmouth (Sir T. Bramsdon) is waiting to speak on the subject of schoolmasters' pay. I will not labour that point, but will leave it to him. We must, however, have a decision on it at the earliest possible moment. It was promised a long time ago; indeed, I understood the promise to be given at least nine months ago. We have not had a decision yet, and I do hope the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to say that some decision has been arrived at on that point. The same is the case in regard to submarine pay, which has been under consideration for a long time without anything having yet been done.
In conclusion, there are one or two words I should like to say about Royal Naval commissioned and warrant officers, and, with the permission of the Committee, I will put their views before the Parliamentary Secretary. There is the recognition of rank. I ask for the revision of the relative rank table in the King's Regulations. I received a deputation the
other day, and they mentioned that by the finding of the Hyde Parker Committee—

Notice taken that 40 Members were not present; Committee counted; and 40 Members being present—

Sir C. KINLOCH-COOKE: By the finding of the Hyde Parker Committee these men were recognised as officers in every respect. Many cases of hardship, many cases of suffering, are caused by the non-recognition of these men as officers, and I suggest that the Parliamentary Secretary should do his best to get the matter put right. With regard to stagnation of promotion, I was reminded by the same deputation that the Admiralty still had this matter under consideration, and I strongly urge upon the Admiralty to find some means of amelioration of the present conditions. One word about messing and cabin accommodation. The accommodation at present provided, even in the latest kind of ships, is hopelessly inadequate, and I would suggest that adequate accommodation should be provided for all Naval commissioned and warrant officers. That would make a good deal of difference to their comfort, and I should like to ask that it should be seen to. I hope the Parliamentary Secretary will pay especial attention to the points I have raised.

Sir T. BRAMSDON: In the early part of the evening the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Rose) severely criticised the cost of the work done in the dockyards and the cost of administration, and he paid attention to the fact that the Geddes Committee states that the cost is £3 for every ton of material in the dockyard while it is only 30s. in private yards. I should like to know how those figures are arrived at. There is an old saying that you can prove anything by figures, and I have my doubts whether the Geddes Committee were right in the estimate they formed of the cost of these respective yards. I should also like to inquire when that estimate was obtained. Was it obtained for work done in the dockyards during the War, because, if so, it may easily be accounted for. We know full well that it was part of the Admiralty policy that there should be an overborne quantity of workmen in the dockyards during the War, and for a very good reason. They did not know when
any ships might be brought into the yards or when any action might be fought and how serious it might be, and the Admiralty would have been wanting in discretion and judgment if they had not had more than a sufficient number of men in the dockyards to undertake that work. If the estimate was based on that fact I cannot wonder that the cost per ton was more than it would be in private yards. Again, there has been more repair work done in the dockyards than in private yards, and of course it follows that the quantity of material for repair work is less than it is for new construction, and therefore, if the estimate was based on that basis, that may be the reason. It has been pointed out that some of the statements of the Geddes Committee have been inaccurate, and I submit that this is one of those inaccuracies which want to be proved. The hon. Member admitted that there was not as good, but, as he put it, a shade better quality of work done in the dockyards than in private yards. He did not want to praise the dockyards too much, but I think he might have said that the work done was a great deal better than it was in the private yards, and certainly I may put it on this basis, that there is no better work done anywhere in shipbuilding than is done in the Government dockyards. He also said the very best men were allocated to the dockyards. I think he is right there. There is no shoddy work done in the dockyards, and we have the very best quality of men in connection with the work which is done there. It is not because the wages of the workmen are more. They are less than in private yards. Then he spoke of the salaries of the Admiralty engineers and managers. I think he will find, if he compares the two, that the salaries of the heads of departments in dockyards are not nearly as much as they are in private yards. My hon. Friend forgot that the "Dreadnought" was built in Portsmouth Dockyard in record time, and that was one of the best pieces of work ever done. I would also call attention to the fact that during the War the loyalty and devotion of the men of the dockyards was beyond all praise, and the Admiralty themselves paid them the best compliment they could for the work done at that time, and praised the men for it, and I think with justice. I answer that point merely because the hon. Member
was attacking the dockyards, and as I represent the senior naval dockyard—I did not say the principal yard; I am always modest in my statements—I thought I was entitled to take some account of the attack which he made.
But I did not get up to talk about dockyards but about the Navy. Last year I called attention to the lack of promotion from the lower deck. That promotion is no better now than it was last year. I have here some astonishing figures that I should like to read respecting the lack of promotion amongst the men of the lower deck. Since the Armistice, a period of three and a half years, the following promotions only to warrant ranks have been made, that is to say from the lower deck, not a single gunner warrant officer, only two torpedo gunners, not a single boatswain, not a single signal boatswain, not a single warrant telegraphist or warrant shipwright, and of the warrant masters at arms only six have been appointed, of warrant engineers only 19, of warrant mechanicians two, warrant electricians six, warrant ordnance officers two, warrant writers 15, warrant victualling officers 19, and warrant cookery instructors four. These are the only promotions to the rank of warrant officer which have been made from the lower deck for the last three and a quarter years and the total is only 73. Now let us look at another phase of the question and see what the promotions among the commissioned officers have been. Would hon. Members believe that over 100 officers of captain's rank have been promoted to the rank of rear-admiral? Would they be surprised to hear that 115 commanders, 33 engineer commanders, 21 surgeon commanders, 22 paymaster commanders, totalling 201, have been promoted to the rank of captain, 214 lieut.-commanders, 94 engineer lieut.-commanders, 52 surgeon lieut.-commanders, and 29 paymaster lieut.-commanders, making altogether 409, have been promoted to the rank of commander?
Of those in the commissioned rank there has been a total of well over 700 promoted, against 73 from the lower deck. My hon. Friend, in replying for the Admiralty, may say that it is not quite fair to refer to these ranks of commissioned officers without taking a corresponding appreciation of the other ranks of the lower deck, that is the say, the ranks of leading seamen,
petty officers, and chief petty officers. If you do take those into consideration, and you bear in mind the fact that the warrant officer is, normally, the highest rank to which a man from the lower deck can get, you find that you have 73, as against 100 officers to flag rank, and 201 officers promoted to the rank of captain. Not only that, but the promotion of midshipmen to lieutenant-commander by way of sub-lieutenant and lieutenant is automatic. It is only a question of time, and at certain periods these commissioned ranks get promotion. So far as the lower deck is concerned, they only get promotion at the will of the Admiralty and on the recommendation of their officers.

Viscount CURZON: Will the hon. Member give the numbers promoted to-lieutenant-commanders?

Sir T. BRAMSD0N: Two hundred and fourteen. That is for three years and a quarter since the Armistice. Some of the warrant officers are over-borne. There are more warrant officers, apparently, than they have use for. If that is the case with the warrant officers, I believe also that all the commissioned ranks are over-borne except members of the surgeon branch, so that if there is one class among the men over-borne, the numbers of the commissioned ranks are very severely overborne. So far I have taken only the warrant officers. What can the man from the lower deck aspire to beyond that? In order to enable him to get to commissioned rank, the Admiralty in 1912 established a system which is called the Mate System, but this only applies to the seamen branch and the engine-room branch. This was considered to be an epoch-making event. It was announced in such terms as: "From the Board school to the ward room," "From the gutter to flag rank." "New era for the lower deck." "Poverty no bar to progress," and so on. What has happened in regard to this promotion to the rank of mate? Since the Armistice the following number of petty officers have been promoted to the rank of mate—mate, executive branch, 13; engine-room branch, 24—a total of 37 who have been promoted to commissioned rank through this system. That is a most unfair thing for the lower deck.
Last year there was a great flourish of trumpets in this House, and there was cheering when it was announced that
there was to be an opening for boys to be promoted to midshipmen and sent to Dartmouth. How many boys have been so promoted? I do not know of one. I remember how the announcement was cheered by some of those who have been in the Navy, and who were delighted that at last there was to be a proper direct executive promotion of men from the lower deck. I think there is one man who has been promoted to the rank of captain from the lower deck, but that was through brilliant war service. In the Army you have an instance of a man being promoted from the ranks to be Field-Marshal. You have many instances in the Army of men who have been promoted to the rank of Colonel. I am not sure of the other ranks. Anything like that promotion would be regarded in the Navy as a very extraordinary event.
It seems to me that we have to go back to Sir Cloudsley Shovel for an instance of a man being promoted to flag rank from the lower deck. When we look to foreign countries, we find that Napoleon's marshals were invariably men from the lowest rank, and right well they discharged their duties, and admirable and brilliant officers they made. Why should there not be better facilities opened up for the promotion of men from the lower deck to the higher ranks in the British Navy? I want to encourage the best class of men to go into the Navy. We have heard that there is to be a reduction in the personnel of the Navy. That being so, what is left of the Navy should be a smart, up-to-date, efficient, contented Navy, but we can only get that by giving the men a regard for their future and an ambition to aspire to positions which at the present time they have not got.
Since last year the Admiralty have established a Welfare Committee, or rather they have resuscitated it. I referred to the question in my speech last year. The Welfare Committee is a committee established so that the men can present their views and their grievances through proper constitutional channels to the Admiralty, to be dealt with by the Admiralty themselves. This Welfare Committee was established; but, I think it was in 1919, the men, who were delighted to have an opportunity of constitutionally presenting their grievances, had so many grievances to redress that they overloaded the ship and trouble arose. The result was that that Welfare
Committee of 1920 was not a success. The men were partly to blame, but I say with all respect that the officers of the Admiralty were also to blame. Therefore, this very important system of the men presenting their own grievances came to an end and the Welfare Committee was discontinued.
It fell to my lot to make representations to the Admiralty on behalf of the Joint Committee of the Lower Deck Societies of Portsmouth, which was as near as possible a true representation of the men of the Navy as could be secured, which was agreed to and acquiesced in by similar societies in Devonport and Chatham. I was desired to approach the Admiralty to see if this Welfare Committee could not be resuscitated. I was met in the most friendly, courteous and admirable spirit by the Admiralty. I put the views of the men of the lower deck as I had obtained them constitutionally, and told how they wanted the Admiralty to resuscitate the Welfare Committee. I am glad that the Admiralty have done so. They have issued an Admiralty Order giving instructions as to what the Welfare Committee should do and it will meet very shortly. I want to thank the Admiralty most cordially on behalf of the men for what they have done, and I hope they will forgive me if I say that the system is, I fear, not one that is acceptable to the men. I do not say that with a view to discarding it, because one would like to give it a proper trial. In the working of this Welfare Committee there are two classes of requests, the class requests and the general requests. The first deal with requests put forward by the different classes in the Navy, and the others refer to requests which affect the Navy as a whole. In connection with the class requests the grouping together is very unfortunate. Take, for instance, the eighth group, which consists of shipwrights, joiners, blacksmiths, plumbers, painters and coopers. The shipwrights can rise to warrant officers and they had charge of the other men. The blacksmiths are better paid than the remaining artisans, and, considered in their different categories, the others have not the best disposition towards the shipwright. To group those classes together is most unfortunate.
Then they are asked to send representatives from each group oh the
subject of these class requests. That is part of the trouble. The electrical artificers, the ordnance artificers, and the armourers, each of whom have different ideas and wishes, are grouped together, and they are to send two men to represent their requests. How are these men with different views going to send two persons to represent them? Another group is the writers, victualling ratings, and the ships' cooks. The writers attend to the clerical work in the different offices and on the ships and they are concerned with accounts. The victualling ratings are the men employed in the victualling of ships, the victualling of which depends on the victualling department, and the ships' cooks deal with the cooking establishments. And those three classes are expected to send three men to represent them as to the accountant class requests.
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Now as to the general requests. At a port meeting of the different ports there are to be 19 men who will represent the seamen, signalmen, telegraphists, sailmakers, and regulating branch, and 13 men representing mechanicians and stokers. Five men are to represent six groups, and I think that there will be considerable difficulty in this. There may be excluded from the representation some important class. Suppose that the engine-room artificers are not represented. That is a typical and unsatisfactory state of affairs. What these men want is that there should be a port welfare committee. They want to discuss this question freely and often at their port meetings; they want to have inter-port interviews every half-year, and they ant to report what takes place at those interport meetings to a representative of the Admiralty once a year. If they have to wait, as they must under this scheme, for two years, I suggest that you are creating trouble. Then as to the selection of these men. They are not to be selected in a democratic way, which would be the proper thing to do, but the commanders-in-chief at the different ports are to pick out the men who are to be on these committees. That is all very well if the commander-in-chief is sympathetic with these particular requests, but we, who are concerned with the men in the Navy, know that the superior officers, as
a rule, are not sympathetic to this mode of representation, and some of them, therefore, can scarcely be expected to do that justice in selecting representatives which should be done. If a commander-in-chief sets to work in a proper way, no doubt he will obtain sufficient information to select or allow to be selected the proper representatives, but if he is not sympathetic, and does not set to work in the proper manner, then there is trouble before him.
I submit to the Admiralty through the Parliamentary Secretary that this system is not in accordance with the wishes of the men. What has been done in this case is what is too often done in connection with nations. People are offered that which they do not want and that which they do want is refused to them. I submit that sooner or later what the men themselves wish to have is the system which will ultimately have to prevail. I say that in no carping spirit, but with the greatest desire to be loyal and patriotic on the part of the men, and I say it because I am convinced that otherwise you cannot have that happiness and contentment among the men which is desired, unless you pay respect to their wishes. You could not have a more loyal and patriotic body than the seamen and sailors of our Navy, but you may try them too much if you keep them on a ship within a confined space and deny them the opportunity of talking these things out amongst themselves Though they are loyal and patriotic they have human nature after all, and if my hon. Friend will only look at this in the light in which I present it, I feel sure that some alteration will be found to be necessary before this scheme can work satisfactorily.
I would like to ask in connection with the scheme why they have omitted in Article 26 the canteen arrangement? Are we supposed to have a different kind of representation for the canteen arrangement? It is presumed that it consists of other machinery. It is true that other machinery of a sort does exist, but the principle of representation is altogether different. I would like to know if this will ultimately be placed on the same footing as the welfare machinery, or do the Admiralty recommend various forms of representation? In the welfare machinery a great deal of trouble has been taken to secure proportional representation, but under the present system of representa-
tion the majority of ships are disfranchised. I would like to call attention to another very important question affeeting the men of the Navy. That is the assessment of their abilities. It is a very strong point with the men in the Navy. For instance, "exceptional" ability is to be awarded only to a man who stands out from his fellows. The number of "Exceptionals" awarded is limited to four per cent. where the total number of ratings borne in ships is over 400, and to five per cent. with 400 or less. The men object to the whole system, as they are not satisfied that they get just satisfaction out of it. They wish to revive the old system.
I suppose most hon. Members have seen the old parchments of the men. I had one sent to me this morning. You see down the lines the letters "V.G.," which mean "very good." They present these to you with pride. You say, perhaps, to a man, "Not a scratch against you?" He agrees and says, "I have been in the Navy so many years and have never had a scratch against me." That is the old system. What is the present system? It is that instead of the old "V.G." they put in the words, "Exceptional," "Superior" or "Satisfactory," as the case may be. Just imagine a man out of the Navy who is seeking employment. His employer asks to see his parchment. It is shown to him, not with the list of "V.Gs.," to which I have referred, but in the case of one ship "Exceptional," another ship, "Superior," another ship, "Satisfactory." They all mean the same thing—"very good." The men do not like the system. They say, "Give us back our old system which we understand and which so long has done us good." The award of "Exceptional" is supposed to carry with it special advantages, but there are many concrete cases in which men have been awarded "Exceptional" with no result whatever. There are serving now in the Navy men who were awarded "Exceptional" continuously since the introduction of the system in 1910. There is serving now in the Navy a Chief Petty Officer who has been awarded "Exceptional" for ability continuously since its introduction in 1910, who has passed both professionally and educationally for warrant rank, has been recommended continually for promotion yearly and half-yearly and also recommended for promotion by a senior flag officer more than
once during the War. That man has not gained a single day's advantage. Surely it is a very severe test of loyalty. Why has he not had promotion? Such instances only show that it is not always the highest recommendation and courage which bring promotion.
There is a new branch of the Service called the Supply Branch. It is to be responsible for naval stores and ultimately, I suppose, for general messing. A knowledge of storekeeping and account keeping will necessarily be a requisite qualification. I presume it is not intended to introduce a costly system of commissioned officers for the branch? There are many excellent and capable chief petty officers anxious to secure promotion to warrant rank. Will they be given a chance as officers of the new branch? If practical experience is necessary the engineer's yeomen, who possess a knowledge of naval stores, might be given a course of instruction in the same way as the present secretaries' course. My hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke) has touched upon a number of subjects to which I had intended to refer. I had proposed to speak on marriage allowance, on the uniform upkeep system, on railway concessions, submarine pay and post-War widows pensions, and on the relative rank of Warrant Officers. I will not say anything on these subjects beyond stating that I agree entirely with what my hon. Friend has stated. I will refer specially to the schoolmasters. They are a very badly treated body of men in the Navy, they are insufficient in numbers, their pay is the poorest of any class similar in rank to themselves, they have no relative rank, they are the only body of men of that class who do not get the pay of their rank. Altogether their case is one which arouses the sympathy of every branch in the Service and everyone in the Service looks to this as one of the worst and unkindest cases dealt with by the Admiralty. Let me be just to the Admiralty. I am inclined to think it is not altogether the fault of the Admiralty. I believe the Admiralty have recommended that these officers should have the treatment they deserve and that only the Treasury blocks the way. It is one of the many cases that is said to be under consideration. The words "under consideration" are almost by-words now in naval matters. I hope that all these things
which I have put before the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty on behalf of the men of the lower deck will receive that sympathetic treatment which I am sure they deserve.

Viscountess ASTOR: It is very difficult to speak at this hour of the evening about the Navy, particularly as everyone who has spoken before has taken all my subjects. There is not one single thing left for me to mention. I should like, however, to deal with the House of Commons' attitude towards the Navy. That seems to be the most important thing I can do. Had this been a question of drink restrictions or trade unions, the Benches of the House would be filled, but as it is a simple question of the British Navy, look at the House! It is really a proper disgrace, as they say in Devonshire. Labour Members are the worst of the whole lot. They do not even seem to know that we have a British Navy. Not one of them has spoken, except the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Rose), and they want to do away with him. It is a most extraordinary thing that we have sat here all day, and every man or woman who wants to speak on the Navy has become rather acrimonious. The hon. Member for Devonport (Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke) dealt with the right hon. Member for South Molton (Mr. Lambert), and gave him a thrashing. The Member for Dunfermline Burghs (Mr. Wallace) said that I should deal with milk and babies, and leave the Navy alone. If he drank more milk and less lemonade he would perhaps be more polite to the only woman Member who is at the moment in the House.
Although I represent Plymouth, which is the most important dockyard port in the Kingdom, I want to congratulate the First Lord on his extraordinarily able statement, and I should like also to congratulate the Parliamentary Secretary. Like every Member of the House who has any vision, I am delighted at the result of the Washington Conference. We who are interested in the Navy know there is something bigger even than the Navy, and that is the peace of the world, and what was done at the Washington Conference has gone a long way towards establishing the peace of the world. It is hard on those who represent dockyard constituencies and naval men that there should be these reductions. It is a
popular thing to say we do not want the British Navy to be reduced, but it is all nonsense. If by reducing the British Navy we can get peace in the world, the British Navy will be the very first people to welcome it.
I do not propose to deal with the ships, but I should like to say something about the men in the ships. We are told that the question of post-War widows' pensions is "under consideration." I must say that the Admiralty is the most considerate place in the world because they are always considering. They are marvellous. Everything with them is "under consideration," but I do not blame the Admiralty and I do not blame the Treasury. I blame the House of Commons. If they backed up the Admiralty and got at the Treasury these things would not be so long under consideration. Then there is the question of the recognition of ranks, a matter which may seem small to the Admiralty but is really rather important as far as the lower deck men are concerned. The Hyde-Parker Committee recommended that there should be a clean cut for the warrant officers, that there should be warrant rank and warrant officers, and that they should be called officers. The Admiralty never carried that out, and what has been the result? I will give you an instance to show how this affects warrant officers, who are really of the same rank as second lieutenants in the Army, but who, if they seek help in time of trouble from the Officers' Family Fund are told they are not officers. This is the case of a man, a retired gunner, invalided in 1920, married, and with three children. He desired to obtain a small grant in order to set up a poultry farm. That is where he was wrong, because chickens are very difficult things to deal with. However, he applied to the officers' association for advice and assistance, and was informed that he was not recognised as an officer, and therefore could not be assisted. He was advised to apply to the Grand Fleet Fund and other like associations, who in turn informed him that being an officer he could not be assisted from their funds. That man applied to several associations, but all to no purpose. It would not be difficult for the Admiralty to deal with this matter, and it would help in many cases of genuine hardship among warrant officers, who are, in every respect, officers.
Messing and cabin accommodation, though it does not seem very important either, is also a question which should receive attention. A warrant officer certainly ought to have cabin accommodation. They have important work to do, and nothing is more difficult than having to do work when there is no place where one can do it alone. Storekeepers have got this privilege.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: Storekeeper warrant officers.

Viscountess ASTOR: Storekeeper warrant officers, but not the others. I believe even the captain's cook has a cabin to himself, and, of course, we all know it is important to make your cook happy, but this is equally important in regard to warrant officers. The stagnation in promotion on the lower deck has been dealt with by the hon. Member for Central Portsmouth (Sir T. Bramsdon). Those who have anything to do with the lower deck know that, although the letter of the Admiralty law is in favour of promotion, the spirit is really very much against it. I know there are great difficulties in the way, and difficulties with regard to the men themselves, but every man who goes into the British Navy ought to feel that by merit and good conduct he can get to the top. That is the only way in which you can have a first-class all-round ship. In the case of your own business you would want a young fellow coming into it to see that by merit and real work he can rise to the top, and the same thing applies to the Navy. It may sound too democratic, but it has been applied to the Army with great success, and I hope that the Admiralty will see that those who oppose it in spirit, though not in letter, will be moved on to a higher grade.
In regard to the schoolmasters that is very important. Some of the hon. Members who have spoken for the Navy are against education. I am for both, and it is a most important thing that the men who are giving the education in the Navy should have contented minds. They have got the chance of filling the minds of the men with whatever they like, and to have your schoolmasters lower paid than other corresponding ranks is a very great mistake, but that also is "under consideration," and we are hopeful. I am quite certain that the American and Japanese Navies, although they are cut-
ting down, are not cutting down in the educational facilities they are affording. The welfare of the Navy is also important. It seems to me, if you are really going to set up a Welfare Committee, where the men can air their grievances, which, after all, are not revolutionary or Bolshevist, but are quite genuine grievances, they surely ought to be represented by the men whom they select and not by men selected by the Commander-in-Chief. Look at the Labour party and the trades unions! You would not dare deal with them in that way. They send their own representatives when it comes to a lockout or a strike, and although, of course, I am not talking about the Navy striking or being locked out, if they have grievances which they think are genuine, surely the Admiralty ought to let them select their own men. Also I would recommend them to have a meeting more than once every two years. I know the Parliamentary Secretary is in deep sympathy, and I am relying upon him, and most of the enlightened members of the Admiralty see how very necessary it is. In regard to marriage allowances, that also is very important. It has been urged in the House frequently—twice to-night. I see the Report of the First Lord has cut it out entirely, but surely that is not quite right. The marriage allowance has been criticised by the Admiralty as novel in principle and a departure from the good old principle of paying for the value of services rendered, but this is what we say: Do you value the services of naval officers less than those of the Army and Air Force? If you cannot have marriage allowances, please make children's allowances until you can give marriage allowances.
I shall not keep the Committee any longer. I have been very much impressed with their boredom all the evening, but I do beg the Admiralty, if we have got to have a one-Power Navy—and it is quite right; we only want a one-Power Navy—let us see that it is the best one-Power Navy in the world, and you cannot get that until you look into every branch and see that the men are contented and feel that their grievances will come up and be dealt with sympathetically. It all depends on the Admiralty. I cannot see that the Navy will ever get much support from the House, until probably there comes another menace to the country, and then they will all come and sing songs
about the good old British Navy. I may not know much about battleships, but I do know about marriage allowances, and married officers and their wives, and, the lower deck men, and I beg the Admiralty, in all their reforms and economies, not to economise on the things that are absolutely vital to the moral of the Navy.

Mr. HOHLER: Speaking from my experience of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, I know I can rely on anything reasonable that is brought forward, at any rate being reasonably dealt with and sympathetically considered by him. The only point to which I really want to direct attention is, what is to be done with the men? I regard the whole seriousness of this Estimate to be the compulsory retirement of a large number of officers and men. We have had no indication to-night as to the basis on which it is proposed to deal with them. Had I, as an able seaman or an officer, entered this Service and found my career cut off in early life, it would be to me the greatest grievance I could have. Every seaman who entered the Navy entered it with the certainty that he could, at the expiration of his 12 years, subject to good character, be entitled to be re-engaged. What are you going to do with these men? I am all for economy, but are you really going to effect an economy on this basis? Just look at your own figures and see what the position is. I find, from the records I have looked at, that the numbers borne in the Navy in 1913 were 142,000 men. We now propose to reduce them to 98,000. That is an enormous reduction. As I gather, it was proposed that this year the number should be 118,000 officers and men, and we are going to reduce them to 98,000. There are 20,000 men whose careers, in my judgment, are absolutely wrecked by this proposal.
While you are saving the money, as it is thought—I will not say by the Admiralty, because, having read the statement of the First Lord, I gather most clearly that he is wholly opposed to it, and I do not blame the Admiralty—I do ask the Government, while yet it is not too late, that something may be done. You are, on the one hand, turning out these men and ending their careers, many of them not being qualified for any skilled vocation in life; the bulk of them will not be mechanics or artisans, and you are throwing out 20,000 men on a market full of
unemployment at the present time. Take the county of Kent. They are making new roads and finding employment for unemployed people, yet you are proposing to turn out from the Navy some 20,000 men. I find that the Vote for Non-Effective services of officers and men in 1913–14 was £2,400,000, whereas you are increasing the Non-Effective Vote up to £9,000,000. Where is the real economy? I protest that you cannot see that although you are making allowance in these non-effective services you are not making effective allowance. Why? Because these Estimates are based on your taking 118,000 men in the Navy. I doubt very much whether you estimated for this further reduction to 98,000 officers and men. Would it not be much better to allow these men to be reduced by natural wastage so far as you can? If the time comes when trade improves and there is further employment in the country and you can be fairly satisfied that they will be able to get jobs surely that would be the time to ask them to go? At present there is little or no immediate prospect of employment and they will have to go to the Labour Ministry and take the dole.
The truth is that the Geddes Report—quite rightly from their point of view—was directed to the question of money, not to the other considerations as to what would happen to these men after they are discharged. The same thing may largely be said about the 10,000 men about to be discharged from the various yards. I realise that the Admiralty and the Government have dealt most sympathetically and, in my view, most generously with the dockyards and the employment of labour there, but what I do ask myself, knowing the condition of the dockyard which happens to be largely within my own constituency, knowing that there is great unemployment—I am getting pathetic letters every day as to the position of these men who are thrown out—what on earth are they to do? They have worked well under the Government, some of them for many, many years. I find that the Admiralty in their statement say—it comes under Vote 8, Section 2—that they are greatly in need of certain works, but that they have cut down that which they thought it necessary to do to the very minimum. I was wondering that if these works are really needed, whether it would
not be well for the Admiralty to point out to the Government that they could easily employ these men on certain of the works which are actually needed, and this will save paying the dole. Surely something of the kind might be done. You are making a nominal or perhaps a substantial saving partly on the Naval Estimates, whereas in truth you are going to increase the grant that you will have to pay for unemployment. These are the two points I wanted to make, and I trust that we shall have put before us the principle and the scale on which these men are to be discharged from the Navy.

Viscount CURZON: It has not been possible for me to take part in the general discussion owing to the necessity of having to keep the terms of the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend, which I seconded. But I do want to say just this on the Navy Estimates. I have read the First Lord's explanatory Memorandum with the greatest possible care, and it seems to me we are going in for what cannot be described in any other words but a most desperate gamble in regard to British sea power. Whatever you may do with armies, you cannot improvise navies. Therefore it behoves everyone of us who cares for his country jealously to look at any reduction that may be proposed in the Navy. I cannot at this time of night go into the merits or demerits of the capital ships. There is a great case, I think, to be made out for the postponement of the building of one of the capital ships, but I am rather sorry the Admiralty are going to lay down both at the same time. I do hope that the Admiralty will take care as to our supplies of oil fuel. After all, in 1914 we were able to justify a weak Army by the fact that we had a strong Navy. Yesterday in this House I listened to the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for North Devon (Sir H. Wilson), who gave us to understand clearly that we had a weaker Army than we have ever had in our recent history. Coupled with that to-day, you are going to have the weakest Navy you have had for a very long time. I do not anticipate war, but I maintain that just as armies are intended to prevent war, so are navies. The worst form of economy is a navy not strong enough to win a war. There is one way in which a navy can be reduced in numbers and yet make up for its weakness, and that is by increased
mobility. If you are going to economise on oil fuel, that is about the most dangerous economy you can make. Out down your numbers if you like, but do not interfere with the fuel supplies of the Navy. You cannot gamble with the Navy, and I beg the hon. Gentleman who represents the Admiralty to make note of the opinion expressed so freely to-day that, whatever you do about building battleships, be careful that you do not unduly reduce our fuel supplies. You are going to have a small Navy which, we have been told, is to be cut down to the bone. Let us see that that Navy is at least 100 per cent. efficient, and that cannot be achieved unless your fuel supplies will enable that Fleet to fight on its own establishment, and be able to operate in any quarter of the globe.
Another point I wish to mention is that of complements. You are going to reduce the complements of the Atlantic Fleet by 15.7 per cent. The present establishment of those ships was laid down as a result of our war experience, and if you are going to cut down those complements now, it will be a very dangerous thing. You will have to reduce the men at the guns and all round, and that is a most dangerous economy, because the Fleet cannot fight properly unless it is fully manned. I warn the Parliamentary Secretary, from my own personal knowledge, that it is a most dangerous, economy to reduce the complements of his first line ships. Before the Admiralty finally settles this matter, I beg the hon. Gentleman to go into the question with the greatest possible care. I hope the Admiralty will find some other way of economising instead of reducing the complements of the first line ships.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I am in rather a difficulty because I believe the Financial Secretary is waiting to reply on some of the points raised. I will not detain him long. The speech we have just listened to is the first protest I have heard from the great Unionist party against the cutting down of the Navy, in the words of the spokesman of the Admiralty, "at great risk" I am almost inclined to make a protest for them: a little of the old Adam is apt to creep back now and again. I want to say this in no unfriendly spirit, that it is possible to economise on ships, oil fuel
and dockyards with much greater safety than on personnel. We may get our dockyard work done in private yards—as much of that was done during the War; we can improvise oil fuel stores by sending floating oil tank ships, we can improvise ships, especially auxiliary vessels, but we cannot improvise personnel Whatever we economise on I do object to economising on men—and seagoing men especially. I hope, too, that the swinging of the Geddes' axe will not be made an excuse for reducing the real staff—the thinking Department—at the Admiralty. There is a certain school of thought among the civilians at the Admiralty that naval men ought not to be on the staff there. We built up that staff in the face of the fiercest opposition during the throes of the great War. The idea that only one limbed, blind, or deaf naval men should find employment on the thinking staff of the Admiralty is a terrible fallacy and the worst possible economy we can make.
May I mention a few economies which might be made without loss of efficiency? If I were so unfortunate as to find myself in the position of my right hon. and gallant Friend—which I hope I never shall be—these are the economies which I would put forward. Take the dockyards in the first place. We do really want a strong man at the Admiralty to deal with the dockyard question. We have two redundant dockyards which we could get rid of to-morrow, and it would be a real economy to pay the workmen in them a pound a week for the remainder of their lives and to close the yards. One is Rosyth, and the other is Chatham, with its satellite, Sheerness. I know the Government may lose two or three seats by doing this, for political influence is serious in these matters. An hon. Friend reminds me of the case of Pembroke. That is simply a scandal, as by the political influence of the Welsh Members we have been keeping going for a long time, and at great expense, a yard which should have been closed long ago. I am afraid the fact that the candidate for the next election is the son of the Prime Minister will not make it any easier to get the Pembroke dockyard cut down. We are, however, facing facts. It is redundant, and the Navy is not a charity organisation. The fact that a township
has grown up which depends on Pembroke is no reason for keeping it on.
Then there is another direction in which economy could be effected. Dartmouth and all its works—and I speak as an old "Britannia" cadet—ought to be closed down and done away with, and we should rely upon special-entry public schoolboy cadets. I have had experience, as a midshipman and as an officer in charge, of both, and my view, which I believe is borne out by officers in the Navy, is that there is little to choose between them. If anything, the public schoolboys are rather better. Their physique is better, and in many cases they show more initiative. That would also open the avenue to the poorer boys in the country, who could enter the Navy by this means if they can only pass the examinations and go through the mill, and it would withdraw a great grievance from poor people in the country. It is a much cheaper way of getting officers for the Navy. The idea of taking boys of 13 and training them at Dartmouth to be naval officers is an exploded idea. It is not necessary. During the War very excellent work was done by these boys who came straight from the public schools.
Then a reduction might be made in shore appointments held by naval officers. I am not referring to the Admiralty now, but to the dockyards and to various artificial posts which did not exist before the War. In March, 1914, there were 78 post-captains employed in shore jobs; to-day there are 114. In 1914 there were 14 post-captains doing war courses; to-day there are 36. It is all right about the war courses, but I can see no justification for having an extra 30 officers in shore appointments. Moreover, there is still the same number of flag officers in shore appointments to-day, although the personnel is smaller than it was before the War. These appointments could be reduced without any loss of efficiency.
The suggestion which I am now about to make will, I know, not be received with approval in some quarters, for it-is very drastic. I think you can afford to-day to halve your battle squadrons, so desperate is the need for economy. You could keep one battle squadron in commission, but I do not see that you need one in the Mediterranean, or,
if you do, you could do without one in the Atlantic. I would do much more of the sea training of officers and men in destroyers and submarines. They would get a much better training in that way. In fact, I do not think you can make sailors in Dreadnoughts; the only real sailors are made in small ships. I admit that there would be a loss of efficiency, but if it is a question of choosing, I would rather have more destroyers and fewer battleships, especially as we can rest on our oars for two or three years without fear of war. You can always commission a battle squadron again if the clouds darken on the international horizon. Then with regard to the two ships which are to be laid down in 1923, the Admiralty have been urged from several quarters to postpone that. Even if you do have to build them at the end of the eight or nine years—which I doubt very much, because people are beginning to understand that there will be no place for battleships in the next war; battle cruisers, possibly, but it will be a war of submarines and light cruisers and aircraft—you will be able to build much more modern ships, because you will be researching and improving all the time. I hope the Admiralty are not going in for the policy of nucleus crew ships, though I see that these are beginning to figure again in their published memoranda and in the "Navy List." That policy is inefficient and demoralising and bad in every way. It is better either to pay the ships off entirely or to keep them in full commission. I have had experience of both.
There are a great many other matters about which one would like to speak on this occasion, but I am afraid we have been rather jockeyed out of our proper naval discussion to-day. I hope we shall have a better opportunity when the full Estimates have been placed in our hands.

Mr. AMERY: Hon. Members will hardly expect me to reply in the two or three minutes that remain to the very wide and interesting discussion which has taken place on these Estimates. I need only say that I shall certainly consider very carefully the many important points which have been raised, and as there will be future opportunities for discussion I hope to be able to give fuller answers to those points then than I could possibly have given to-night, even if I had risen somewhat earlier. The only thing I
should like to say, in reference to the last two or three speeches—leaving aside the rather technical controversy as between putting battleships to reserve and reducing complements, on which to some extent the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Central Hull (Lieut. -Commander Kenworthy) answered the Noble Lord the Member for Battersea (Viscount Curzon)—is that I quite agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken that the question of personnel is, in its essence, the most important of all. The efficiency of the men is really the finally deciding factor. The building up of an efficient system of training, the efficient training and working together of these men in a battle fleet, so that you get in those supreme minutes in which the fates of navies and of empires may be decided loyal cooperation, mutual understanding, and discipline—all these matter more than anything else. I quite agree also that you are running grave risks if you cut down the personnel below the numbers requisite to maintain its high state of efficiency and to make it capable of forming a nucleus for expansion if the danger should arise. I should like to introduce just one qualification to that in present circumstances. We have to-day a larger reservoir of men who have been through the navy owing to the circumstances of the Great War than any country in the world, and, in any case, during the next few years we can expand on the nucleus of the present regular Navy more quickly than any other power conceivably could expand. Of course, it is very difficult to secure large economies in any direction unless you also reduce your personnel very much. Therefore, with all these considerations in view, while cutting down in every other direction, we were also bound to cut down very considerably in the matter of personnel.
The only other part on which I wish to say anything was raised by my hon. and learned Friend for Gillingham (Mr. Hohler), and I think his contribution, though very brief, was perhaps the most important to our Debate to-night, because it raised what to my mind is the most difficult and at the same time the most vital question in this whole matter. It is the question of what are we in justice and equity going to do with these men whom we wish to leave the Service during the coming year. Also, a question no
less important is whether if we do treat them with any reasonable consideration, whether we do it through the Navy or whether it is done in a much more sorry fashion through unemployment relief and other forms of public assistance, we are saving as much as we may think. The only answer I can give to that latter point is that, undoubtedly, these economies can never have the whole effect they appear to have at first sight. There is another side to the account. The only thing that can be said is that the need for economy is so great, and the advantage of reducing taxation so substantial in the improvement of industry, that even the differential advantage gained may be worth a great deal in the present economic crisis. On the other point I would only say one word. I would remind my hon. and learned Friend that we hope to get rid, as far as the Navy is concerned, of a very large proportion of our ratings by ordinary wastage and by stagnation of recruiting. I think three-quarters of the 20,000 can be secured in that way. We also hope the terms which we shall offer will be so reasonable, taking into account the varying circumstances of the men's lives and their possible opportunities outside, that to a large extent they may voluntarily accept and thus reduce to the very minimum the difficult question of finally deciding who, among those who are not willing to go, will have to be given reasonable and fair compensation, but still have to be told that the Naval Service can no longer make use of them. Then again we recognise that where we have contracts, moral as well as legal, we have to give every consideration. Having said this much I hope I may appeal to the Committee to give us this Vote A and the Vote on Account to-night. I think the discussion has very fairly covered the broad general statement contained in the skeleton Vote and in the First Lord's memorandum. I hope as soon as possible the detailed Estimates will be in hon. Members' hands and then we may have more detailed and more adequate discussions.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I think I can suggest one way in which we could help this absorption of men and that is to ante-date the pensions by a year. If you secured that for the marines,
stokers and bluejackets that would be something to the good.

Mr. HOHLER: But I suggest that this must be discussed when we see what the proposals are. They are really most important.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: I agree. If we can have our scheme later on we shall have the benefit of the hon. and learned Gentleman's advice. I only wish to put the suggestion forward because we get so few opportunities on the Navy. We got the Speaker out of the Chair by 8 o'clock, which is unprecedented in the history of the House. It shows the lack of interest in naval affairs. A lot of officers will have to go in the prime of life—men of intelligence, who have travelled, and many of them linguists. They will have a much better chance of getting good employment if they could be given commercial courses in the great commercial cities of the North. I should like to see started commercial classes for the last six months before they go. Give them six months' warning, and send them to Manchester or Liverpool, and let them have a course of commercial practice, and when they go it would be much easier for them to get employment. That is a suggestion for the officers. Whether anything of the same sort could be done for the men depends on my Friends on the right. If the trade unions are prepared to allow these men to be trained, it will be a great aid to them to get employment when they leave the Service.

Question put, and agreed to.

VOTE ON ACCOUNT.

Resolved,
That a sum, not exceeding £12,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, on Account, for defraying the Charges for Navy Services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1923.

NAVY (EXCESSES), 1920–21.

Resolved,
That a sum, not exceeding £1,632,990 8s. 6d., be granted to His Majesty, to make good Excesses of Navy Expenditure beyond the Grants, for the year ended on the 31st day of March, 1921.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.

Committee to sit again To-morrow.

BOARD OF EDUCATION SCHEME (DEWSBURY ENDOWED SCHOOLS FOUNDATION) CONFIRMATION BILL.

Order for Second Reading read.

The PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY to the BOARD of EDUCATION (Mr. Herbert Lewis): I beg to move, "That the Bill be now read a Second time."
This is a Bill to confirm a scheme which has been made by the Board of Education for a school for boys and a school for girls at Dewsbury. So far I have heard of no objection to the Bill which has now been before the House for a month. The Government has been unanimously asked for the Bill.

Sir F. BANBURY: I do not know that I understand the Bill, but in deference to the request of the hon. Gentleman I will not object to the Second Reading.

Question put, and agreed to.

Bill read a Second time, and committed to a Standing Committee.

The remaining Orders were read, and postponed.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That this House do now adjourn."—[Colonel Leslie Wilson.]

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I want to inform the House what will be the course of business on Monday. I have received from the right hon. Member for Platting (Mr Clynes) the information that he and those for whom he speaks, think that it is desirable to have a discussion on the dispute in the engineering trade, and the possible extension of that dispute. Accordingly, I propose to move the Adjournment of the House first thing after Questions on Monday, to enable that discussion to be taken, on the understanding that the Motion will be disposed of by General Consent not later than Eight o'clock and that we shall then proceed with the Estimates.

Commander BELLAIRS: Is the policy of the Government being challenged by the Labour party, or what is the case? Are we to have a mere discussion or will the Government be challenged?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: I do not think, so far as I understand it, that it is a desire of the right hon. Gentleman and his Friends to move anything in the nature of a Vote of Censure on the Government, though I am not in a position to say that they may not challenge the policy of the Government or may not criticise the position of the Government in the matter. I am convinced that when a demand of this kind comes, so supported, in face of what is nothing less than a calamity to the nation, it would be unwise for one in my position to take up on behalf of Parliament the attitude that we have no time to give consideration to this matter. There are people in this country who would be only too glad to challenge the authority of this House. We must not play into their hands. Personally, I have already said that I am sorry the discussion should be asked for. I am rather afraid that the consequences of the discussion may be harmful rather than helpful, but when it is asked for, and asked for by the Leader of the Labour party, I think that I should put the House and not merely the Government in a false position if, it being in my power to give an opportunity, I refused to do so.

Major WHELER: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Estimates that will be taken on Monday will be the Agricultural Estimates?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: The Estimates will be as I stated at Question time to-day.

MEXICO (BRITISH INTERESTS).

Major C. LOWTHER: I desire to revert to two questions which I asked yesterday of the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the subject of British interests, in Mexico, to which I received, as I thought, a very unsatisfactory answers. The questions were, regarding the claims of British subjects in Mexico and what was being done for the settlement of them, and I gather I am not over stating the answer when I say that nothing definite has as yet been settled as regards these questions. There originated, as I understand, from Mexico a suggestion that all British subjects who had suffered loss from the revolutions in Mexico dating from 1910 should have their claims examined by what is known as a mixed Commission, to be composed partly of
nominees of Great Britain and partly of nominees of the Mexican Government with an independent chairman. In October last I happened to be in Mexico City and, by a strange coincidence, I happened to be in the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs when a telegram sent by the Mexican agent here arrived from London stating the stipulations which His Majesty's Government made regarding this mixed Commission. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was good enough to show me the telegram. The stipulations were, roughly, that the independent chairman should be a Chilean, and that there was some demur as to whether the payments should be made ex gratia or de jure. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me then and there, "These proposals are entirely acceptable, and I shall instruct our agent in London so to inform His Majesty's Government. About the same time I had the honour of seeing the President of the Mexican Republic, and he said to me definitely, "As soon as His Majesty's Government appoint commissioners on the mixed Commission, we, the Mexican Government, are prepared to examine all claims of British subjects who have suffered loss since 1910, and to satisfy them."
According to the answer I received yesterday, I understand that negotiations have been in progress, and His Majesty's Government hope shortly to communicate to the Mexican representative a draft scheme containing a modification of the original proposals to the Mexican Government. Considering that the Commission was proposed by His Majesty's Government, and that the terms of the Commission were agreed to by the Mexican Government in October last, I cannot see why the Commission should not have been already appointed, and the claims of British subjects examined and a number of them satisfied by now. The same offer was made to every country which had nationals who had claims of that kind, and a number of the Commissions have been appointed and they are now working. There is only one reason which I can think of why His Majesty's Government have not appointed their Commissioners, and it is that through what without offence I may be allowed to term an obstinacy
almost inconceivable His Majesty's Government will not recognise the Mexican Government. They fear that by appointing Commissioners to a mixed Commission they will be taking a step towards the recognition of the Mexican Government. I have not time now to enter into that very vexed question. When the Foreign Office Vote comes before the Committee of this House I hope to deal with the subject.
That brings me to the second question I asked yesterday, and this I must deal with rather more delicately, I am sorry to say—and all the more sorry because the gentleman himself, of course, from the nature of things, cannot be here to answer mc—I am sorry to say that His Majesty's representative in Mexico City is not doing his best to mantain cordial relations between the two countries. It is not a light thing to make a charge of this kind, but I am prepared to make it and to stand by it. I was informed last autumn that the Mexican Government had requested His Majesty's Government to have this gentleman recalled because he was endangering the friendly relations between the two countries. I understand that the Foreign Office asked for the reasons. They were informed that his notes to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to the President, were exceedingly impertinent, and that to them he was not persona grata. I had an opportunity of seeing the Mexican officials concerned. I was definitely informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that under no circumstances would he admit that gentleman to the Foreign Office. I was told by the President that they would not allow him into the National Palace. I referred to the list of foreign representatives, official and unofficial, which is published in Mexico City, and his name is not included. I went to British residents in Mexico City, and they one and all told me the same tale. They said: "We do not have recourse to him because we do not stand a chance of having our case properly considered by the Mexican Government if we did. That was rather a serious charge. I had an opportunity of seeing this gentleman. I do not know whether I ought to enlarge on this point. Anyhow, I may say that he made it perfectly manifest to me that his attitude to Mexico was one of intense hostility. I was very reluctant to believe a number of accusations which
were levelled against him by the Mexican Government, and I do not now do so. But without fear of exaggeration I say that his conduct is most imprudent, that he has unfortunately got himself identified with the enemies of the present Mexican Government. There is no hon. Member who does not know that in a State such as Mexico there is a number of what some would call comic opera generals. Hon. Members do not need my assurance that they play an important part in the politics of the country. Unfortunately our representative there has got himself identified with those generals who are supposed to be actively hostile to the Mexican Government.
Can the House wonder that the Mexican Government object to the presence of this gentleman in Mexico City? That in itself is a very serious matter from our point of view, but it is serious from other points of view. The fact that official diplomatic relations cannot be restored with Mexico is militating against the development of British interests in Mexico. Perhaps I shall surprise the House when I tell them that British interests in Mexico exceed by over 17,000,000 dollars American interests in that country. Most of the loans have been floated in Europe and we hold the greater part of the Mexican bonds. The Mexican railway has been financed by British financiers. A great deal of oil has been exploited in that country on British capital. The light and power, the trams, and hundreds of industrial enterprises in that country have in them British capital. So we cannot afford, through the hostility of a representative in Mexico City, to imperil our interests in that country. The irony of it all is that this gentleman is receiving the full salary of a Minister plenipotentiary; be is receiving £3,000 a year free of tax, and, in addition to that, the Legation, which is one of the best houses in Mexico City. I earnestly represent to the Foreign Office that these present hard times, these days when it is necessary for us to develop to the utmost our industries and to export as much as we possibly can to foreign countries, are not the time when we should hesitate to take action and to examine very carefully the state of affairs which has been brought about, as I verily believe, by this gentle-
man, who is our unofficial representative in Mexico.

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Cecil Harmsworth): My hon. and gallant Friend has for a very long time shown a great interest in Mexico. It is very much to his credit that he should take an interest in a great and important country which comes very little under the consideration of this House. He has asked from time to time a number of questions and has exhibited a very great familiarity with the recent history of that country and with its natural resources. I very much regret that he should have taken this occasion to animadvert in terms so serious on a gentleman who is in a diplomatic position as representing this country in Mexico. I wish he had given me some notice of the particular charges which he was about to make against Mr. Cummins, who is chargé des archives in Mexico City.

Major LOWTHER: May I interrupt my right hon. Friend to say that the charges were indicated in my second question yesterday. I think I did give my hon. Friend notice I was going to raise further questions.

Mr. HARMSWORTH: With respect, I do not think my hon. and gallant Friend indicated in that question the serious nature of the accusations he has made against Mr. Cummins. What does he say? He says Mr. Cummins is not admitted to the Foreign Office in Mexico. I am not in a position to affirm or deny that statement at this moment, but I should be much surprised if I learned that my hon. and gallant Friend is well informed in regard to that matter. He has spoken of the intense hostility of His Majesty's representative in Mexico City to the present Mexican Government. I think he sought to prove to the House that this intense hostility did exist. I should think that one of the gravest charges that can be brought against a diplomatic representative of this country in a foreign country is that he was animated by intense hostility to the Government to which he is attached. My hon. Friend has gone further. He has said that Mr. Cummins is identified with general officers who are hostile to the present Government of Mexico. I can only say these two last allegations come to me as a surprise. I think I may repudiate both of these suggestions.
My hon. and gallant Friend has gone a little out of his way to object to the salary which Mr. Cummins is at present receiving. Expenses, as he knows, are very high in Mexico, and Mr. Cummins, who although he has a diplomatic position, has not that of an accredited Minister, nevertheless occupies the legation, which must be maintained, and so far as our diplomatic arrangements in Mexico extend, is in full charge of them. I do not think, in the present circumstances, having regard to the cost of living in Mexico at the present time, that his salary of £3,000 a year is to be taken serious exception to. It is the ordinary salary of a Minister accredited to a country such as, Mexico. However, I am free to admit with my hon. and gallant Friend that our relations with the Mexican Government are unsatisfactory. This fact is the occasion of much regret to His Majesty's Government, who have always been anxious to recognise the Mexican Government as soon as they are convinced of its stability and of its intention to remedy the losses incurred by British firms and interests. I will not enumerate again, as I have on former occasions, the cases in regard to which His Majesty's Government have from time to time made representations to the Mexican Government, and will content myself with reminding the House of two special circumstances.
The House will remember that the Government of President Huerta was recognised by His Majesty's Government. Succeeding Mexican Governments have failed to acknowledge the loans raised by the Huerta Government. My non. and gallant Friend is as well acquainted with that fact as any hon Member. Again, I take only one salient instance. The Inter-Oceanic and Southern Railways taken over by the Carranza Government have not been returned to their proprietors.

Major LOWTHER: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman is not aware that the proprietors of the Inter-Oceanic and Southern Railways are the Mexican Government themselves. They own over 53 per cent. of the shares.

Mr. HARMSWORTH: I only know that no dividends are paid to the other shareholders.

Major LOWTHER: That is perfectly correct, but the majority share proprietors are the Mexican Government themselves.

Mr. HARMSWORTH: I am anxious not to dwell on these inconvenient circumstances. I have no desire to dwell at any length on the outstanding points of difference between the two Governments, serious enough as some of these matters are. I trust that we are already in prospect of a more hopeful condition of things. As the House has already been informed, and again by my hon. and gallant Friend this evening, negotiations have been in progress between the two Governments with the object of concluding an agreement for submission to an arbitral tribunal of all British claims against the Mexican Government, and it is hoped that at an early date a draft of this Agreement will be submitted to the Mexican Government for their consideration and acceptance. We sincerely desire to come to better terms with Mexico. In that great country we have many interests, and there has long existed and, I am glad to say, still exists, between the two peoples a feeling of mutual respect and esteem. For the moment there are hindrances and stumbling blocks in the way of a closer and more intimate understanding. I hope that these will soon be removed, and that we may be able to look forward with confidence to a return to those happier conditions of former days that were advantageous alike to us and to the Mexican people. I do not think that I can usefully say anything further in reply to the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend. This is a difficult and delicate matter. Anyone who has to speak on behalf of the Government must very carefully weigh every word he uses, and I hope the House, if not my hon. and gallant Friend, will be content for the moment with the statement that I have made this evening.

Question put, and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at Twenty-five Minutes after Eleven o'clock.